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 [I]t is clear that there is no classification of the Universe not being arbitrary and 
full of conjectures. The reason for this is very simple:  
we do not know what thing the universe is . . . .  
We are allowed to go further; we can suspect that there is no universe  
in the organic, unifying sense that this ambitious term has.  
If there is a universe, its aim is not conjectured yet;  
we have not yet conjectured the words,  
the definitions, the etymologies, the synonyms, 
— Jorge Luis Borges 
 
“I prefer it ‘open.’” 
— Lynette Hunter 
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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation considers the ways in which artists working with living 
animals articulate the complex and paradoxical nature of human-animal 
relationships. The examples used are from signature moments in the more recent 
past, with an emphasis the interactions of contemporary European and American 
artists. Works considered include circus acts, natural history dioramas, and pieces 
by Bartabas, Joseph Beuys, Carolyn Carlson, Catherine Chalmers, Hubert Duprat, 
David Nita Little, Joanna Mendl Shaw, and David Wojnarowicz.  
Various discursive and knowledge systems are at play in these works, and 
affect how the animals are treated and how they are represented. This project also 
challenges the cultural construction we call nature. Much effort has been put into 
avoiding the hazards of positivism, duality, and relativism. In spite of the 
inevitably limiting cultural and historical constraints, my aim is to generate some 
usable knowledge that informs how we understand the languages of art and 
philosophy and engage with systems of knowledge, especially as it concerns our 
ethical and aesthetic relationships with animals, including other humans.  
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Combining artistic and deconstructive practices within the theoretical 
framework of situated textualities reveals the richly complex yet tenuous nature of 
our relationships. The art works considered here express misunderstandings, 
tensions, connections, and the potential for transformation, sometimes 
simultaneously. Deconstruction is used as a prism to reveal a spectrum of insights, 
where what once seemed familiar now points toward the unknown, ignored, or 
overlooked. Situated textualities, which insists that a complex matrix of practices, 
materials, beings, and contexts must also be taken into account, offers openings 
for tacit and sensory ways of knowing, which both complement and resist the 
limits of rational analysis. My theoretical approach is influenced by the ideas of 
Mikhail Bakhtin, Matthew Calarco, Jacques Derrida, Donna Haraway, Lynette 
Hunter, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Jakob Von Uexküll and, of course, by the 
artists whose work is considered here. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this dissertation I consider the ways in which artists working with living 
animals, ranging from damselflies to coyotes to horses, express the complex and 
paradoxical nature of human-animal relationships. The works considered include 
the eighteenth century circus, natural history dioramas created in the early 
twentieth century, and works by European and American artists from the mid-
twentieth century to the present. Since they involve living bodies, the narratives 
and experiences found in these art forms extend beyond the written and spoken 
word to encompass sight, sound, movement, and touch, all of which are 
heightened by the presence of the animals. This often enhances the perception that 
what is portrayed is “natural.” Less obvious is that the animals in these works are 
rarely acting “naturally” but instead are being used by the artists to express 
particular ideas or produce certain effects.  
I will argue that the various discursive and knowledge systems which 
influence these works affect both how the animals are treated by the artists, and 
how they are represented. This in turn influences our response to the works, and 
also our understanding of the animals and our relationship with them. Still 
available in these art forms however, in spite of the various cultural and historical 
constraints that inevitably limit both artist and viewer, is what Donna Haraway 
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calls a “usable, but not an innocent, doctrine of objectivity” which, with respect to 
the animals, can help us “name where we are and are not, in dimensions of mental 
and physical space we hardly know how to name.”1 This usable knowledge can 
help to inform the ways in which we communicate with and understand animals, 
and especially the ways in which artists might use these insights to enhance 
respect for and the desire to better understand other animals.  
Using a critical approach informed by methodologies associated with 
deconstruction and situated textualities, I will consider how the material and 
semiotic fields within which these works are created by artists and encountered by 
others express what Haraway has described as a “situation of tensions, resonances, 
transformations, resistances, and complicities.”2 I have tried to avoid the hazards 
of positivism, duality, and relativism, and to be alert to what Haraway calls the 
“god trick” of being a disembodied “know it all.”  
While obviously humans have always lived with animals, over the past 
several decades scientific and philosophical inquiry into and aesthetic exploration 
of these relationships has intensified. Most relevant to my study are those that 
concern the question of identity or being, and those that concern ethics. My goal 
in this project is to consider how the arts might help us become more answerable 
to — and more ethically and aesthetically aware of — our relationships with and 
responsibilities to animals. Doing so will enlarge the discursive possibilities that 
frame human-animal relations. My approach is guided by the premise that the 
“reality” being represented in each of the artworks considered is not a “still life” 
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waiting to be decoded, but instead, as Haraway notes, comprised of living and 
dynamic agents that can make claims on us.3  
That said, I will continue to use the binary implied by the terms “human” 
and “animal” whenever it is not possible to refer to a particular species or 
individual. In part this is because I wish to draw attention to this still-dominant 
cultural construct, and also because this inquiry involves considering the ways in 
which art either reifies or subverts what Derrida has called the abyss that has long 
existed between human and all other living things. I also want to avoid 
substituting one binary for another, such as referring to human animals and non-
human animals, which is another kind of negation. This problem of which words 
to use reveals how our interactions with other animals is always already part of an 
ongoing matrix (or quagmire!) of human histories, languages, and vested interests.  
Finally I am (intermittently) aware that I am also ever the insider, 
profoundly influenced by the discourses and systems of knowledge in which I am 
a participant. I also do not want to deny or forget other animals, for example, that 
one particular woodchuck who lives and is raising her offspring (or should I say 
children?) under the porch of the house next door. She is, as far as I can tell, is 
pursuing her own interests and (most likely) perceiving the world, including “my 
yard,” in ways very different from my own.  
I will begin with a brief historical overview of human-animal relations and 
then move to chapter summaries. Each of these chapter summaries will include a 
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review of the thinkers and artists whose work has been influential in furthering 
my own understanding.  
1. Relationships and Responsibilities  
 Some scientific and philosophical approaches to human-animal relations 
rely on an anthropocentric scale. Others assign animals a moral status that at first 
glance appears to be independent of their relationship to humans, but often 
ultimately prioritizes human concerns. Still others propose a meta-ethics that goes 
beyond rights or recognition to the obligations of responsivity.4 In an array of 
disciplines and with increasing frequency, contemporary artists have also taken up 
the question of human-animal relations in works that include living animals 
Artists who are working with these animals, even “lowly” insects such as larvae 
and cockroaches, are faced with ethical as well as aesthetic decisions. Here too, 
one can discern a diversity of approaches. Sometimes the animals are objectified 
— used as a means to an end, as symbols or props or the embodiment of the 
“natural” or the “pure;” at other times artists claim an intersubjectivity which 
insists the outcome is the result of a collaboration or a partnership. More typically, 
the engagement is characterized by a dynamic that expresses the contradictory or 
confused nature of our relations.  
These moments are what Derrida has termed aporias, the simultaneous 
appearance of a paradox that appears and yet at the same time its paradoxical 
nature is passed over as unremarkable. How the answers to these questions are 
worked out will depend in part on one’s understanding of human-animal relations 
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and in part on the distinctions made between human and animal, and culture and 
nature. A brief review of some of the literature that considers the history of these 
relations in western societies is helpful for understanding their complicated nature. 
Over the past few centuries philosophers and theorists have approached 
the question of the animal from differing perspectives. Most relevant to my study 
are those that concern the question of identity or being and those that concern 
ethics. Beginning in the late eighteenth century, utilitarians such as Jeremy 
Bentham and John Stuart Mill and developed a philosophy which asserted that 
outcomes that achieve the greatest good or happiness for morally significant 
beings is the best approach to ethics. For many utilitarians, then and now, this 
status is exclusively assigned to humans, but Bentham also included animals. He 
argued that an animal has intrinsic moral standing regardless of its relationship to 
humans. His question, which still carries a great deal of power today, directs us to 
the quality of a life rather than the traits it possesses or its place in an 
anthropocentric hierarchy. With respect to animals, he asked, “The question is not 
can they reason? Nor, can they talk? But can they suffer?"5  
Peter Singer, a contemporary utilitarian philosopher, further developed 
Bentham’s ideas. His seminal book, Animal Liberation, published in 1975, 
brought the term speciesism (originally coined by psychologist Richard Ryder) 
into widespread usage. Speciesism is the discrimination against or exploitation of 
animal species based on an assumption of human superiority. Singer believes 
utilitarian principle of equality should be prescriptive rather than descriptive.6 
Animals may not be guaranteed treatment that is equal to humans, but they do 
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deserve equal consideration.7 In this equation, for example, it is still morally 
allowable for humans to kill animals for meat, something that Bentham would 
agree with. However Singer goes further than Bentham in that he argues that 
animals should not be raised or slaughtered in ways that cause them to suffer, and 
also that they should not be eaten if nutritionally adequate alternatives are 
available.8  
Another way of considering human-animal relations arises from ontology, 
the questions related to being. In the early twentieth century, and early in his own 
inquiry into animals, Heidegger attempted to understand animals on their own 
terms, rather than through the lens of human concerns, something he later 
abandoned. Foreshadowing the conclusions of contemporary scientists he 
acknowledged, “It is difficult to determine . . . the distinction between man and 
animal.” 9 In contrast Tom Regan takes a nonconsequentialist or deontological 
view. According to Regan, both humans and all animals that posse a particular 
degree of cognitive and sensory capacity have inherent value. As Regan explains, 
both an animal and a human are “the experiencing subject of a life.” He goes on 
to explain, we are similar in that we both possess, 
an individual welfare that has importance to us whatever our usefulness to 
others. We want and prefer things, believe and feel things, recall and 
expect things. And all these dimensions of our life, including our pleasure 
and pain, our enjoyment and suffering, our satisfaction and frustration, our 
continued existence or our untimely death — all make a difference to the 
quality of our life as lived, as experienced, by us as individuals.10 
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Therefore Regan believes we should never use animals as a means to an end. 
Unlike Kant, who believed that animals do not have intrinsic moral value, Regan 
says that because animals are “subjects of a life,” they have a right not to be 
harmed.  
 In Animal Rights the contemporary philosopher David DeGrazia describes 
three kinds of moral rights; each is based on a different kind of moral status. In 
the first, the moral status of humans and animals is unequal. This is essentially 
Kant’s position. Equal consideration, the second category requires an animal’s 
suffering or needs to be weighed as much as a human’s when making a decision. 
In the third category, there is a “utility-trumping sense of rights, which means that 
the rights of the animal should be protected even if it is harmful to society as a 
whole.”11 Inevitably rights are associated with hierarchical rankings, or at least 
the rights that most people in Western societies are willing to consider. While the 
majority of people in western societies still dismiss the claim that animals have a 
moral status today, there is an increasing willingness to consider quality of life for 
animals, especially mammals. In contrast, concern with the well being of animals 
has long been the case for many indigenous traditions, which are characterized by 
a respect for certain nonhuman animals. Also some religions, including Buddhism, 
teach ethical values that result in the protection of nonhuman animals.12 
In spite of the efforts of the animal rights movement, as the legal scholar 
Paul Waldau points out, many people still use Cartesian arguments to support the 
dismissal of any rights for all non human animals. He points to the considerable 
challenges faced by those advocating for animals rights:  
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[C]laims about all organisms, at times including plants and viruses, 
confound even the most inclusivists of human minds . . . . The rhetoric of 
total equality of all life — lettuces or chimpanzees, bacteria or viruses (not 
normally considered “living” in the classical sense), fungi or protoctists 
can mislead. It obscures what all human cultures and moral systems have 
recognized: that given the value of all forms of life, some forms, animals, 
take ethical priority over others.13 
However, while conclusions about the moral and legal status of animals remain 
elusive, the questions we ask about animals and their relationship to us have 
changed. As Angus Taylor, a philosopher specialized in animal rights and author 
of Animals and Ethics, points out, the debate has shifted from whether animals 
possess consciousness to what kind of consciousness and what this may means for 
their moral status. Other criteria for recognizing moral status might include 
having self-awareness; whether or not self-awareness is even necessary; and if 
self-awareness must be combined with the ability to think rationally. Taylor 
points out that we do not agree about “who fundamentally counts in our moral 
reckoning” or “whose interests should receive the same consideration as our 
similar interests.”14 The grey zone is the area where interests conflict. Taylor 
concludes, just as Waldau did, that “even those willing to grant that many animals 
possess consciousness [are] likely to find some reason to justify subordinating 
their basic interests to human interests, whether basic or not.”15 Nevertheless, the 
following questions, posed by Taylor, are ones that increasing numbers of people, 
including artists, are engaging with. These include: “Who counts as someone?” 
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“What justifies harming someone?” and “Can any rational justification be given 
for drawing a neat, one-and-for-all line in the sand between all humans and all 
animals?”16 
Although this is now changing to some degree, western philosophy has 
long affirmed human superiority, including our uniqueness and our right to use all 
other living things for our own purposes. Reflecting on this history and mounting 
a challenge to Rene Descartes’ belief that animals lack both reason and feeling, 
Derrida writes in The Animal That Therefore I Am, 
All philosophers have judged [the] limit [between human and animal] to 
be single and indivisible, considering that on the other side of that limit 
there is an immense group, a single and fundamentally homogeneous set 
that one has the right, the theoretical or philosophical right, to distinguish 
and mark as opposite, namely, the set of the Animal in general, the Animal 
spoken of in the general singular. It applies to the whole animal kingdom 
with the exception of the human.17  
This text, published posthumously, is the complete text of Derrida’s ten-hour 
address which was presented at “The Autobiographical Animal,” the third of a 
series of conferences devoted to his work. It was held in Ciresy, France, in 1997. 
Derrida opens his address with a meditation on his pet cat, whose intimate yet 
indecipherable presence reveals the paucity of our language with respect to what 
Derrida will call l’animot. In a review of this book, Kari Weil, a scholar of 
comparative literature observes, the look of an animal, even one as familiar as a 
pet cat, 
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prepares me, if it does not compel me, to address the vulnerabilities we 
share as living, mortal beings, as they also bring me to acknowledge the 
qualities and talents of an other I may know little of and may not know 
despite my efforts to name him or her.18  
She concludes her review of this text by writing, “Letting animals be in their 
being, outside our projects and outside our will for knowledge, would, Derrida 
seems to suggest, constitute the ultimate ethical stance.”19 At the same time she 
acknowledges the difficulty of stepping outside of our anthropocentric selves. 
This may be because, as Derrida himself observes,  
Philosophical right . . . presents itself as that of ‘common sense.’ This 
agreement concerning philosophical sense and common sense that allows 
one to speak blithely of the Animal in the general singular is perhaps one 
of the greatest and most symptomatic asininities of those who call 
themselves human.20  
Our increasing knowledge of genetics affirms Derrida’s critique of human 
exceptionalism. As it turns out, the difference in genomes between humans and 
some primates is only between five and seven percent. According to the 
Smithsonian’s National Museum of Natural History, “The wall between human, 
on the one hand, and ape or animal, on the other, has been breached.”21  
In addition to dismissing the close connection that humans have with some 
species, insisting on the binary of human and animal with some species obscures 
the vast range and diversity of animal life. Instead, Derrida points out, 
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Beyond the edge of the so-called human, beyond it but by no means on a 
single opposing side, rather than “the Animal” or “Animal Life,” there is 
already a heterogeneous multiplicity of the living, or more precisely (since 
to say “the living” is already to say to much or not enough”) a multiplicity 
of organizations of relations between living and dead, relations of 
organization or lack of organization among realms that are more and more 
difficult to dissociate by means of the figures of the organic, and inorganic, 
of life and/or death.22  
Both our closeness to other animals, and our differences, along with the richness 
and diversity of life itself complicates the discussion. One thing we can be sure of 
is that there are complex nuances rather than simple boundaries. 
 Such a restructuring of the “natural order” poses ethical dilemmas. How 
would life — for both human and nonhuman animals — be different if we put 
aside or at least questioned what has so long been assumed as our human right to 
use animals as we wish? In Animal Lessons the philosopher Kelly Oliver points 
out that before we can begin defining rights or relationships, we must define 
animal and human, “particularly as the man/animal binary has been elemental in 
the development of the very notion of rights.”23 She observes that most 
discussions about rights measure animals against humans and that although 
challenged, it remains the case that “[e]nlightenment ideals that make man 
superior to animals lay the foundation for the rights discourse.”24 This leads to the 
creation of hierarchies that value animals based on their similarity to humans. For 
example, many would agree that the great apes deserve protection while shellfish, 
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since they do not feel pain, do not.25 Such an approach, according to Oliver, 
addresses the symptoms but not the structures of oppression, which include 
material, economic, linguistic, conceptual, and cultural structures and 
institutions.26 She notes the “struggle that continues between environmental and 
business interests over the allocation of resources for wildlife.”27 Although some 
rights are better than no rights, they do not go far enough.  
As Oliver points out, “Moral rules and juridical legalism may help us sleep 
peacefully at night, whereas ethical responsibility, as Emmanuel Lévinas might 
say, produces insomnia. Rights can be granted, laws can be followed, but ethics 
and justice cannot rest there. In this sense, ethics must go beyond rights.”28 Such a 
complex web of relationships is not one that lends itself to a legal code or a set of 
moral precepts. Instead, as Oliver observes, it calls for a “meta-ethics that goes 
beyond rights or recognition to the conditions or embodied life on a shared planet 
and the obligations those conditions entail.”29 She sees the first step as one in 
which we reconsider “oppositional and exclusionary ways of thinking about 
animals.”30 It’s clear that the centuries-old quandary regarding human 
relationships with other animals, including their rights and our responsibilities, 
continues on today. 
2. A “Natural” History 
While the Bible is often used to justify the exploitation of animals, and the 
message it delivers has been criticized by animal rights activists, and as some 
contemporary scholars have observed, interpretations of this text vary, with some 
	   23	  
challenging the broadly accepted notion of the “dominion” of humans over nature. 
Given its long history, numerous sources and authors (or transcribers), and the 
various cultures within which it has circulated, this is not surprising. Even today 
there is little agreement on the meaning of passages related to current social issues. 
Instead, scholars including Rod Preece, a political scientist, and David Fraser, a 
zoologist, argue that many people today misinterpret the Biblical messages 
concerning the treatment of animals, and that they were more valued (and 
therefore received better treatment) than is commonly understood. for example, 
the King James version of Genesis provides the following account of the 
relationship between humans and animals: 
And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let 
them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, 
and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing 
that creepeth upon the earth. So God created man in his own image, in the 
image of God created he him; male and female created he them. And God 
blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and 
replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have dominion over the fish of the 
sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth 
upon the earth. And God said, Behold, I have given you every herb 
bearing seed, which is upon the face of all the earth, and every tree, in the 
which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed; to you it shall be for meat. And to 
every beast of the earth, and to every fowl of the air, and to every thing 
that creepeth upon the earth, wherein there is life, I have given every green 
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herb for meat: and it was so.31  
Preece and Fraser think that the harsh critique of Genesis offered by Peter Singer 
and other philosophers concerned with the well-being of animals is a narrow one, 
and represents a “failure to recognize the complexity of the development of 
animal ethics in the Christian tradition.” While acknowledging that the “inherent 
worth of animals” has not always been recognized, they believe the Christian 
tradition is “complex and inchoate” and that within Christianity “the status and 
appropriate treatment of animals have been repeatedly discussed and debated.”32 
Further, some people believe that this passage reveals that humans and animals 
are to be vegetarians. 
To support their position, Preece and Fraser point out that in a pastoral 
economy domestic animals are “repositories of wealth, sources of food, and items 
of trade,” and so to prosper these “possessions must be treated with appropriate 
care.”33 Also the often-quoted “dominion” of human over animals that appears in 
Genesis could be interpreted as either despotic or as like a “good shepherd.” 
Preece and Fraser lean toward the latter, asserting the intention of these passages 
is to direct humans to model themselves on the divine. Therefore, just as God 
brought “blessing and goodness, not tyrannical mastery, to the world” that was 
under his dominion, just so should humans treat all that was under their dominion. 
As evidence they cite a number of examples, including several from the 
eighteenth century alone, which illustrate how the meaning of dominion has 
changed over time: 
In Seasons of 1728, James Thomson, former divinity student, understood 
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our role as “the Lord and not the Tyrant of the world.” In Self-Interpreting 
Bible of 1776 John Brown, the staid Biblical traditionalist, declared it an 
“honourable dominion over the creatures.” “Gentle dominion,” avowed 
George Nicholson in his 1801 On the Primeval Diet of Man. In 1802, 
Joseph Ritson described the dominion of Genesis as instituted, “for the 
sake of authority, protection, and the glorious offices of benevolence and 
humanity.”34 
The relationship with animals portrayed here is patriarchal, but not ruthless 
exploitation.  
Preece and Fraser also find a kinship between humans and animals in 
Ecclesiastes, one they believe has not been emphasized enough. Both humans and 
other species are “works of God . . . [both] are created from dust, return to dust,” 
and “all draw the same breath.”35 Their conclusion is that Christian thought was 
influenced by contradictory ideas about animals from Greek, Roman, and Hebrew 
religious and philosophical traditions. The result of all of these influences is that 
there was no “uniform ethic.”36 
A closer look at the Great Chain of Being also reveals a more complex 
dynamic of human-animal relations than is commonly portrayed today. Now this 
concept is imagined by most people as a linear hierarchy, with those above 
dominating the beings below, but just as with the Bible the concept has a long 
history and interpretations have varied over time. The idea of a Chain of Being 
originated in classical Greece, was developed into a formal system by Plotinus (a 
vegetarian) in the third century CE. It was highly influential from the Middle 
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Ages through the end of the eighteenth century. Preece and Fraser observe that in 
some versions hierarchies are emphasized more than in others. One can find 
examples where the Europeans are above all of the other “races,” and men are 
superior to women.37 However a more careful study of this “chain” reveals that 
especially in the Middle Ages the interconnectedness of relationships was 
emphasized. Instead of a line or ladder, one could imagine it as a three-
dimensional grid, with coordinates determined by the proportion of soul to matter. 
While there is no question that God, as pure spirit, was superior, and followed by 
angels, humans, animals, plants, and inanimate objects, each being was valued for 
possessing a divinely ordained, unique, and irreplaceable position.  
In addition to faith, reason became increasingly influential in 
understanding human-animal relations in the early modern period. As noted above, 
Descartes, sometimes called the first modern philosopher, believed that animals 
lacked both reason and feeling, and so humans were free of any moral 
responsibility with respect to them. As Taylor explains, Descartes acknowledges 
that animals possess sensitivity which provides them with the ability to react 
appropriately to their environment, but this is not the same as consciousness. 
Taylor uses the following example to explain this Cartesian thinking: 
By way of analogy, we might think of an automobile: it possesses 
equipment that allows it to “sense” the amount of fuel left in the tank and 
to register this on a dial, or to “sense” that a seat-belt is not fastened, or a 
door is not properly shut, and to announce this by means of a buzzer, or 
even in human language.38 
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In the Cartesian view, mind and matter are separate entities. Animals and humans 
have “machine bodies,” but only humans have minds. As Taylor points out, there 
appears to be a contradiction in Descartes’ thinking in that he also acknowledged 
that animals experience feelings such as joy or fear. On the other hand, this might 
be explained away as simply a natural behavior rather than a conscious mental 
state.39 
The claim that animals do not have consciousness was challenged even 
during Descartes’ lifetime. Most of the philosophers that followed, including 
Hobbes, Locke, and Kant, disagreed with him. However, while these philosophers 
thought that animals did have perceptions and emotions, because they lacked 
reason, it was widely accepted that animals do not have moral status.  
Kant’s influential moral theory of autonomy asserts that because humans 
have free will, humans are free from the causal determinism of nature. Therefore 
humans are intrinsically valuable and so have a moral status. They never should 
be used as a means to an end. In contrast, since animals lack free will, they have 
neither autonomy nor moral status and only possess instrumental value. Also, 
since animals lack will, they are inferior to humans, and so there is no duty of 
reciprocity. Since animals do not have a moral status, humans do not have a duty 
toward them and can use them as they wish. However even though there is no 
direct duty, as is the case between beings that possess intrinsic value (humans), 
Kant believed we do have an indirect duty to animals, including a moral 
responsibility to not cause them needless suffering. To illustrate his point, Kant 
uses the example of a man that shoots his dog because the animal can no longer 
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serve him. He has an indirect duty to treat the dog “humanely,” but not a direct 
duty that forbids him to shoot the dog. At the same time Kant’s work was 
interpreted to suggest that animals should be treated “kindly” because someone 
who is cruel to animals will also treat people badly.40 While this was Kant’s 
conclusion, others, including the philosopher Christine Korsgard, use his theory to 
make substantive arguments for animal rights. 
 Darwin’s The Origin of Species, published in 1859, intensified an ongoing 
debate over evolution, especially because his theory of natural selection 
decentered God’s role. This accelerated a growing loss of confidence, fueled both 
by scientific discoveries and philosophical thought, in the existence of an essential 
and transcendental human-self, and along with it the possibility of a meta-
narrative that provides a reassuring historical justification of human superiority. 
Ever since, we have been grappling with our identity and human-animal 
relationships in one way or another. Evolutionary theory now asserts that the 
differences between human and nonhuman animals are far less distinct that we 
once had imagined. Differences are now described as in quality rather than in kind. 
Both human and non-human animals use symbolic communication, live in social 
groups, and care for each other in ways that suggest the experience of empathy. 
Humans, whose uniqueness seemed to be marked by their exclusive access to 
reason and free will, are now understood to be strongly influenced by 
physiological forces, which affect how we feel and think. One more reminder that 
we too are animals.  
The influential Swiss biologist Jakob von Uexküll (1864-1944) imagined 
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living beings as inhabiting a horizontal matrix. In a short monograph, A Stroll 
Through the Worlds of Animals and Men: A Picture Book of Invisible Worlds, 
published in 1934, Uexküll invites the reader on a “stroll into unfamiliar worlds, 
words strange to us but known to other creatures, manifold and varied as the 
animals themselves.” Uexküll embodies liberal humanism’s optimism in that he 
believes that one can enter other realms to attain an objective understanding of 
them. Refuting the Cartesian metaphor of the machine, Uexküll argues that 
animals are “subjects whose essential activity consists of perceiving and acting.” 
The “self-world” of an animal, although it may be invisible to some humans, 
consists of the umwelt. To “unlock the gates that lead to other realms” one must 
stop perceiving animals as machines and enter into, as much as possible, the 
perceptual world (what an animal perceives) and the effector world (what an 
animal does).41 Instead of a universal reality, Uexküll describes a subjective 
universe, a complex matrix comprised of the perspectives of all living things.  
For Uexküll even time and space are based on perception. For example, 
during the period that a tick is waiting for her prey, time does not exist. 
Operational space, which is used by some, but not all animals, is an embodied 
experience measured in “directional units” (right/left, up/down, forward/back) and 
will vary depending on the characteristics of the animal’s body.42 Tactile, auditory, 
and visual space, which are used to identify location and manage navigation, are 
also particular and subjective orientations. In addition, because space is dependent 
on each animal’s experience, the horizon or farthest plan will vary. Since animals 
are capable of acting and perceiving, this is “not an exchange of forces between 
	   30	  
two objects, but the relations between a living “subject” (the animal) and its 
object.” 43 For example, in the world of a tick, it is the subject and its object is the 
dog. The stimulus of heat given off by the dog is perceived by the tick, which then 
performs the action of dropping from its perch onto its prey. This sequence is 
neither mechanistic nor instinctual. Each creature is free to act according to its 
perceptions, unconstrained by internalized or external social, economic, or 
political forces. 
 During the period when Uexküll was writing, liberal humanism is based 
on the concept of an autonomous and unified self, widely understood as the 
“unconstrained author of meaning and action.”44 Uexküll applied this ideology to 
his concept of the umwelt. The umwelt is a humanist’s utopia where every being is 
free to act according to his or her own perceptions. Yet at the same time Uexküll’s 
decentering of the human anticipates posthumanism in his insistence that animals 
are beings in their own right.45 According to the philosopher Brett Buchanan, this 
is the beginning of an onto-ethology, “an ontological elucidation of ‘what is’ via 
the active behavior of living beings.”46 Buchanan	  acknowledges	  this	  term	  was	  first	  used	  by	  Eric	  Alliez	  in	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  work	  of	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari.	  However	  for	  Buchanan	  the	  concept	  can	  first	  be	  found	  in	  ideas	  of	  Uexküll,	  and	  especially	  in	  his	  descriptions	  of	  the	  relationships	  between	  being	  and	  behavior.47 
Another aspect of Uexküll’s concept that challenges both the concept of a 
unified self and the so-called abyss between humans and animals is that Umwelts 
are not isolated units, but may overlap or encompass each other. Further, there 
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isn’t a one-to-one correspondence between species and umwelts. Individuals 
within a species can have different umwelts. The umwelts evoke curious miniature 
empires, each with its own subject/ruler. There is a sense of dynamism and 
multiplicity as well as the implication that the many others inhabiting these 
overlapping worlds must somehow manage to co-exist.  
These umwelts are organized around “functional cycles” which balance 
what Uexküll calls “nature’s plan” and “the subject’s goals.”48 According to 
Uexküll, organisms differ from machines because they are “self-developmental 
and autonomous.”49 As a result of this dynamic, the laws that rule nature are 
neither mechanistic (or purely instinctual) nor teleological (determined by a 
master plan), but rather are similar to those that guide the creation of a harmonic 
composition. In language reminiscent of Bakhtin’s theory of discourse, Uexküll 
writes about the tension which exists between the “centripetal architecture of 
things” and the “centrifugal architecture” of organisms.50 In a similar way, 
Bakhtin describes a dynamic in which centripetal forces seek to maintain the 
official forms of language while centrifugal forces resist this order through the 
continuing use of local dialects, slang, and other informal intragroup or 
interpersonal ways of speaking. Both Uexküll and Bakhtin are describing a 
dynamic in which both centrifugal and centripetal forces are necessary if there is 
to be a workable order for living things.  
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3. Reasons for Caring 
During the lectures he gave at Cerisy Derrida launched an impassioned 
critique of the ways in which language obliterates both similarities and 
differences between “us” humans and “those animals.” He described this gap as:  
the infinite space that separates the lizard from the dog, the protozoon 
from the dolphin, the shark from the lamb, the parrot from the chimpanzee, 
the camel from the eagle, the squirrel from the tiger, the elephant from the 
cat, the ant from the silkworm, or the hedgehog from the echidna.51 
This is not merely a linguistic or conceptual matter, but one that has profound 
consequences for animals, both human and not. How we are in relationship with 
each other influences the quality of our lives together and also, potentially, the 
quality and length of each animal’s life. Derrida characterizes the abyss between 
human and animal as a “disavowal” of our obligations to all living beings. The 
emphasis on differences supports hierarchies that obscure or negate not only what 
we hold in common but also muddy ethical considerations and responsibilities. 
Bruno Latour, a French philosopher and sociologist of science, calls this abyss the 
“Great Divide.” The ways in which humans have separated themselves from all 
other animals raises a number of significant questions for how we live today, 
ranging from the treatment of the animals we raise to eat or use for medical 
testing to habitat preservation and the extinction of species.52  
 Derrida and the other contemporary thinkers discussed so far outline the 
broader parameters of identity and ethics with respect to human animal relations. 
They offer some insight into the barriers that continue to prevent us from 
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acknowledging the immense diversity of animal life, its significance to us in 
terms of our mutual dependence, and ethical responsibilities to other living beings, 
including the animal. As Derrida has pointed out,  
No one can deny seriously, or for very long, that men do all they can in 
order to dissimulate this cruelty [to animals] or to hide it from themselves, 
in order to organize on a global scale the forgetting or misunderstanding of 
this violence that some would compare to the worst cases of genocide 
(there are also animal genocides: the number of species endangered 
because of man [or more inclusively, human beings] takes one’s breath 
away).53  
How might the arts engage us with animals in ways that interrupt, obscure, or 
reify this dissimulation? How might the arts assist us in rethinking a human-
animal ethics? Rather than a fixed moral code or set of precepts, ethical decisions 
are themselves inevitably subject to a continuous process of consideration and 
reconsideration, as conditions and contexts change. Because the arts respond and 
rely upon particular contexts and material conditions, they have the capacity for 
continual transformation necessary for engaging with the ongoing processes of 
ethical decision-making. Aesthetic processes and products also yield their richest 
communications when they invite a rigorous and continuous process of translation 
and reflection.  
In addition to questions related to identity, relationship, justice, and 
renewal, there is the fundamental challenge of survival. A reconsideration of the 
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hierarchies that have been in place for centuries in western societies may help to 
reduce the ever-increasing acceleration of extinction. Some experts estimate that 
over the next twenty years the rate could reach 10,000 times the background rate 
(defined as the rate before humans) in a world made smaller through the 
expansion of human technology and population and their effects on habitat and 
climate.54 These rates of extinction not only threaten those “other” animals, but 
also the human. According to Simon Stuart, chair of the Species Survival 
Commission for the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, 
“Anything over ten times the background rate of extinction – ten species in every 
million per year – was above the limit that could be tolerated if the world was to 
be safe for humans.” 55 
Rethinking human-animal relations is a complex undertaking. Derrida has 
described this network as “a multiplicity of organizations of relationship between 
living and dead, relations of organization or lack of organization among realms 
that are more and more difficult to dissociate by means of the figures of the 
organic and inorganic, of life and/or death.”56 An additional challenge is the 
distance between humans and animals forged by urbanization. Instead of being in 
direct contact with a wide array of animals in their native habitats, we live and 
work for the most part in environments that are segregated from other species. 
Our animal companions are, for the most part, those who have been domesticated, 
captured. Our exposure to “wild” animals is for the most part limited to what is 
portrayed through images and stories designed to appeal to us. These animals, 
made available for our consumption, “exist” in wildlife programs on television, in 
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Hollywood films, in zoos, and in natural history museums. As observers of these 
animals, we are spectators who as the theorist and filmmaker Guy Debord points 
out, are always “at a distance” from ourselves, lost in “spectacular time.” 57 The 
spectacle generated by a culture dominated by consumerism and the mass media 
isolates human beings from directly experiencing contact or becoming familiar 
with most other species. Instead of the “luxurious expenditure of life,” we exist 
within boundaries determined by a mediated rather than a living world.58 This 
mentality of the spectacle can lead to the abuse of animals by artists. Those types 
of work will not be discussed here. This dissertation will focus on the expanding 
possibilities for relationships between the animal and the human that are being 
created by art makers.  
4. Chapter Summaries 
A. Skin Deep: Collecting Animals 
The dioramas in the Akeley Hall of African Mammals at the New York 
Museum of Natural History are the focus of my first chapter. Carl Akeley began 
envisioning the project in 1909, and continued working on it until his death in 
1926. The Hall was completed in 1936. At the time, the 28 dioramas were 
presented as a scientifically sound, objective presentation of a world Akeley 
feared was vanishing, and even today, the museum still emphasizes that these are 
accurate and realistic portrayals. In “Teddy Bear Patriarchy: Taxidermy in the 
Garden of Eden, New York City, 1908-1936,” which was published in 1984, 
Donna Haraway agrees that these dioramas depicted a threatened world, but that 
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world was America, not Africa. Early in the twentieth century, many Americans, 
including the board of the museum, feared the large waves of immigration and 
rapid urbanization would destroy American as they knew it. According to 
Haraway, the dioramas present the animals as object lessons about an ideal 
American way of life, especially with regard to the nuclear family, and the 
gendered division of roles and responsibilities.  
Using the Akeley collection as an example, Haraway explores themes 
related to natural history exhibitions, eugenics and conservation. According to her, 
Akeley, and more generally the American Museum of Natural History, had three 
overlapping preoccupations which guided the development of the Hall of African 
Mammals. The first was to use the exhibition as “a practice to produce 
permanence, to arrest decay;” the second was to affirm the value of eugenics in 
order to “preserve hereditary stock, to assure racial purity, to prevent race suicide;” 
and finally, to further conservation as “a policy to preserve resources, not only for 
industry, but also for moral formation, for the achievement of manhood.” The 
goal was “to cure or prevent decadence,” and to ensure the “preservation, purity, 
social order, health, and the transcendence of death, personal and collective . . . in 
the face of extraordinary change in the relations of sex, race, and class.”59 
Although some of her analysis anticipates a reading informed by situated 
knowledge, a theoretical tool that she was instrumental in developing, in this early 
essay Haraway employs a social constructionist approach. While situated 
knowledge is a “view from somewhere” which takes into account the observers’ 
particular situation with respect to culture and power, social construction asserts 
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that social relations, including a complex of interactions among individuals, 
groups, animals, and objects, and science combine to create knowledge that is 
jointly constructed. While the stuffed bodies of these animals were considered 
evidence of “embodied truth”60 by Akeley and his museum supporters, Haraway 
reveals the subjectivity of their position, and uncovers layers of hidden social 
relations, including the cultural and social preoccupations of elite, white, and male 
twentieth century American, and the hidden labor of the many Africans who 
assisted Akeley during the hunting expeditions and the dozens of museum 
employees who worked on the project.  
Also examined in this first chapter is a narrative written by Mary Hastings 
Bradley, who along with her husband and five-year old daughter, accompanied 
Akeley and one of his adult nieces on a safari in 1911. The memoir provides some 
insight into what these hunters were thinking; equally interesting is what is not 
considered. For example, while Hastings Bradley regularly expresses admiration 
for the animals, frequently anthropomorphizes them, and regrets their impending 
extinction, she does not appear to consider the implications of her own actions or 
those of her companions. In one passage she worries that she will not secure a 
trophy-quality gorilla before these animals are hunted to extinction. “There were 
moments,” she writes, “when we wondered anxiously if there were any gorillas 
left for us, anything but lone widows and undergrown youths.”61 While Hastings 
Bradley and her family valued the wilderness and the animals, their belief in and 
commitment to the “sporting life” and to human superiority resulted in competing 
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values in which empathy for the animals she was hunting did not prevent her from 
killing them, even to the point of extinction. 
During the period between 1890-1930 a nature movement, deeply 
informed by organicism, was a powerful influence in American culture. 
Organicism, which equates the universe to an organism, was a view of the world 
that was embraced by many involved in the natural sciences. Since both are 
“orderly and alive,” each animal can be seen as a metaphor for the world. The 
engraving in the American Museum’s lobby: “Speak to the Earth and It Shall 
Teach Thee” is evidence of this.62 The museum, according to Haraway, is “the 
ideological and material product of the sporting life.”63 As she points out, every 
specimen is presented as a permanent fact.” These “facts,” the animal bodies, are 
actors in a morality play. She explains, “Artistic realism and biological science 
were twin brothers in the founding of the civic order of nature.”64 For this reason, 
“Taxidermy became the art most suited to the epistemological and aesthetic 
stance of realism.”65 Realism is not simply a particular point of view but a 
fundamental assumption of civic order. Realism is an ideology that assumes there 
is an objective truth which can be depicted. In the dioramas realism and 
organicism are used to teach visitors to aspire to a more natural way of life, which 
is equated with the American way of life. 
Certainly the Akeley Hall dioramas and Hastings-Bradley’s book 
exemplify an episteme that, according to Michel Foucault, makes “certain 
perceptions, certain statements, certain forms of knowledge possible, others 
impossible.”66 The episteme is an epistemological field, which is not governed by 
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rational value or objective form. Just as with Akeley, the contradictions in 
Hastings Bradley’s account of the safari appear to be indiscernible to her. In The 
Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences, Foucault proposes that in 
various periods differing sets of laws govern knowledge. Therefore “the very 
possibility of recording facts, of allowing oneself to be convinced by them, of 
distorting them in traditions or of making purely speculative use of them” is 
determined by the period within which these activities occur.67 Foucault explores 
what he calls “epistemological spaces,” not in order to “restore what eluded 
consciousness” but rather to identify the “rules of formulation that were never 
formulated in their own right.”68 As the philosopher Gary Gutting explains, 
“Individuals operate in a conceptual environment that determines and limits them 
in ways of which they cannot be aware.”69 Foucault calls this the “positive 
unconscious of knowledge,” something outside of the consciousness of the 
scientist and yet part of scientific discourse.70 One particular twentieth century 
episteme, that of formal science, is explored by Haraway, who of course is 
thinking and writing within another episteme, another “epistemological space” 
which is outside formal science. 
 Foucault is interested in the middle ground rather than either of two poles 
of theory and empiricism. One is the locus of scientific theories or philosophical 
interpretations; the other is the material and experiential realm. In between lies the 
invisible, imperceptible, which creates an underlying order between the “encoded 
eye” and reflexive order.71 While for social constructionists these networks are 
organized and driven by power relations, Foucault believes the forces can 
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sometimes be arbitrary. In any period, there are limitations to what might be 
thought or expressed, and this is determined to some degree by the terrain and 
relationships that are accessible or perceptible at that time. The breaks between 
periods are marked by discontinuities, rather than any sense of historical 
progression as, for example, with Marxism. The underlying code of implicit and 
unconscious rules proposed by Foucault within a given period are not as variable 
or situation specific as those described by social constructionists.  
For Foucault, language is not only grammar and logic, but a set of implicit 
rules that limit what can be thought. He writes, “The whole curiosity of our 
thought now resides in the question: what is language, how can we find a way 
around it in order to make it appear in itself, in all its plentitude?”72 Foucault 
focuses on thought, but not the thinker. He is interpreting text not with the aim of 
understanding individual psychological processes, but to investigate the system 
within which we think and communicate what we know. The a priori in this case 
is a set of conditions for knowing that arise from a historically contingent network 
of laws. These ideas are exemplified in his comparative study of three periods. In 
the first, which ends in the 1500s, idea and object resemble each other. In the 
Classical Age (which Foucault identifies as beginning with Descartes and ending 
with Kant), language is a physical manifestation and a transparent representation 
of an idea, with idea understood as a mental representation of what we know. 
Beginning in the nineteenth century, the empirical is understood as subjective, 
and language is a thing in itself, something that creates its own autonomous 
reality. In what might be characterized as an overreaching claim by Foucault, each 
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age is characterized by one episteme, one set of codes. Now it is widely accepted 
that epistemes are not so monolithic. In any given time or culture, multiple 
epistemes can co-exist. 
As the political scientist William Gorton observes, “For Foucault what 
counts as truth or knowledge in a particular society is merely the product of a 
certain configuration of power relations. There is no truth or knowledge outside of 
such power regimes.” Societies create rather than discover “the categories by 
which we make sense of our social world.” Gorton concludes, “Foucault’s radical 
relativism would seem to undermine the central aim of any critical approach that 
seeks to unmask oppressive ideologies, enhance human autonomy, advance 
justice or promote greater social transparency.”73  
In the social constructionist approach used by Haraway in “Teddy Bear 
Patriarchy,” the effects of ethnicity, class, and gender are context-rich and specific. 
Certainly realists such as Akeley, who put forward his own direct experiences as 
an indicator of a universal, non-subjective, would not agree with Foucault’s thesis 
that in the twentieth century the empirical is widely understood to be subjective. 
Foucault and Haraway offer significant challenges to assumptions of positivism 
and scientific objectivity but do not always use the same theoretical lens. For 
example the difference between Foucault and social constructionists is that the 
latter rely heavily on the various disciplines of the social sciences to critique 
positivism. Foucault does not believe that the social sciences are neutral 
(something that Haraway would soon agree with), or more generally that reason is 
the pathway to justice and knowledge. This is because he considers change to be 
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at times unpredictable and therefore not subject to reason, and also that the social 
sciences themselves are arbitrary constructions. He believes various disciplines or 
fields of study are not based on any kind of objective structure or empirical reality 
but rather that the categories are determined by social institutions with the aim of 
making sense of our world.  
In a wonderfully inventive way, Foucault introduces this problem of 
categorization in the preface to The Order of Things. The Celestial Emporium of 
Benevolent Knowledge's Taxonomy from Jorge Luis Borges’ essay “The 
Analytical Language of John Wilkins” places animals in the following categories: 
(a) Those that belong to the emperor 
(b) Embalmed ones 
(c) Those that are trained 
(d) Suckling pigs 
(e) Mermaids (or Sirens) 
(f) Fabulous ones 
(g) Stray dogs 
(h) Those that are included in this classification 
(i) Those that tremble as if they were mad 
(j) Innumerable ones 
(k) Those drawn with a very fine camel hair brush 
(l) Et cetera 
(m) Those that have just broken the flower vase 
(n) Those that, at a distance, resemble flies 
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Reflecting on this list, Foucault asks,  
When we say that a cat and a dog resemble each other less than two 
greyhounds do, even if both are tame or embalmed, even if both are 
frenzied, even if both have just broken the water pitcher, what is the 
ground on which we are able to establish the validity of this classification 
with complete certainty? On what ‘table,’ according to what grid of 
identities, similitudes, analogies have we become accustomed to sort out 
so many different and similar things? What is this coherence — which, as 
is immediately apparent, is neither determined by an a priori and necessary 
concatenation, nor imposed on us by immediately perceptible contents? 
For it is not a question of linking consequences, but of grouping and 
isolating, of analyzing, of matching and pigeon-holing concrete contents; 
there is nothing more than tentative, nothing more empirical (superficially, 
at least) than the process of establishing an order among things.74  
These kinds of questions lie at the heart of my research, which considers how 
various discourses, representations, and fields of knowledge can limit 
relationships and obscure ethical considerations. Useful tools provided by 
Foucault include his emphasis on the value of thinking outside of the “customary 
boundaries” which led him to developing case studies outside of traditional 
disciplinary fields, and his efforts to expose the unstated or unconscious “codes” 
that govern whether particular knowledges and their practical application can be 
recognized and accepted at any given time.75 His treatment of representation, 
including various forms of discourse, and of the ways in which preconceptions 
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govern how we think about the empirical world is relevant and informative. As I 
work with Foucault’s concepts, it is fair to say that I am not working with 
equivalences, but expansions: episteme becomes pluralized and situated; an 
unconscious code becomes tacit understandings; an underlying structure becomes 
invisible dynamics, and so on. Nevertheless, The Order of Things was an 
important starting point for my own investigations, and it led to some of the 
questions that this dissertation explores. 
B. Representing Relationship: Framing the Animal 
 Insight into our relationships with animals, as suggested by the second 
chapter, can be gained through looking at the history of zoos and circuses in 
Western Europe and the United States. As Diane Ackerman observes, “We flock 
to zoos for many reasons, not least to shed some of the burden of being human.”76 
Zoos and circuses often provide the only opportunities for most people living in 
post-industrial urban societies to come into contact with animals. These venues 
have served as a means for demonstrating power over animals, pursuing 
knowledge, instructing children, inspiring patriotism, and even recreating Eden. 
More recently zoos have also become sanctuaries for preserving species threated 
by extinction (a role which has been disputed by some animal activists). 
Because the dominant view in Western societies is that animals do not 
have language, and so it was assumed that discourse between humans and animals 
was not possible, historically zoos and circuses have been places where we go to 
look at animals. As John Berger notes in his essay, “Why Look at Animals,” 
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cages operate as frames that transform the animals into actors in a daydream; the 
animal becomes “an ideal, an ideal internalised as a feeling surrounding a 
repressed desire. The image of a wild animal becomes the starting-point of a 
daydream.”77 He notes that communication with animals is only possible by 
someone who is an “exceptional being,” such as Orpheus.78 Historically trainers 
and performers in circuses and other kinds of performances have also been seen 
as having a special relationship with animals.  
Menageries, owned by royalty and those with great wealth, were first 
established in 2500 BCE.79 The animals displayed in them were used as symbols 
of power. Some animals were gifts from foreign rulers or from territories captured 
during military campaigns. During the Enlightenment, zoological societies had 
private collections which were only open to their members. The societies 
emphasized that these were for scientific study, not for popular entertainment. 
The first modern zoo that was open to the public was established during the 
French Revolution, after the royal menageries were appropriated by the 
revolutionaries. Public zoos in London and Berlin soon followed. The idea of a 
wild animal itself is a cultural construct, in that humans determine categories such 
as wild, domestic, and exotic. 
The early modern circus was established in England in the late eighteenth 
century and consisted of exhibitions of equestrian, acrobatic, and other 
performances presented in a theatre format. (The circus is not a descendent of the 
Circus Maximus, which were actually Roman chariot races.) The first modern 
circus was established by Philip Astley, an Englishman, and his wife Patty. Astley, 
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a former cavalry man, offered equestrian lessons each morning and performed 
riding tricks in the afternoon in an open ring near what at the time was the 
outskirts of London. He also established the circus’ signature format, a ring 
approximately 42 feet in diameter. He soon added acrobats, clowning, and 
vaulting to the cavalry-style horsemanship demonstrations. Just as with the 
zoological societies, Astley and other circus owners wanted the circus to attain the 
status of theatre, which was considered an elite form of entertainment, and so they 
sought to distance themselves from lower class animal entertainments, such as 
bear baiting and cockfighting offered at fairs. (Both bear bating and cockfighting 
continue today.) For a period of time the circus owners were successful. Although 
there were critics that believed the association with circuses degraded theatre, 
they were embraced as suitable entertainment for the upper classes, and even 
women and children. In part this may have been because the early modern circus 
animal acts were devoted almost exclusively to horses and displays of fine 
horsemanship, which were animals and activities associated with the elite classes. 
In contrast to the horses used for agricultural purposes or the transportation of 
goods, maintaining a stable of fine horses and carriages was an expensive 
undertaking,  
The Hippodramas that were popular in nineteenth century England also 
express racist and imperialistic attitudes which supported and fueled British 
colonialism. The fascination with the “exotic” that accompanied these ideologies 
are evident in one of the most famous hippodramas, “Mazeppa and the Wild 
Horse of Tartary,” which was based on the poem by Byron and first staged in 
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1831.80 In the story a commoner becomes romantically involved with a woman 
betrothed to a nobleman. The commoner (actually a nobleman who has been 
unfairly cast out) is lashed naked to the back of a wild horse that is then released 
into the wild. The young man survives, eventually reunites with his lover, and is 
recognized as the rightful heir to the throne.81 This combination of violence and 
sexuality expressed in the binding of human and animal bodies together was 
enthusiastically received by audiences. Of course the actors were never presented 
as being English or American, but as members of the uncivilized Tartar “race.”	  
In his essay “Animal Apparatus,” Michael Peterson, a scholar of 
performance studies takes the concept of matrixing and applies it to animal 
performances. Matrixing is a concept developed by Michael Kirby, who also 
studied and critiqued theatre. Matrixing describes how meaning is produced 
through simple behaviors and appearances, even without the performer’s 
awareness. While Kirby applied this concept only to human performers, Peterson 
points out that this is what happens in animal acts. He writes, “Animal actors 
function either in a ‘symbolic matrix,’ in which, quoting Kirby, ‘the performer 
does not act and yet his or her costume represents something or someone,’ or 
in . . . . ‘received’ acting.”82 As Kirby has noted, “When the matrixes are strong, 
persistent and reinforce each other, we see an actor, no matter how ordinary the 
behavior.”83 
 
 Peterson points out, “behind the referential and thematic content of 
representations lie questions about their production; the analysis of animals as 
objects of performance necessitates investigating how actual animals perform.” 
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He then goes on to ask, “How are animals made to perform?”84 On one level, if 
acting is “creating for the audience the illusion of events and interactions that 
[are] fictional,” then he asserts, animals do not “act.” However on another level, 
animals are “made to perform” by being taught behaviors which are then 
presented in a series of framed units which add up to a narrative. The animal 
apparatus consists of “framing trained behaviors in a ‘non-animal narrative,’” that 
is, a human narrative is wrapped around units of trained behaviors in ways that 
lead to the “constructions of social relations between humans and animals.”85 
Peterson also notes, “Much human culture about nonhuman animals, including 
performance and especially live performing animals in anthropomorphic frames, 
works to ‘humanize’ humans and ‘dehumanize’ animals.”86 Peterson believes that 
using animals can make “art safe” because they seem to "demand only a simple 
emotional response.”87 Furthermore, these frames and narratives are 
representations of animals; although they may be presented to the audience as 
such, these are not unmediated encounters. Peterson believes that simply by their 
very presence animals “matter as themselves” in artistic performances. 88  
In Circus and Culture: A Semiotic Approach Paul Bouissac analyzes how 
animals are made to perform, both literally and semiotically, using a structuralist 
approach informed by Saussure. Bouissac examines how the circus presents 
“spectacular events that are remarkably patterned and highly meaningful for large 
audiences.”89 Bouissac approaches circus acts as cultural texts. The acts employ a 
language system that uses a code to communicate. His assumption is that this 
code delivers messages that are intentionally sent by human trainers and 
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performers in animal acts, received and understood by the audience.90 According 
to Bouissac, the trainer uses rewards and coercion to attain the desired behaviors. 
Once these are established, only the subtlest hints are needed to control the 
animal’s behavior.91 The goal, as Bouissac notes, is to “integrate, perfectly, the 
gestures of the training code with the paralinguistic (i.e., nonverbal) gestural code 
of a natural [human] dialogue.”92  
Bouissac appears to assume that these communications are uniformly 
interpreted by viewers, and so doesn’t allow for varying interpretations that may 
arise from differences, such as gender, culture, experience with animals, and so on. 
He also doesn’t consider the ways in which animals might impact what is being 
communicated but instead seems to think they are a transparent medium, at least 
in the sense that they correctly enact a sequence of trained behaviors. And finally 
he does not discuss the impact of particular animals whose actions may disrupt 
the “code” through behaving in ways that are unanticipated by the trainers or 
performers nor does he mention the resistances described by Calarco. While it 
was interesting to see how this theoretical approach assumed the same stance as 
the positivist approach critiqued by Haraway and Foucault in the first chapter, 
Bouissac’s assumptions about a single, common reception of these codes was not 
convincing. However his discussion of how the many possible units and 
combinations of units create meaning is helpful in expanding the definition of 
discourse to include not only the written and spoken word, but a vast array of 
movements (from the smallest gesture to a complex choreography) visuals, and 
sounds. 
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Bouissac observes, “The circus [or theatrical performance more generally] 
freely manipulates a cultural system to such an extent that it leaves the audience 
contemplating a demonstration of humanity freed from the constraints of the 
culture within which the performance takes place.” 93 (emphasis provided) It is 
interesting to consider Bouissac’s ideas with those offered by Deleuze and 
Guattari. They describe the ways in which relying on a structural approach 
inhibits freedom because it “is designed precisely to deny or at least denigrate 
their [the animals’] existence: a correspondence of relations does not add up to a 
becoming. When structuralism encounters becomings of this kind pervading a 
society, it sees them only as phenomena of degradation representing a deviation 
from the true order.”94 While Bouissac suggests that the circus can somehow step 
outside of culture, from the perspective of Deleuze and Guattari, both the 
structuralist analysis and the performances that are being critiqued would 
inevitably “denigrate” the animal’s existence. Therefore neither is an expression 
of freedom, but only a simulation of it. Of course one must wonder what Deleuze 
and Guattari mean by a “true order.” If it means a natural order outside of culture, 
then it would be a perpetually elusive one according to both Foucault and 
Haraway. 
C. Means to an End: The Symbolic Animal  
In the third chapter, a work by Joseph Beuys created in 1974, “I Like 
America and America Likes Me,” challenges the dominant social, political, and 
economic order of that period. He intended for this work to be a challenge to 
rationality and science, and what he saw as our over reliance on its processes and 
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strategies yet it was as meticulously constructed as any scientific experiment. In 
“I Like America and America Likes Me” predetermined roles and symbolic 
concepts limited possibilities for relating to the animal-other, and especially to a 
particular coyote named Little John who was used in the performance. In a 
statement which describes his intention, Beuys explains,  
My intention was firstly to hold together and retain in the West powers, 
and then to appear as a being representing the group soul area. I wanted to 
show the coyote a parallel power, but I also wished to remind him that it 
was now a human being who was speaking with him, and that's why my 
behavior was varied: sometimes the image was more like a hieratic 
figure—a shepherd, but then, when I sprang out of the felt, I was quite an 
ordinary man. And then the drooping tulip hat which had quite lost its 
form made it just like the circus. What I tried to do was to set up a really 
oscillating rhythm. 
What was for Beuys a mixture of “circus” and a shamanistic ritual designed to 
restore order to a natural world disrupted by imperialism and capitalism must 
have been stressful, if not downright terrifying for the coyote. The cycle of 
movements and sounds were also symbolic: a triangle was an “impulse of 
consciousness,” the roar of a turbine was “undetermined energy,” a flashlight 
symbolized the kind of energy which dissipated as the day progresses (similar to a 
sun or a hearth), and the brown gloves represented the energy of human hands.95 
The coyote represented “psychological trauma point of the United States’ energy 
constellation: the whole American trauma with the Indian, the Red Man.”96 This 
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must have been a difficult experience for the displaced and undoubtedly 
disoriented coyote. 
 Beuys’ challenge to imperialism, scientific positivism, and rationalism, 
ironically enough, led him to inadvertently reaffirm those very structures and 
behaviors, including the authoritarian practices, the affirmation of the role of a 
solitary and heroic individual who dominates and controls nature, and the reliance 
on mechanistic and objectifying methodologies. While his system was 
intentionally irrational, it was nonetheless a totalizing technological system that 
was imposed on a creature trapped in circumstances beyond his control. Rather 
than treating the animal in ways that demonstrate an awareness of and sympathy 
for its particular needs, Beuys was focused on other things. As is the case with so 
many colonized peoples, Little John is used as a means to an end. While Beuys 
thought that he was seeking out a mutually beneficial relationship with him, all of 
the terms of engagement are defined by Beuys, not Little John.  
Many philosophers have, like their artist contemporaries, tried to seek a 
relationship with animals, using their writing as the performance space to make 
sense of the encounter. For Derrida the chance encounter, the interlocking gaze, 
ended in an unanswerable question marked by an awareness of “absolute alterity.” 
Derrida’s experience with his little cat was the kind of encounter that Lévinas has 
termed face-to-face. It causes Derrida to wonder, “Who I am—and who I am 
(following) at the moment when, caught naked, in silence, by the gaze of an 
animal . . . I have trouble, yes, a bad time, overcoming my embarrassment.”97 
This cat, named Logos, is not referred to by name in the essay, but is repeatedly 
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described as little. It’s interesting that this word, an adjective that can be used to 
express endearment or to minimize, is also part of the coyote’s name, and also 
that in his own writing about his performance Beuys never refers to Little John by 
his name.  
However, unlike the relationship between the coyote and Beuys’ where he 
never seems to wonder about this particular coyote’s perspective, this little cat 
provokes a powerful response from Derrida. He writes, 
the cat that looks at me in my bedroom or bathroom, this cat that is 
perhaps not “my cat” or “my pussycat,” does not appear here to represent, 
like an ambassador, the immense symbolic responsibility with which our 
culture has always charged the feline race . . . If I say “it is a real cat” that 
sees me naked, this is in order to mark its unsubstitutable singularity. If it 
responds to its name . . . it doesn’t do so as the exemplar of a species 
called “cat,” even less so of an “animal” genus or kingdom. It . . . comes 
to me as this irreplaceable living being that one day enters my space into 
this place where it can encounter me, see me, even see me naked. Nothing 
can ever rob me of the certainty that what we have here is an existence 
that refuses to be conceptualized.98  
Clearly the cat is neither a symbol (unlike Beuys’ coyote, he does not represent 
anything or anyone other than himself) nor is he a concept — a “cat” — but 
instead posses “unsubstitutable singularity” and is an “irreplaceable living being.” 
  Derrida goes on to reflect that this experience is “The point of view of the 
absolute other, and nothing will have ever given me more food for thinking 
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through this absolute alterity of the neighbor of the next (door) than these 
moments when I see myself seen naked under the gaze of a cat.”99 Derrida asserts 
that human relationships with the “animal,” (as if there is only one) opens up 
questions related to “living, speaking, dying, being, and world as in being-in-the-
world.”100 The other (a particular cat) provokes a line of inquiry that is outside of 
language and yet the power of this moment of exchange between the two, and 
Derrida’s effort to make sense of it—to translate—initiates a philosophical 
inquiry. This did not occur in the encounter between Beuys and Little John.. The 
coyote was, essentially, a concept and was never really recognized as a particular 
living being. 
Beuys’ encounter with Little John was far less intimate than what Derrida 
experienced with Logos. Beuys used the coyote as a prop for a performance that 
was intended to critique/heal humans. Although rich in the use of sensory media, 
the interactions between the two were governed by a set of pre-scripted behaviors. 
The relationship between Beuys and Little John, the coyote, occurs within a 
highly controlled environment, and one that is further constrained by a set of 
concepts which affirm binary oppositions such as human/animal and 
culture/nature. Any opportunity to engage with the coyote in ways that would 
permit a more open-ended relationship is “deflected” (to use a term coined by the 
philosopher Cora Diamond).101 
 Beuys is an artist who cared deeply about the environment. He is rejecting 
“science” and turning to myth and shamanism to find another language to heal the 
rupture between culture and nature, and human and animal. However he is not 
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treating the animal in an animal-focused way, but as a way to act out a symbolic 
language. In Ecology without Nature Timothy Morton, an interdisciplinary 
scholar who works at the intersections of philosophy, ecology, literature, explores 
how in art, “the fantasies we have about nature take shape—and dissolve.”102 He 
believes “nature’s “confusing ideological intensity . . . impedes a proper 
relationship with the earth and its life forms.”103 This is because, “Putting 
something called Nature on a pedestal and admiring it from afar does for the 
environment what patriarchy does for the figure of Woman. It is a paradoxical act 
of sadistic admiration.104 In doing this we turn nature into a fetish object.   
In order to change from an anthropocentric to an ecocentric worldview, 
Morton says we need to ask of any text, “What does it say about nature?” I would 
ask more specifically, “What does it say about animals?”105 Doing this will help 
us to engage with “things that are not identical to us or our preformed concepts” 
about nature.106 He believes that deconstruction, because it searches for points of 
contradiction and “deep hesitation in systems of meaning” can help us to this. 
According to Morton, shifting our worldview can alter how humans experience 
their place in the world, and since art is concerned with questioning established 
ways of feeling and perceiving, it is a powerful means for change. Even so, 
Morton does not believe we should “aestheticize ethics” (i.e., small is beautiful) 
or use it as a means of re-enchanting the world, which would then turn the 
aesthetic into an anesthetic.107 He writes, 
Our notions of place are retroactive fantasy constructs determined 
precisely by the corrosive effects of modernity. Place was not lost, though 
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we posit it as something we have lost. Even if place as an actually existing, 
rich set of relationships between sentient beings does not (yet) exist, place 
is part of our worldview right now — what if it is actually propping up 
that view?108 
This is an argument against the re-enchantment of the world, and one which 
affirms the value of engaging the world as it is, not necessarily to accept it, but 
rather to give the attention it so richly deserves, to look closely and wonder, as 
Derrida did with his cat. 
The concept of nature has continuously changed in western civilization. In the 
Middle Ages it was “practically a synonym for evil” while in the Romantic period 
it was considered the “basis for social good.” In the Enlightenment nature was a 
justification for establishing hierarchies for sexual and racial identity. Science 
used nature to make claims about what was abnormal and what was not. Nature is 
a common metaphor (i.e., the “invisible hand,” the “survival of the fittest”) and 
understood as either substance (the material realm) or essence (abstract principles, 
or the sublime).109 Morton proposes that we think about nature as an environment 
where humans live “in continuity with other beings such as animals and 
plants.”110 Perhaps following Haraway, he believes it is about “being-with, and 
offers some compelling reasons for why this is important: 
All kinds of beings, from toxic waste to sea snails, are clamoring for our 
scientific, political, and artistic attention and have become part of political 
life—to the detriment of monolithic concepts of Nature . . . . Historical 
conditions have abolished an extra-social nature to which theories of 
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society can appeal, while at the same time making the beings that fell 
under this heading impinge every more urgently on society.111  
If we removed the ideology of nature, Morton thinks our relationship with the 
environment would de-accelerate, which in turn would open up opportunities for a 
closer reading. Using a theoretical approach to ecocriticism (Morton’s focus) or 
human-animal relations (my focus) allows us “to examine the ways in which 
ideological illusions maintain their grasp.”112 The goal is not to feel better or to 
“attain any special state of mind” but rather to come to a place where “thought 
necessarily bumps its head against what isn’t.”113  
D. Object or Actor: An Insect Aesthetic 
 In chapters so far, the critical engagement is with institutions and 
individual artists who are using nature and animals as foils, as means to human 
ends. The fifth chapter considers the work of Hubert Duprat, a French conceptual 
artist, and David Wojnarowicz, an American artist and AIDS activist working in 
multimedia. Their work offers rich opportunities for considering relationships 
between these artists and these insects, and also the ways in which other artists 
and scientists interact with animals. These include questions related to whether or 
not these objects are “art” or “artifact;” whether or not the artist can claim to be 
the creator; and the artist’s responsibilities to the animals. 
 Duprat places the insects in an environment carefully designed to suit their 
requirements, and then replaces the organic material that they would normally use 
to construct protective casings with precious materials. The jewel-bedecked 
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outcomes, cast off by the tiny animals after they mature, are presented as aesthetic 
objects. Although the objects are quite beautiful, just as much attention has been 
paid to the process by which they are created. While he is an excellent caretaker, 
carefully providing the larvae what they need to flourish, Duprat doesn’t seem to 
have settled on exactly what kind of a relationship he has with these creatures. In 
a short documentary about his exhibition at Norwich Castle Museum and Art 
Gallery, Duprat’s ambivalence is clear when he describes the process as “a 
collaboration between me and the caddis larvae. I create the conditions necessary 
for the caddis to display their talents. I create situations. I’m a bit like an architect 
who has builders carry out his work.“114 Collaboration is defined in the Oxford 
English Dictionary as “[u]nited labour, co-operation; esp. in literary, artistic, or 
scientific work.” As it is commonly understood, collaboration suggests consent, 
but “united labour” is ambiguous in that it does not assign identity to whoever is 
doing the uniting. Collaboration implies equality, but the metaphor of an architect 
working with builders who “carry out” the work refers to a hierarchical 
arrangement in which one person is giving the orders while others are following 
instructions. To assert that this process is a collaborative effort glosses over the 
artist’s manipulation of and power over the insects, and clearly is not a description 
that even Duprat always feels comfortable with. In another interview the artist is 
quoted as saying, “I am playing a very bad trick on them.”115 In a third interview 
he noted that when he etches his name onto the gold plates that the insects will 
weave into their casings, he sometimes feels, “as if I am exploiting my workers. It 
is their work as much as it is mine” (emphasis added).116 In this final example, 
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Duprat affirms that the insects are co-creators and co-owners of the artifacts, but 
at the same time they are not collaborators, but workers. The possible relations 
described here range from a Marxist system in which the workers own the 
products of their labor to what occurs in an extractive colonial economy. 
Many critics also anthropomorphize the relationship. One admiring 
reviewer refers to the insects as Duprat’s “beloved apprentices” and “assistants,” 
and notes that the artist has learned to speak their language.117 Some responses are 
more scientific. For example another reviewer impersonally describes the 
situation as one of “productive collisions between organic forms and 
technologized materials” — in other words the random interaction of nature and 
art.118 Here the insects are not anthropomorphized, but there is also a failure 
recognize them as living creatures. From an environmentalist perspective, this 
might be seen as the equivalent of grass-fed cows or free range chickens; yet a 
postcolonial perspective could characterize this as an extractive economy where 
the colonized are fortunate enough to be ruled by a benevolent despot.  
The philosopher Christian Besson brings a Kantian perspective. In his 
discussion of Duprat’s work, he quotes Kant’s claim that “Art is distinct from 
nature just as ‘making’ (facere) is from ‘doing’ or ‘causing’ in general (agere) 
and [just as] the product of the consequence of art is distinct as work (opus) from 
the product of nature as effect (effectus).”119 Besson also takes up questions of 
causality, ownership, and the relationship between Duprat and the caddis larvae. 
He asks,  
Is the caddis worm's precious case the work of the insect or the work of 
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the artist? This is not the right question . . . . According to the first view, 
the caddis worm owed nothing to the artist (who is simply the author of 
one noise among the thousands of other noises in its environment). 
According to the second view, the caddis worm is merely the executor of 
the artist's project.120  
Besson believes that both questions miss the mark. For him the question is not so 
much whether it is the insect or the artist that creates the work, but both. The 
caddis worm is doing what it does, regardless of the interference of the artist and 
the insect might be considered “merely the executor of the artist’s project.” The 
result is a “doubly exposed object” which is both natural and artistic.121 Besson 
notes the “random upheaval” caused by replacing the organic matter with 
precious metals (the “noise” in the insects’ environment) that results in what 
Henri Altan, a biophysicist and philosopher, calls “absolute novelty.” Again, 
quoting Altan who takes a Kantian view, for human actors, a “series of gestures 
[such as the insertion of the foreign material into the larvae’s environment] is the 
result of our conscious will and is directed toward the goal that we wish to attain.” 
In contrast, for the insects, innovation or “absolute novelty stems from the 
indeterminate character of stimuli which thus play the part of random upheavals 
in the system which they affect.”122  
These “events” occur on two levels in the construction of the altered 
larvae cases: the biological and the aesthetic. The first involves the response of 
the larvae to the “noise” in their environment and the other is the action of the 
artist. While the human actor behaves in ways that are determined by a specified 
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goal, the larvae, while indispensable in producing an artifact that is a “novelty,” in 
this view are only responding to their environment in a genetically-determined 
manner. They are reactive rather than proactive. Kant wanted to clearly delineate 
differences between culture and nature as well as human and animal. However 
these hybrid artworks blur the distinction Kant wished to establish between 
beauty in art and in nature. In fact, if one challenges the nature-culture divide, 
Kant’s aesthetic theory evaporates.  
In “Third Nature or the End of Origins,” the cultural historian Celeste 
Olalquiaga considers the history of and values attached to nature and culture in 
contemporary society. Because we place so much value on being there first, she 
explains, nature trumps culture. Nature is seen as natural and good. In contrast, 
culture is secondary, imitative, and inferior to nature. Oddly enough this makes 
culture, which is comprised of experiences, a material good while nature is 
immaterial, larger than life, and independent of time. Because nature, the original, 
was there first, it appears to transcend the chronology of culture.123 However 
“origins” is itself a cultural concept and so therefore is not outside of historical 
experiences. Nevertheless the “naturalization” of the cultural concept of origins 
allows it to escape “its cultural source by identifying with nature,” while 
ironically, at the same time, nature itself is “essentialized by such idealization” 
and so becomes denaturalized and immaterial.”124 While culture seeks legitimacy 
in nature, nature is made abstract, and is an “empty matrix” to be used by 
culture.125 
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Until the end of medieval period, nature, in the abstract, is associated with 
divine will. Natural materials or things made out of natural material can be cult 
objects that possess religious and spiritual powers. Over time, Olalquiaga writes,  
This change from a sacralized nature to one that, already in the eighteenth 
century has become a relic of itself . . . [and] will later be known as 
‘natural history,’ that is, a field of knowledge, is so gradual and dramatic 
that we still have trouble assessing its full impact. The change from cult 
value to exhibition value of organic objects is in fact the transformation of 
a living nature, with which culture maintains an active, dynamic 
relationship, to a dead nature, which far from being the agent of divine 
power, is reduced to a passive object of human curiosity.126 
The preoccupation with originality and authenticity is a result of the mass 
production of the industrial age. Progress, individualism, and constant change 
were also associated with originality. Olalquiaga explains that only when the 
“proliferation of copies threatens and in effect displaces the singularity of an 
object does this singularity become important, representing an experience and a 
presence considered unique in space and time.” Originality becomes associated 
with authenticity, which in turn embodies truth and singularity (a quantity that 
takes on qualitative attributes). This occurs during this period because, according 
to Olalquiaga, authenticity and originality are reactionary responses to mass 
production.  
However authenticity and originality are no longer meaningful in 
postmodernism. This is because while in the premodern period, copies were 
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secondary to the original (nature), over time modern copies lost their “inferiority 
complexes.”127 Olalquiaga reflects on this change, 
It isn’t easy to state this aspect of modernity without falling into moral 
judgments, such as we have lost the capacity to relate cosmically or 
spiritually with the work; therefore we are worse off than before, we are 
less human, more mechanical and cold, and so on.128  
She then proposes the concept of a “third nature,” which could allow us to think 
of nature “without immediately attaching to it the notion of origins and its collar 
of authenticity.”129  
 Third nature relieves nature of its idealism and allows it to be “intertwined 
with the cultural.” Olalquiaga defines nature as “a condition we’ve adapted to” 
rather that something that is “biological and non-socialized.” This is because our 
relationship to nature is mediated by language and culture, and also because 
human interactions within nature and culture change both. Therefore both nature 
and culture are experiential rather than static state or essence imagined by 
idealists. In other words nature has always been “contaminated” by culture. She 
explains, 
From the moment it goes beyond the strictly sensorial, our relationship to 
nature becomes a second-degree relationship, one that is not direct and 
immediate, but filtered by culture. However, this is a two-way street, since 
in the same way that nature becomes cultural to our eyes and through our 
actions, our own human nature is susceptible itself to this change. That is, 
our ‘original’ nature is transformed by culture in what is sometimes 
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perceived as a ‘second nature,’ usually indicating that something outside 
us has become such a part of ourselves that we now consider it part of our 
very nature.130  
Third nature is defined by Olalquiaga as the manipulation of nature with no 
cultural presence. Some examples of third nature provided by Olalquiaga include: 
• Clones, “an original that is only nature, nothing else” because it is all 
biological, contains all attributes of original, and is not a copy or a fake 
(Further, if a clone can experience subjectivity, then it is a form of nature 
that is neither singular nor unique); and 
• In vitro fertilization, where an egg is fertilized in an artificial environment 
outside of the living organism. 
According to Olalquiaga, the jeweled casings produced by the caddis larvae are 
an example of third nature because after intervening, Duprat allows nature to 
“take its course.” It is similar to pearl farming in that both create “a hybrid issued 
from nature and culture.”131 In contrast, cyborgs are not third nature because they 
contain a mixture of the biological and the artificial (natural and cultural). 
Duprat’s work, and that of Catherine Chalmers, which are discussed in the 
next chapter, are situated at the intersection of science with aesthetics and ethics. 
In the 1980s, the philosopher Sandra Harding called for a successor science, an 
approach that recognized the societal structures that influence the production and 
acceptance of what we call scientific knowledge. According to Harding the 
ideology of objectivity dominates Western science. A more accurate and inclusive 
understanding of the world could be achieved by taking into account the ways in 
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which particular “social locations” influence scientific practices and 
understandings. These social locations are located at various intersections within a 
structure organized around power hierarchies and include groups whose identities 
are determined by race, ethnicity, gender, and class, among other factors. Harding 
thought including as many points as possible in this “grid” would offer a better 
way of doing science, since traditional perspectives rely too heavily on an 
assumed universal reality. Therefore she argued, social and natural science should 
include various standpoints, each of which may value different types of 
knowledge, and thereby challenge knowledge-producing systems that overlook 
these standpoints.132 
A standpoint is not the same as a viewpoint or a perspective. A standpoint 
is the place from which people usually peripheral to the social hierarchy analyze 
the conditions of their lives and engage in a political struggle for change.133 While 
Harding’s standpoint theory offers a powerful critical tool to offset the isolated, 
rationalist, and universalizing strategies of science at the time it was first 
developed, since then Harding and others recognized some of its problematic 
tendencies. For example, since there is no objective position, standpoint can be 
criticized for being overly subjective. Because there is no clear way to determine 
which of competing stances or theories are correct or valid, it is vulnerable to 
relativism. In response to the first problem, one could argue that subjectivity 
already exists in science and that standpoint is actually a more democratic 
scientific practice. To the second, as others have observed, along with true, not-
true and false, less false can be a category of “epistemic assessment.”134 A final 
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caution is that anyone using standpoint theory must be careful to avoid the 
essentialist trap, and not assume all members of a particular group share the same 
opinion. Harding herself brings her work to the point of strong objectivity, 
arguing that ‘objectivity’ that is dependent on the dominant order does not 
understand its parameters nearly as clearly, or ‘strongly,’ as an objectivity that is 
based in standpoints from marginalized positions. 
Donna Haraway agrees with Harding that we need “views from 
somewhere” rather than “a conquering gaze from nowhere.”135 However, rather 
than focusing on the knower, Haraway emphasizes what is known within the 
particulars of a situation. Her concept of situated knowledge builds on the work of 
Harding and also addresses some of its potential pitfalls. Knowledge that is 
specific to a particular situation, according to Haraway, “offers a more adequate, 
richer, better account of a world, in order to live in it well and in critical, reflexive 
relation to our own as well as others’ practices of domination and the unequal 
parts of privilege and oppression that make up all positions.”136  
Theorist and performance artist Lynette Hunter expands Haraway’s ideas, 
arguing that not only the sciences but also the arts would benefit from a situated 
critique. In “A feminist critique of the rhetorical stance of contemporary 
aesthetics: Alternative standpoints,” Hunter introduces the rhetorically-informed 
concept of “situated textualities.” Situated textualities are places and occurrences 
where “people work on words together to build common ground for the 
articulation and valuing of knowledge.”137 Hunter draws upon rhetorical theory 
and practice, which has long distinguished between the situated, the systematic, 
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and the authoritarian. Rhetoric also positions truth as that which can be certain, 
plausible, or negotiated or probable.138 She explains that rhetoric can be 
understood as situated communication, and that it can create pathways between 
the situated textualities of the arts and the situated knowledges of science.139 
Approaching art in this way can begin to offer alternatives to the “wordlessness” 
of what is denied, even as these pathways themselves should be critiqued. It is not 
only the end point of either the art-making or the science that is important, but 
also the textuality of the process used to get there while at the same time 
sustaining the medium.  
The elements employed by science often appear to rely on an 
“autonomous, isolated individual” who is using “rationalist analytics in the 
service of absolute value-free logic” in the production of knowledge that appears 
to possess “neutral objectivity with verisimilitude and exact replicability.”140 
However while scientific knowledge is subject to critical review, insights 
discovered or revealed by the arts are often not. Yet, as Hunter points out, “much 
recognized ‘art’ is just as systematic as science,”141 and both are concerned with 
knowledge and with the communication of knowledge. We need to recognize that 
aesthetics as well as science has its epistemological concerns and so we must 
more seriously study this kind of knowledge, including how it is acquired and 
communicated. Without this effort at articulation, knowledge in both of these 
domains remains tacit. The “autonomous yet universal man” and other tacit 
assumptions will continue to obscure the situatedness of the lives of every 
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individual, including scientists and artists, and limit what falls within the 
“representational parameters.”142  
The consequence is that many people (and I would add, other sentient 
beings) are erased or overlooked. As a result the insights of those with differing 
perspectives that could enrich processes of assessment, change, and renewal are 
lost.143 Hunter goes on to ask, “[I]f the artistic texts are also able to carry and 
impose precisely the same elements as reductive science, why has there not been a 
parallel and through-going critique of aesthetics and criticism as they are taught 
and/or disseminated in the same institutional structures of the western world?”144 
Situated textuality allows one to read against the “privileged status,” in ways that 
are engaging rather than controlling or being controlled by it. Sidestepping 
adversarial debate, the work can become a “discursive site” that includes 
engaging with others in discussion or analysis.145 Rather than an “isolated genius 
who simultaneously can speak on behalf of all, conveying the absolute truth, 
through pure beauty,” artists can become engaged with “attempting the strategy of 
articulating the not-yet-represented or even embodied.“146 These epistemological 
and discursive strategies allow the arts and humanities to “discuss the difficulties 
that arise from the impossibility of neutral objectivity, fixed subjectivity and 
value-free knowledge” and provide a “context for the material working out of 
probably-the-best” rather than “plausible rationalization.”147 In contrast, 
according to Hunter,  
When valued canonical art, in the name of culture, wrests some element 
from ideology’s obscuring and brings it to language and representation, it 
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finds something that seems ‘true’ because it fits so neatly into the 
interstices of social life, something that seems to be ‘beauty.’ The power 
of such production occludes the fact that we have few ways of recognizing, 
let along valuing, elements brought to language from outwith ideological 
representations and their shadows.148  
While standpoint offers opportunities for negotiations to occur between 
individuals and communities, not all standpoints are morally acceptable. Hunter 
warns, “[T]extuality is not always conducive to moral or indeed ethical awareness. 
Much negotiation between the self and community is authoritative, it imposes 
rather than articulates, and so does a considerable amount of textuality.”149 Other 
criticisms to this approach arise from more traditional stances. For example, as 
Hunter observes, Barthe’s and Foucault’s work on critiquing the “isolated genius” 
is treated as “erasure of the ‘individual’” and Derrida’s critique of “pure truth” is 
dismissed in the essentialist/relativist dichotomy.150 
David Wojnarowicz, who died of an AIDs-related illness in 1992, used 
cockroaches as metaphorical objects and actors in his artworks, which were a 
response to the AIDs crisis. In the 1980s, Wojnarowicz identified with the 
cockroaches, and called them “non-charismatic mini-fauna.” Unlike in Duprat’s 
work, many of the cockroaches were harmed or killed during the art-making 
processes or while they were being exhibited. Ironically Wojnarowicz’s treatment 
of the cockroaches unintentionally mimics the abuse suffered by many gay people 
at the hands of homophobic people. In these works which address cultural phobias 
about AIDS and homosexuality, sexism and speciesism meet 
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While Haraway would surely not condone Wojnarowicz’s harmful 
manipulation of these insects, the ways in which the artist altered their bodies 
could be described as a cybordic process in which the cockroaches become hybrid 
creatures of both fiction and social reality. In “A Cyborg Manifesto” the metaphor 
of a cyborg is used by Haraway to address the problem of dualism, including 
human/animal and human/machine. Cyborgs do not have stable identities and 
cybernetic organisms can be divided into four categories: biological and 
mechanized systems; a hybrid comprised of machine and organism; a “creature of 
fiction” or a creature of “a lived social reality.”151 Any of these four categories 
allows for a cyborg to be human or animal, or a bit of both along with mechanized 
components or networks. The cyborg throws into disarray any conception of a 
stable identity or discrete social groups.  
Haraway wants to confuse boundaries and facilitate border crossings, 
because she rejects identities based on the ideologies of naturalism, essentialism, 
or traditional feminism. Instead Haraway is interested in what Media Studies 
scholar Theresa M. Senf calls a “linguistic community of situated, partial 
knowledges,” which instead of dividing the world into public and private, operate 
as “partialities” rather than as a “totalizing whole.”152 Along with a number of 
contemporary theorists, Haraway sees Western science and politics as building on 
“a tradition of the appropriation of nature as resource for the productions of 
culture.” This has led to a breakdown in relations between humans and animals 
due to pollution, tourism and medical experimentation among other things. The 
result is that “A stressed system goes awry; its communication processes break 
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down; it fails to recognize the difference between self and other.”153 Now, 
according to Haraway, machines are making “ambiguous the difference between 
the natural and the artificial.” She anticipates a time when “people are not afraid 
of their joint kinship with animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial 
identities and contradictory standpoints.”154 As Senft notes, Haraway uses the 
metaphor of the “integrated circuit” to illustrate that categories such as home, 
state, and church now function more like networked communications forms, 
rather than the separate, discrete entities they once claimed to be under older 
forms of capitalism.155 “A Cyborg Manifesto” has two main points: 
1. [T]he production of universal, totalizing theory is a major mistake that 
misses most of reality, and 
2. Taking responsibility for the social relations of science and technology 
means refusing an anti-science metaphysics, a demonology of 
technology.156  
Haraway concludes by stating “Cyborg imagery can suggest a way out of the 
maze of dualisms in which we have explained our bodies and our tools to 
ourselves. This is a dream not of a common language, but of a powerful infidel 
heteroglossia.”157 Haraway’s writing enacts what it might be like to be in such a 
linguistic community. Senft observes, “To a large degree Haraway's Manifesto 
operates in the spirit of ‘l'ecriture feminine’, using non-linear, performative and 
autobiographical language to describe the truth of a new kind of body: that of the 
cyborg.”158 This approach to theory was compelling to me because of the 
interdisciplinary nature of this dissertation, which melds art and philosophy. 
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Duprat and Wojnarowicz both use insects in their work, but there the 
similarity ends. For Duprat, the insects create the aesthetic object; for 
Wojnarowicz, the altered insects become the aesthetic object. Were one to image 
Duprat and the caddis fly larvae within the framework of the medieval conception 
of Chain of Being discussed earlier, each could be seen as functioning in unique 
ways within an indivisible whole, rather than as two discrete entities working 
either in a hierarchical fashion or across a nature-culture divide. It is also clear 
that Duprat is aware of the lifeworld or Umwelt of these tiny animals. Also Duprat 
appears to be as concerned with human-animal relations as with the objects 
created with or by them. Although harsher than Beuys, who did not intend to 
harm the coyote and seems to have developed a real affection for Little John, both 
Beuys and Wojnarowicz use the animals to communicate symbolically. 
Wojnarowicz is using the cockroaches in a very instrumental manner and seems 
to hold a Cartesian attitude toward them. They are treated more like machines 
than living beings. The artist does not seem to perceive, or perhaps doesn’t care, 
that the cockroaches have particular needs and interests, He transforms them into 
mechanized objects to create particular effects or reactions. In contrast, Duprat’s 
direct experience with the caddis fly larvae in their own environment is similar to 
that of an ethnographer intimately familiar with the people (or in this case, 
insects) he is studying, and with their ways. From how he handles and speaks 
about the caddis fly larvae, it is clear he is beginning to work on developing a 
culture and a language that honors their relationship. 
E. Biophobia: Situated Animals 
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The fifth chapter examines the American Cockroach project, which was 
created by Catherine Chalmers, an American artist who lives and works in New 
York City, using photography, video, sculptures, drawings, and installations. She 
began exhibiting these works in 2003. Her exploration into the lives of insects, 
amphibians, reptiles, and small mammals more generally began in 1994. 
Chalmers’ work is an example of more recent and challenging theories of human-
animal relations, and different concepts of sentience. As this summary 
demonstrates, the artwork being studied prompts a thorough-going reassessment 
of late twentieth-century philosophy around issues of aesthetics, ethics, and 
ontology.  
Not only in film, but also in performances with living animals, a comfortable 
distance between animals and humans is typically maintained through an array of 
artistic conventions. Michael Kirby, a drama theorist, describes a performance as 
a symbolic matrix of time, place and character. As discussed earlier in this 
introduction, he believes the disparity between the artistic event and the 
spectator’s reality is important in performances. Some theorists would disagree, 
and believe that affirming the audience member’s personal response can result in 
a much deeper and stronger aesthetic experiences. Chalmers’ work, in which the 
staged “performance” of the cockroaches is designed to intrude upon the 
spectator’s distanced perspective, is an example of this alternate view. In contrast, 
in a non-matrixed performance of a task (for example in scientific experiments 
with cockroaches) scientists are simply performing tasks, but not “performing” in 
the theatrical sense. This suggests the differing aims of art and science with regard 
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to animals. In both situations, the insects are manipulated by humans to one 
degree or another and so “perform.” Chalmers intends to provoke thought and 
reflection in viewers. In a scientific study, the focus is on a performance that has 
measurable outcomes. There is no audience, only consumers of information, and 
the animal is an object of study. Chalmers presents the cockroaches as subjects or 
actors. They both embody and deliver content and even emotion, in a symbolic 
matrix. In a scientific experiment they are objects used as a means to deliver 
content. 
Chalmers describes herself as being “born with an over-active sense of 
what E. O. Wilson calls ‘biophilia.” In addition to her strong sense of a bond with 
all living things, her interest in human-animal relationships is driven by the 
realization that we live in a time when many animals are becoming extinct.159 For 
her, the art is “a toolbox I use to investigate what intrigues me.” Her artwork is a 
“record of her discovery.” She hopes that her work “could function like a 
flashlight illuminating what I think is important.”, Food chains were obvious and 
there was “No need to make art about them” a few hundred years ago, but there is 
now because people today are much less connected with natural processes and no 
longer raise their own food.160 
Just as with the theorists discussed earlier, Chalmers also sees nature as a 
human creation: “It's one of those words whose definition changes throughout 
time. We would call a nature reserve natural because there are no buildings or 
roads there. But that reserve has been completely modified and managed by 
human beings."161 Zoos, with their breeding and conservation programs, are 
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another example. She notes, “We have got ourselves into a position where, in the 
natural world, things are so out of balance that there is a need for intervention on 
our part, trying to put it right, or to what we believe is supposed to be right.”162 
Although through her close-up, large-scale images Chalmers is engaging 
with face-to-face encounters in a literal, rather than a metaphysical sense, it is 
irresistible to think about her work within the context of the ethics of Emmanuel 
Lévinas. The ethics of Lévinas is phenomenological in that it is founded upon a 
face-to-face encounter that is a “pre-intellectual affective experience.”163 As 
Bruce Young, a critical theorist, explains, the “other” (autrui) means the other 
person. This is someone that we encounter one at a time, face-to-face. Lévinas 
defines “face” (visage), according to Young, as a human face, but one that is not 
experienced as a physical or aesthetic object. Instead it is the “living presence of 
another person” and so could include bodily presence and other sensory 
impressions. Our inability to conceptualize this other face demonstrates the 
other’s “infinity.”164  
This encounter with the other arises from an individual’s capacity to 
experience sensations and emotion, sensibility and affectivity, and not from logic, 
utility, or duty. Lévinas believes the impact of the other on one’s senses and 
emotions is unlike any other experience one could possibly encounter. According 
to the philosopher Bettina Bergo’s reading of Lévinas, this “affective event,” in 
which another person calls out to me, even without words, evokes a response in 
me. This “intrinsic relationality” is “the beginning of language as dialogue.” 
According to Lévinas during a face-to-face encounter I first perceive an other (the 
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third person), then recognize the “thou,” the second person. In both instances 
there is an unbridgeable distance, but a sense of responsibility arises with a shift 
to the second person. Bergo describes this encounter as “an affective interruption” 
or a “lived immediacy” that is translated into language before it can be understood. 
This “lived immediacy” is also a characteristic of many creative activities and 
arts-oriented experiences. With respect to animals, the artist can make choices 
which will either enhance or diminish the likelihood of this kind of face to face 
encounter. In addition to increasing the potential for ethical recognition, according 
to Lévinas, the ego will discover its particularity — the “me,” the “I” — only 
after being “singled out by the gaze of another.” 165 We recognize ourselves at the 
same moment as becoming aware of our responsibility to others. 
Bergo identifies three stages in this “event of transcendence,” or the 
interruption in which dialogue and ethics are intimately intertwined:  
First, the onset of the other, as the expression of the face, causes freedom 
of will to falter and opens a “me” to goodness. Second, in accounting for 
itself, the subject approached by the other engages the first act of dialogue. 
Out of this, discourse eventually arises. The unfolding of discourse carries 
a trace of ethical investiture and self-accounting, and may become 
conversation and teaching. As the breadth of dialogical engagement 
expands, the trace of the encounter with the other becomes attenuated; and 
this, to the point where the meaning of justice poses a question.166 
The transcendence is the spontaneous sense of responsibility for another person. 
As such, it is essentially relational. This “face” of the other is “outside of 
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structures of force and conflict” and makes a “demand” that is unavoidable and so 
pulls the “me” outside of its usual sphere. The face-to-face encounter is between 
particular beings, so transcendence is redefined as a day-to-day common event 
rather than an “out of this world” experience. Since it is precognitive, there is no 
clear memory of it; each event has unexpectedness about it, and a unique quality. 
It is not intentional and cannot be contained by moral codes or universal precepts.  
 So far, this does not preclude what Lévinas calls the face-to-face 
relationship with an animal, and yet he restricts this kind of encounter to humans. 
In “Ethics and Trauma: Lévinas, Feminism, and Deep Ecology,” the philosopher 
Roger S. Gottlieb agrees with Lévinas that our responsibility for the other arises 
from “our sense of the other’s vulnerability and need, together with the other’s 
call to justice.167 He also agrees that we need to move ethics away from 
“knowledge, emotional connection, or self-interest.”168 However Gottlieb is 
critical of any ethics founded on the binary premise that humans have choices 
while animals, bound by instinct, have none. As other contemporary thinkers 
concerned with human-animal relations have noted, Lévinas himself offers a 
compelling example of an animal whose actions appear to contradict this instinct-
driven fight for survival that precludes the capacity for ethical encounters. In “The 
Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights,” Lévinas recalls the period when he was 
incarcerated as a prisoner-of-war. A stray dog wandered into the Nazi prison 
camp and prisoners named him Bobby. Lévinas calls him “the Last Kantian in 
Nazi Germany.”169 During the time of their encounter with Bobby, Lévinas 
describes himself and the other men as “stripped of our human skin. Both guards 
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and local residents behaved as if the prisoners were “subhuman, a gang of 
apes.”170 Bobby’s joyous greetings each morning and evening, “jumping up and 
down and barking in delight,” reminded them that they were men. Yet for Lévinas, 
Bobby does not have a face.  
The philosopher Matthew Calarco devotes a chapter to Lévinas in 
Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Heidegger to Derrida. In spite of 
the fact that for Lévinas “the Other is always and only the human Other,” Calarco 
argues that the “underlying logic of his thought permits no such 
anthropocentrism.”171 Instead Calarco finds a foundation for a universal ethical 
consideration without a priori constraints or boundaries.” 172 He challenges two 
premises used by Lévinas. The first is that no nonhuman animals are capable of 
an ethical response to the other, and the second is that animals do not elicit ethical 
responses from humans. 
Calarco points out that Bobby is acting altruistically. Although he has 
nothing material to offer the prisoners, and even though his life is also at stake, he 
“pause[s] in his struggle for existence to be with the men and to offer them what 
he can: his vitality, excitement, and affection.”173 This gift is received but not 
recognized by Lévinas. Further Calarco asserts these kinds of gifts are not 
“interruptions” in the order of being, not marks of human transcendence, but are 
done by both humans and animals, and are “purely and wholly immanent to the 
natural world.”174  
Calarco argues that Lévinas’ reading of Darwin, in which Lévinas 
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concludes that “animal existence is ‘solely a struggle for survival without ethics’” 
is off the mark. Rather Calarco believes Darwin believed that “basic forms of 
ethical behavior can be found throughout both human society and the animal 
kingdom.” Second, Darwin identifies characteristics such as rationality, language, 
and morality as traits that are not unique to humans but can be found elsewhere in 
Nature. Finally, unlike Lévinas’ claim that there is a fundamental difference in 
kind between humans and animals, Darwin found (and 21st century scientists 
agree) that the differences between humans and animals are only in degree.175 
Calarco concludes that to make a distinct break between animals and humans is 
not only bad biology, but also bad philosophy.176 
Biological continuism, first introduced by Darwin, is today widely 
accepted by many scientists. Calarco calls for philosophy to critically examine 
“the anthropocentric-epistemological thrust that has dominated and continues to 
dominate the overwhelming majority of philosophical inquiry.”177 He believes, 
Philosophy can no longer in good conscience ground itself on the 
assumption that human perspectives and human interest constitute the 
primary locus for thought. In short, today philosophy finds itself faced by 
animals, a sharp reversal of the classical philosophical gaze.178 
While we are inevitably — perhaps — anthropocentric, if this were to be 
recognized, instead of blindly assumed, we could admit, in Calarco’s words, “We 
know neither what animals can do nor what they might become.”179 We would not 
only admit that we are unable to definitely claim that animals do not have a face, 
as Lévinas did, but also to becomes more vulnerable to their power to call our 
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egoism into question. Being open to “an affective interruption” from an animal 
offers rich opportunities to recognize our own particularities, which is also 
something that experiencing the arts can do. 
 Calarco believes Lévinas’ account of ethical experience doesn’t support 
the boundary he tries to establish between human and animal.180 In Totality and 
Infinity, the other is not identified specifically as a human being, but as an “ethical 
concept.” Exclusions to the ethical challenge posed by the other include the 
feminine, essentially an empty placeholder for intimacy and welcoming, and “the 
resistance of nonhuman things [which] does not make any impact on me.”181 
Neither can evoke a sense of responsibility from the ego. If one were to remove 
what Calarco calls this “idiosyncratic restriction,” there would be far more 
occasions where we might experience the interruption of egoism and also more 
opportunities for the evocation of ethical responses. Also, Calarco suggests that 
we enlarge the possibilities for interruption to include kindness or vitality as well 
as lack. The possibility of transformation, understood as the push by the other 
toward responsibility, might occur not only through giving, but also through 
leaving alone or joining with in celebration.182 
Historically Calarco notes all attempts to enlarge moral considerability 
have always been met with “the same reactionary rejoinder of absurdity from 
those who uphold common sense.”183 As feminists and environmentalists and 
animal rights ethicists have enlarged areas of moral considerability, we should 
recognize that the question of who is eligible for this status does not have a final 
answer. Calarco asks, “If ethics arises from an encounter with an Other who is 
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fundamentally irreducible to and unanticipatable by my egoistic and cognitive 
machinations, how could this question ever be answered once and for all?”184 
As Calarco observes, “If we are to learn anything from Lévinas, it is that 
ethical experience occurs precisely where phenomenology is interrupted and that 
ethical experience is traumatic and not easily captured by thought. Given its 
diachronic structure, ethical experience can at best be only partially reconstructed 
in thetic form. This would, it seems, require us always to proceed as if we may 
have missed or misinterpreted the Other’s trace.”185 While the arts use many 
strategies, including concepts and logic to communicate, they can also reach us on 
the precognitive and affective level. Therefore the arts are especially well suited 
for offering new ways of engaging with the animal other and for the strategic 
disruption of metaphysical anthropocentrism called for by Calarco. 
Calarco concludes his chapter on Lévinas with a reminder of the urgency 
and the necessity of recognizing our responsibility to the animal other: “Never 
before in human history have so many animals been subjected to horrific 
slaughter, unconscionable abuse and unthinkable living conditions.” He also calls 
on us to notice animal resistance: 
The elephant who escapes from its imprisonment at a circus; the pig who 
flees the slaughterhouse and runs free in the streets until shot by police; 
the whales who protect each other from harpoons; the lion who mauls its 
human handler; the chimpanzee who attacks an experimental scientist; the 
feral cat who refuses to be handled; Bobby the dog surviving against all 
odds in ‘some wild patch in the region of the camp’ — these and other 
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such figures of animal resistance should remain at the core of animal 
ethics as much as the suffering animals whose terrible fate we indirectly 
catch sight of at meal time or in underground videos of slaughterhouses.186  
This notion of animal resistance is one that is rarely considered by theorists, and 
for many artists and animal trainers it is simply something to be overcome. For 
Calarco it is an intentional act by the animal, an articulation of a position demands 
our attention and an ethical response. 
In “(De)Facing the Animals: Zooesis and Performance,” Una Chaudhuri 
also reflects on the story about Bobby. She also challenges the denial by Lévinas 
to see in Bobby an “ethical face.”187 “The phenomenon of the face is not in its 
purest form in the dog," Lévinas claims. One wonders if in that moment it is 
Lévinas who is unable to access that moment of transcendence, that “Good 
beyond Being,” and not Bobby. As the years went on, although Lévinas never 
affirmed that animals could have this capacity, he seems to have become less 
definite about it. In an interview in the late 1980s he says, “I cannot say at what 
moment you have the right to be called ‘face.’” Yet he continued to believe that 
“The human face is completely different and only afterwards do we discover the 
face of the animal.”188  
Why does Lévinas deny the “ethical face” of the animal in his philosophy? 
Perhaps for a man that was treated as subhuman for so long in a concentration 
camp, it was too threatening to think that a dog could contain “a trace of the 
infinite.” Perhaps the answer lies in his effort to connect philosophy and religion, 
the immediate moment and the infinite, the material and the ineffable. Bergo 
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explains that Lévinas believed “[it] is and must remain a question too large for 
philosophy to know what explains the force of the other's expression. Nothing 
explains it.”189 The transcendence is the “Good beyond Being” and as such 
contains a trace of the infinite. Therefore transcendence is neither fully in the 
world, nor is it an exclusively spiritual experience. Because animals are only 
“biological” according to Lévinas, they do not contain the “trace of the 
infinite.”190  
Chaudhuri notes many similarities between the face-to-face encounter of 
Lévinas and those experienced by artists who are working with animals. These 
include embodied presence and expressive encounters in a shared time-space.191 
In spite of what she calls “the laugh test,” the response of most people to the 
claim that we should take animals seriously, she points out that an increasing 
number of artists and philosophers are concerned with our ethical relationship 
with animals. She cites Derrida’s observation that ignoring the capacity of an 
animal to look at us is a “calculated forgetting” and that pets are “radical others 
sharing one’s most intimate moments and spaces.”192 On the other hand, 
Chaudhuri points out the face is not always a means of connecting. She describes 
Deleuze’s and Guattari’s description of the face as a “deadening social mask 
imposed on the modern subject.” This face, according to them, can “cover the 
whole body, indeed the whole world; it is a grid, a diagram, a binary machine, and 
is in its very nature despotic; it takes the human animal and makes it Man; it takes 
the love and makes her Citizen; it takes the animal and makes it bestial.” The 
animal on the other hand is “free of faciality, immersed in the very condition that 
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makes the animal so threatening to individualistic humanism: its multiplicity, its 
membership in a herd or pack in which individuals are not readily 
distinguishable.”193 While the dog remembered by Lévinas is very much a 
particular individual, the erasure of his face, as proposed by Deleuze and Guattari, 
would cast him into a pack.  
In spite of our perception of their pack-like existence, if we could in fact 
see the faces of insects in the ethical sense described by Lévinas, our relationships 
could be reimagined, something that Chalmers is very much interested in 
exploring. In the text accompanying “Befriending a Bug,” a multimedia work 
created for “Should You Ever Find Yourself in Solitary,” Chalmers writes, “Flies, 
spiders, ants and cockroaches – all could easily come and go through the cracks of 
a prison cell as if they were freeways, challenging the very notion of solitary.” 
There are many similarities: for example, ants are social and have “invented a 
networked communication system that rivals the Internet.” She compares 
antennae touches to text messages, and points out that ant conversation is not top 
down, but is one of connection and collaboration. Anyone could benefit from 
feeding ants, because “those antennae touches will communicate a message to 
come visit you. To feed and care for another being, or hundreds of beings, has 
proven health and emotional benefits.”194 Flies live out the same dramas of birth, 
sex, predation, war and death as humans, just on a smaller scale. However, as 
Chalmers observes, “humans often prefer control over companionship, and this is 
something that bugs offer even someone in solitary confinement.” She concludes, 
“But maybe you buy none of this. For some people solitary confinement is 
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preferable to the company of insects. Then at least a bug could provide a rare 
opportunity for the expression of control over your environment, as you chase it 
around the cell and simply squish it out of existence. Humans have been doing 
this for a very long time.”195 Her imagined interactions between prisoner and 
insect dissolve the barrier between the aesthetic object or actor and the spectator 
or viewer. The insect and the person are in one matrix of time and space, perhaps 
a “becoming animal.”  
For Lévinas, for whom the particular and singular individual is so 
important, the pack would be an erasure of the self, and so of one’s humanity. In 
contrast, in A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guatarri reject the idea of any 
stable and fixed self, preferring instead the pack. Rather than affirming the value 
of an individual, which could be understood metaphorically as a tree, with its 
single trunk and stable point of origin, they prefer the rhizome, a multiple that 
grows horizontally and has an expansive network of connections. Not only plants, 
but also animals, and especially those in packs are rhizomes.196 Also in contrast to 
Lévinas, who prioritizes the human, Deleuze and Guattari affirm a horizontal 
orientation in which animals are important because, as they explain, 
the relationships between animals are the object not only of science but 
also of dreams, symbolism, art and poetry, practice and practical use. And 
on the other hand, the relationships between animals are bound up with the 
relations between man and animal, man and woman, man and child, man 
and the elements, man and the physical and microphysical universe.197 
While animals aren’t explicitly valued for their instrumental use, the focus is still 
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on the human. Based on their relationships with, and use by people, Deleuze and 
Guattari categorize animals in three ways.198 “Individuated animals” are 
sentimental pets. These are “oedipal animals each with its own petty history.” 
Deleuze and Guattari disdainfully state that “anyone who likes cats or dogs is a 
fool.” The second category applies to animals used in myths, often for patriotic or 
religious purposes. The third grouping, the “demonic animal,” is in a pack or 
comes together as “affect animals that form a multiplicity, a becoming, a 
population, a tale  . . . .” The philosopher Alain Beaulieu explains that demonic 
here means daïmon, a creature existing between the world of the living (states-of-
beings) and some kind of suprasensible world comprised of inorganic life, affects, 
and impersonal forces.199 An animal in one category can be “treated” in ways that 
will move it to another one. For example, an animal that is a member of a pack 
might be singled out to be treated as a pet.  
In their philosophy Deleuze and Guattari transform subject-object 
relations. Molar units — discrete forms with clearly delineated boundaries and 
identities — are replaced by fields of activity described as molecular. Affect is not 
a personal emotion but an interactive state. Molecular dynamics are not contained 
within nor dependent upon form. The molecular “effects a dissolution of form that 
connects the most diverse longitudes and latitudes, the most varied speeds and 
slownesses, which guarantees a continuum by stretching variations far beyond its 
formal limits.”200  
These multiplicities — the pack or the molecular dynamics (and not a 
collection of entities) — become assemblages. Assemblages come into being, 
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change, or even dissipate in an ongoing dynamic of becomings.201 Deleuze and 
Guattari celebrate “multiplicity” because they believe that “everything is not 
composed of units operating within rules, as in structuralism, but of multiplicities 
spreading and connecting with other multiplicities within a non-centered 
structure.” According to them, “A multiplicity has neither subject nor object, only 
determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions that cannot increase in number 
without the multiplicity changing in nature . . . .”202 Instead of offspring — or 
filiation, as they characterize the process — the life of the pack increases through 
infection or contagion. Therefore “packs form, develop, and are transformed by 
contagion.”203 The pack is simultaneously an animal reality, and the reality of the 
becoming-animal of the human being.  
Instead of “playing” family with animals, Deleuze and Guattari place the 
greatest value on “becoming animal.” Becomings occur in the space in between 
rather than within any given entity. Since they emphasize what becoming animal 
is not in great detail, but do not spend much time defining what it is, I found it 
helpful to consider they ways in which other philosophers interpreted this concept. 
The one that came closest to my own reading of One Thousand Plateaus was 
written by Gerald L. Bruns: 
Basically “becoming-animal” is a movement in which a subject no longer 
occupies a realm of stability but rather is folded into a nomadic mode of 
existence in which one is always an anomaly, that is, inaccessible to any 
form of definition. It is a movement from body to flesh, where the one is a 
figure of unity and strength, while the other is in an interminable state of 
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disarticulation or disfigurement . . . . It is not animal metamorphosis but an 
achievement of non-identity, which for Deleuze and Guattari is the 
condition of freedom.204 
Deleuze and Guattari contrast this work of becoming free through the dissolution 
of identity — a philosophical approach, with two scientific ones: natural history 
(defined as exploring relationships within a framework of series and structures 
between animals) and evolutionary science (which is concerned with “genealogy, 
kinship, descent, and filiation).205 In both, the driving principle is mimesis: for the 
natural sciences, this is “as perpetually imitating one another, progressively or 
regressively” in relation to a divine being. For evolution, this is in the form of 
“mirror imitation with nothing left to imitate because it itself is the model 
everything else imitates, this time by ordered difference.”  
Chalmers’ work with insects, and especially cockroaches is interesting to 
consider within the differing perspectives of Lévinas and Deleuze and Guattari. 
The cockroaches’ movements in packs that are both impersonal and energetic are 
unnerving for many. These pack-like characteristics are just what Chalmers is 
challenging in her subversive presentation of them as individuals with “faces” and 
facing very human predicaments. The cockroaches are “becoming human.” They 
are certainly not pets or mythic beings. Chalmers’ cockroaches could also be 
understood as falling into what Deleuze and Guattari describe as the demonic 
category, living yet without affect, embodying a human reality — or perhaps 
nightmare in the execution series. Both of these apparently incongruous 
philosophies can be applied to Chalmers’ work, in which the animal moves into 
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narratives once reserved only for humans. In the follow chapter, it is the humans 
who try to “become animal,” not by relinquishing their humanity but by merging 
with a herd and seeking out a common language. 
F. Leaving the Field: Being with Animals 
In chapter two I consider the question “How are animals made to perform 
in circuses?” In chapter five I engage with the question “How are animals made to 
mean?” through looking as some recent changes in the ways in which artists work 
with animals in performances.206 In that interview with “The Guardian” cited 
earlier in this introduction Chalmers observes that we bring a “third human eye” 
to the predator-prey act. Humans place themselves outside of nature and watch, 
both “fascinated and repelled by violence among animals . . . .” Another strategy 
for distancing is that afforded by maintaining the human-animal and nature-
culture divide. Televised nature films are example of this dynamic. “[A]s long as 
nature stays over there, we accept it being red in tooth and claw and, as every TV 
producer knows, viewers get a thrill watching, from the comfort of the couch, 
animals tearing one another apart.” Chalmers observes, “But, when nature unfolds 
in the human realm, people’s reactions are all over the map.”207 Chalmers’ work 
is designed to disrupt the distance, and so is the work of the artists discussed next. 
Animal acts that emphasize human-animal relationships and celebrate the 
innate behaviors of horses are the focus of the performances in this concluding 
sixth chapter. While the productions of Théâtre Équestre Zingaro, under the 
direction of Bartabas, are informed by mythic and symbolic content, the dances 
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by Nita Little and Joanna Mendl Shaw focus on how we might redefine human-
animal relations through expanding our conception of language and creating a 
shared vocabulary. In all of the works, nature is presented as superior in one way 
or another to culture, and so that binary is a powerful influence. The premise that 
language is a uniquely human attribute is challenged by all of these artists, and 
other, embodied kinds of languages are embraced, studied, and utilized. With 
perhaps the exception of Little, the works described here are cultural products 
created for audiences that present a vision of human-animal relations or of what 
humans imagine about these animals, about nature, or both. While more or less 
building on natural behavior in ways that are distinctively different from the 
circus acts described in chapter five, the horses are still not simply acting 
“naturally.”  
Théâtre Zingaro comes out of a circus tradition, but also integrates theater, 
dance, music and poetry in its spectacular multimedia productions. The head 
trainer and artistic director, Bartabas, uses a system of incentives or disincentives 
with the horses, and is careful to respond to each particular animal’s personality 
and abilities. In language that echoes the ideas of Haraway and Deleuze and 
Guattari, Bartabas describes his work as “a joint ‘becoming,’ a collaboration 
between two forms of intelligence”: “dances of the im/possibility of contact.”208 
Bartabas also seems to express the longing for that cross-species connection 
described by Diane Ackerman. 
Nita Little describes her interactions with a horse named Kate during a 
workshop offered by Mendl Shaw. In her essay, “Dancing Attention on a Ground 
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of Inequivalence,” Little uses a form of dance called Contact Improvisation to 
explore relationships between the territories of her own body and that of the horse 
Contact Improvisation has been described as a “framework for an improvised duet” 
and “a dance of investigation of weight, touch, and communication.”209 Mendl 
Shaw is interested in the “nonverbal conversations” which can occur between 
humans and horses. Her work is informed by the Parelli Natural Horsemanship 
(PNH) equine training system. PNH training uses a set of exercises called 
horsenatilies. Depending on the horse’s personality, approaches to training will 
vary.210 Like Bartabas, Mendl Shaw emphasizes a relational and embodied 
approach. The Equus Project under the direction of Mendl Shaw presents large-
scale site-specific works for dancers and horses. One of their dances, (Un)stable 
Landscape, which is performed on a hillside field in Maine, is discussed at length 
in the last chapter. 
The field, as contrasted with a paddock, serves as metaphor for a 
movement by horses and dancers from culture to nature. Fields are also used to 
refer to areas of scholarly specialization. These fields, as Edward Said observes in 
Orientalism, “acquire coherence and integrity in time because scholars devote 
themselves in different ways to what seems to be a commonly agreed-upon 
subject matter.”211 In another passage he writes,  
Yet it goes without saying that a field of study is rarely as simply defined 
as even its most committed partisans . . . claim it is. Beside, a field can 
change so entirely, even in the most traditional disciplines . . . as to make 
an all-purpose definition of subject matter almost impossible.212  
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Said connects these disciplines with the production of particular kinds of 
knowledge. As Spivak has noted, these relations are informed by assumptions 
which support the establishment of power relations based on hierarchies which in 
turn justified Western imperialism. While Said is referring to the Western 
production of knowledge about the Middle East, his insights also can be applied 
to how we produce knowledge about and understand concepts such as nature and 
culture, and more specifically, human-animal relations.  
The challenges for artists who are concerned with these issues evoke the 
one raised by Gayatri Spivak in “Can the Subaltern Speak?” This essay explores 
relations between imperialist Britain and the Indian Hindus in general, and the 
practice of sati in particular, and suggests that this dynamic might also be applied 
to other situations and relationships. She considers the challenges associated with 
understanding groups that are in subordinate positions in relation to those in 
control. As Spivak’s later work, clarifies, the subaltern is not simply the radical 
other. She believes excessively emphasizing differences, or in the case of her 
work in subalternity, the inability to speak or to be heard diverts our attention 
away from the necessity of having in place what Spivak calls a “valid institutional 
background for resistance.” In the example of sati, there is only “institutional 
validation” for this practice and so resistance was possible, or in the case of those 
who did resist, it was not recognized. In some ways this parallels the animal other, 
who is positioned on the other side of that “abyss” or “Great Divide” and yet both 
is and is not the other we imagine.213 Spivak describes the ways in which those 
with the power cannot help but impose their standards and ways of knowing on 
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that other. The interests, activities, and perspectives of the subaltern group are 
distorted, according to Spivak, because even in spite of the best intentions the 
dominant group inevitably and at times even unconsciously, put its own interests 
first. Even those wishing to give others a voice end up unintentionally silencing 
them. 
 In “Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography,” Spivak considers 
possibilities for change, and specifically ones that will put the subaltern in the 
position of being a change agent rather than the object of reform. Summarizing 
the conclusions of the Subaltern Studies group, she describes change as something 
that should be “pluralized and plotted as confrontations rather than transition” and 
that such changes are “signaled or marked by a functional change in sign 
systems.”214 An example of a functional change in a sign system is the shift from 
describing a group from criminal to insurgent, or an individual from bondsman to 
worker.215 These shifts relocate the agency of change; in this case from the 
enforcers of the law to the insurgent (or subaltern).  
Spivak writes that a functional change in a sign-system is a “violent event” 
because “change itself can only be operated by the force of a crisis.” For change 
to occur, the space for a change must already have been present in the sign-system 
as it was functioning beforehand. This is because the change functions as a 
supplement to a lack in a previous function. Therefore, Spivak explains, “The 
crisis could not have made the change happen.”216 She directs her reader to 
Derrida’s analysis of this shift: “The movement of signification adds 
something . . . but this addition . . . comes to perform a vicarious function, to 
	   94	  
supplement a lack on the part of the signified.”217 For Derrida, texts are structures 
that are created through “inclusions, exclusions and various means of cancelling 
out contradictions.” A text may be a book, and it also can be any kind of structure 
that has borders, edges, or limits. Texts have what Derrida calls “contradictory 
coherence,” which means that the contradictions in it are suppressed. In what 
Spivak calls the “clandestine operation of supplementarity” something is added to 
complete a thing, make up for a deficiency, or extend or strengthen the whole.218 
 According to Derrida, it is impossible to know everything about any field 
of study. As the literary theorist John Phillips explains, this “assumption of 
totalization” is an illusion for two reasons. First, “There is more than one can say. 
There is no theoretical language rich or dense enough to capture the finite world 
of rich particularity.” 219 The second reason is that the field itself — exclusive of 
whatever content it contains — is finite, without a center, and nevertheless 
contains infinite substitutions. At this absence center is the process of difference, 
which can mean either to defer or to differ from.  
 Because of this absence at the center, knowledge is never complete. In 
“Structure, Sign, and Play,” Derrida explains, 
If totalization no longer has any meaning, it is not because the infiniteness 
of a field cannot be covered by a finite glance or a finite discourse, but 
because the nature of the field — that is language, and a finite language — 
excludes totalization. This field is in effect that of play, that is to say, a 
field of infinite substitutions only because it is finite, because instead of 
being an inexhaustible field, as in the classical hypothesis, instead of being 
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too large, there is something missing from it: a center which arrests and 
grounds the play of substitutions.220  
Derrida’s point, as Phillips emphasizes, is that there is an “unpresentable absence 
at the very core of experience.”221  
In “Violence and Metaphysics” Derrida considers the differences between 
empirical knowledge, arising from the senses, and philosophical knowledge 
arising from an interaction between experience and reason. Lévinas’ “radical 
empiricism” is one that is neither transcendental nor empirical. While Derrida 
agrees with Lévinas’ description of this encounter, and agrees that “the experience 
of the other (of the infinite) is irreducible” he asks, 
[C]an one speak of an experience of the other or of difference? Has not the 
concept of experience always been determined by the metaphysics of 
presence? Is not experience always the encountering of an irreducible 
presence, the perception of a phenomenality?222 
Derrida concludes that the experience of the infinitely other exposes the 
illusion of a “metaphysics of presence,” the belief, or perhaps the premise, that 
one can use either rational or empirical means to gain a complete knowledge of 
another creature or thing. Yet even the radical empiricism of Lévinas’ experience 
of the other is insufficient. As Phillips points out,  
You cannot see a difference per se (nor taste one). You cannot think a 
difference per se. If one is serious about calling the experience of 
difference an experience then one has to go beyond both empiricism and 
metaphysics. The empiricality of the trace or mark . . . cannot be reduced 
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to sensible or intelligible experience. There is now a different concept of 
experience altogether.”223 
While Said and Spivak consider the ways in which field of knowledge and 
cultural hierarchies limit understanding, and Derrida examines how language 
itself is a centerless field of infinite substitutions, Bakhtin affirms the value of a 
“multiplicity of social voices and a wide variety of their links and 
interrelationships.” He is also interested in the multilayered links between 
utterances and languages.224 
In Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, Bakhtin uses the concept of 
polyphony, a situation in which voices do not add up to one complete whole and 
yet they do not necessarily contradict each other. Instead, polyphony is related to 
the “unfinalizable self.” While Bakhtin’s focus was on humans, these insights can 
be applied to communications between and among many species. In their 
biography of Bakhtin, Clark and Holquist explain, “In Bakhtin, the difference 
between humans and other forms of life is a form of authorship, since the means 
by which a specific ratio of self-to-other responsibility is achieved in any given 
action — a deed being understood as an answer — comes about as the result of 
efforts by the self to shape a meaning out of the encounter between them” 
(emphasis added).225 Bakhtin’s ideas about language extend beyond the written 
and spoken word. He writes, “The dialogic contrast of languages (but not of 
meanings within the limits of a single language) delineates the boundaries of 
languages, creates a feeling for these boundaries, compels one to sense physically 
the plastic forms of different languages.”226   
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Heteroglossia or the “social diversity of speech types” refers to internal 
stratification within the same language. 227 Age, group membership, profession, 
current events, “passing fashions” and “sociopolitical purposes of the day, and 
even of the hour” influence how we use language.228 In “Discourse in the Novel,” 
Bakhtin writes, “Each word tastes of the context and contexts in which it has lived 
its socially charged life.”229 In The Dialogic Imagination Bakhtin describes 
language as embedded in a physical realm: 
At any given time, in any given place, there will be a set of conditions —
social, historical, meteorological, physiological — that will insure that a 
word [and I would add gesture, sound, touch, glance] uttered in that place 
and at that time will have a meaning different than it could have under any 
other conditions; all utterances are heteroglot in that they are functions of 
a matrix of forces practically impossible to recoup, and therefore 
impossible to resolve. Heteroglossia is as close a conceptualization as is 
possible of that locus where centripetal and centrifugal forces collide; as 
such, it is that which a systematic linguistics must always suppress 
(emphasis added). 230  
An utterance — a spoken word, statement, or vocal sound — is one of many links 
in innumerable chains of speech acts. Utterances are not simply generated by an 
individual, but are “responsive reactions to other utterances.”231. According to 
Bakhtin, each utterance has four traits: boundaries, responsivity or dialogicality; 
an ending (where the speaker has finished), and a generic form. The generic form 
depends on the sphere where the communication is occurring, and yet at the same 
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time it is maintained by the speech genre. If the genre doesn’t match the sphere, 
the one communicating is seen as incompetent by others in that sphere. A sphere 
could be a professional, social, or familial environment, among others.232 An 
utterance — a spoken word, statement, or vocal sound — is one of many links in 
innumerable chains of speech acts. Utterances are not simply generated by an 
individual, but are “responsive reactions to other utterances.”233  
A philosopher whose work lies directly in the path of concerns put 
forward by Said, Spivak, Derrida and Bahktin, Donna Haraway opens her most 
recent book, When Species Meet, with two questions: “Whom and what do I touch 
when I touch my dogs?” and “How is ‘becoming with’ a practice of becoming 
worldly?”234 She is critical of philosophy’s tendency to generalize from rather 
than grapple with the ordinary, especially with regard to animals. This, she 
believes, results in a movement away instead of a staying with. As her questions 
suggest, an embodied engagement with particular beings and an intentional 
sharing — a becoming with — is a worlding experience. Worlding is an active 
process in which “sticky knots . . . bind intra-acting critters, including people, 
together in the kinds of response and regard that change the subject — and the 
object.235 There is no first place, but instead a becoming consisting of “meetings 
make us who and what we are in the avid contact zones that are the world.” 
Responsibility comes out of this because “if we know well . . . we care.”236  
In contrast to the Great Divide, Haraway asserts, “To be one is always to 
become with many.”237 This is a challenge to human exceptionalism, which holds 
that humans are unique in not being part of the “spatial and temporal web of 
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interspecies dependencies.”238 This is also clearly a criticism of Deleuze’s and 
Guattari’s “becoming animal” in which the figure represents a metaphorical 
movement from a body into a state of nonidentity that they associate with 
freedom.”239 For Haraway embodied experience is highly valued, and animal and 
human bodies engage in the “subject-and object-shaping dance of encounters.”240 
The figures in this dance are “ordinary beings-in-encounter in the house, lab, field, 
zoo, park, office, prison, ocean, stadium, barn, or factory.” 241 These figures, 
Haraway writes,  
are not representations or didactic illustrations, but rather material-
semiotic nodes or knots in which diverse bodies and meaning coshape one 
another. For me, figures have always been where the biological and 
literary or artistic come together with all of the force of lived reality. My 
body itself is just such a figure, literally.242 
Obviously Haraway disputes the Cartesian claim that while humans can respond, 
animals can only react. In contrast, for Haraway, animals (including humans) are 
always “meaning–making figures that gather up those who respond to them, into 
unpredictable kinds of ‘we.’” Further, these figures don’t only respond but also 
ask, “who ‘we’ become when species meet?”243 Haraway is interested in the ways 
in which this “we” might flourish together. Contact between ordinary beings and 
actual bodies is an indispensable part of that process. In addition to touch, looking 
and becoming with “make us responsible in unpredictable ways for which worlds 
take shape.”244  
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While Haraway very much agrees with Derrida’s critique of Cartesian 
tradition, she believes he misses the opportunity to truly engage with the animal 
other, even his little cat, which he recognizes as unique and irreplaceable. She 
also appreciates Derrida’s point that 
in asserting human exceptionalism and dominion, we are not simply 
attributing particular traits to humans; we are also denying, in Derrida’s 
words, the animals’ capacity for “speech, reason, experience of death, 
pretense of pretense, covering of tracks, gift, laughter, tears, respect, and 
so one—the list is necessarily without limit.245  
By expanding Bakhtin’s communicative sphere beyond speech, to include other 
sensory forms of communication and other species, it is not only the self that is 
unfinalizable, but all of our relationships with other creatures, and even the world 
itself. Haraway refers to this as creating a “we” while Derrida presents it as the 
impossibility of totalization. 
 The question of the animal responding leads to the challenge of 
communication, and inevitably of translation. Can they speak? Many would say 
yes. If so, how do they speak and what are they saying? How can we avoid the 
anthropomorphic temptation to put words into their mouths or interpret their 
actions in ways that make sense to us, but do not necessarily correspond with the 
particular animal’s intention? One way of engaging with these questions is to 
consider how animals have been “made to mean” in performances both in popular 
culture and in the performing arts. Another would be to ask, as Haraway does, 
“How can we create a world together.” This different kind of experience, is one 
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which is set in motion by an encounter with the “other” — or as Haraway 
describes it, a “being with” our companion species. The three encounters 
considered in this final chapter demonstrate how elusive it is to have such an 
experience, even for those who care deeply and have a great deal of insight into 
the behaviors of the horses they are working with and are sensitive to what they 
perceive as the needs of these animals. 
 A willingness to make the attempt to be with another, and to become with 
particular being, whether it be one’s own species or another, opens up new 
possibilities and responsibilities. It can generate insights and instigate creativity. 
This is what Mendl Shaw discovered during her troupe’s exploration of a 
movement vocabulary. “What is realized . . .” she writes, “is the process of 
coming to know one’s own language as it is perceived in someone else’s language, 
coming to know one’s own belief system in someone else’s system.”246 An 
Un/stable Landscape does not only refer to a dance by the Equus Project, but also 
to the territory we inhabit when we open the gate, and thereby expand possible 
fields of knowledge that have been too long constrained, either arbitrarily or 
unintentionally. It is a profoundly life-affirming move, and certainly expands the 
number of dancing partners. No longer need we be that lonely species, isolated on 
the other side of that abyss.  
 
 
5. Questions to Consider 
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How do the art practices and the critical practices discussed here speak to 
each other? Both are concerned with the nature of being and the ethics of 
relationship. These artists and philosophers explore ways of becoming and being 
with, of particularity and of the dynamics which obscure or erase boundaries. All 
are deeply involved with language and expanding possibilities of expression and 
communication among and between species. All of the works considered here are 
addressing what Hunter has more generally called the “rhetorical context of moral 
and ethical issues in society.” 247 My dissertation focuses this rhetorical context 
more specifically on the ways in which artists who are working with living 
animals may or may not open up new possibilities for understanding and being in 
relationship with these animals. Even as I consider the blind spots of Beuys, I 
wish to heed Hunter’s observation that “responsible critics” do not “leave the 
pieces on the floor” but attempt to reconstruct new strategies.248 These strategies 
include a set of questions raised by Hunter that I find extremely helpful. This 
includes:  
• Why am I working on this in the first place? 
• Where are the tensions and difficulties in the art work? 
• What kind of pressures are put on art to so that it can fit a representation 
more understandable to the reader or viewer? 
• Is the artwork understood as created by a single individual, acting as a 
transgressor on behalf of the reader/viewer? If so is the viewer “deprived 
of agency, unable to discuss or respond or articulate the things “difficult to 
value yet immediate to our lives?” 
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• How can this artwork be understood in the “rhetorical context of moral 
and ethical issues in society”  
• And then finally, and more specific to my own project, are the animals 
also deprived of agency? What would agency look like or be like for this 
specific animal in this particular situation?  
Each artwork presents not one, but multiple “views from somewhere,” as 
Haraway expresses it, rather than the single artist’s or viewer’s “conquering gaze 
from nowhere” discussed earlier.249 As discussed earlier, knowledge that is 
specific to a particular situation, offers a richer account of the world and helps us 
to live in ways that keep us aware that each of us has our own particular ways of 
seeing the world. It will also help us to remain sensitive to the challenge and even 
the impossibility of understanding the perspectives of other living creatures, both 
human and not. In spite of the inevitable misreadings and omissions, this 
approach still “offers a more adequate, richer, better account of a world.” And 
finally, Hunter’s point that it is not only the endpoint, whether that be an aesthetic 
product or scientific knowledge, but also the “textuality of the process used to get 
there” that should engage our attention and our critical reflection.  
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Chapter One 
Skin Deep: Collecting Animals 
 On a winter weekday morning, hundreds of elementary school children 
pour into the Akeley Hall of African Animals at the American Museum of Natural 
History. Their high-pitched voices echo through the cavernous galleries. Like 
flocks of sandpipers rushing along intertidal zones, the children ebb and flow, 
pausing briefly at each diorama, then quickly moving on. Their animated motions 
and sounds accentuate the animals’ unnatural stillness. In addition to school 
groups, there are families with young children. Mothers mostly (and the 
occasional father) gently direct their child’s attention to the dioramas with 
comments such as “Look honey, Can you see the mother and the baby?” or 
“They’re a family, just like us!” On the other side of the glass, the animals, 
eternally frozen behind the plate glass, gaze back or seem to interact with each 
other, the life-like gestures painstakingly recreated by invisible hands. A mother 
nuzzles her offspring; a male protectively stands by his “family;” exuberant cubs 
tumble and play with each other. Although the species change, idealized familial 
interactions are a reoccurring theme. In one of the most poignant arrangements a 
massive grouping of elephants, led by an enormous and confidently posed bull, is 
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forever traveling in a tightly-knit formation. A baby elephant, “safely” ensconced 
in the midst of its enormous elders, hooks its small trunk around its mother’s 
larger one and perpetually gazes up at her.  
This family-oriented narrative is occasionally interrupted by an animal 
that has been presented in a fierce pose — obviously futile, considering the 
eventual outcome. What were the last moments of these animals like? Were their 
deaths mercifully sudden? Prolonged? Painful? What prevented them from 
escaping? From successfully protecting their young? The answers are not 
presented in the carefully composed texts on the panels accompanying each 
display. It is just not something that comes up for most of the visitors. It’s not 
what they think about when they visit the museum. 
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Figure 1. Studying African Elephant Group, Akeley Hall of African Mammals, 
1927, New York Museum of Natural History, New York. 
1. Object Lessons 
Natural history is a branch of knowledge that uses observation rather than 
experimentation to learn about natural objects, including animals, vegetables, and 
minerals that dates back to Aristotle and Pliny the Elder. Over time, the focus has 
shifted to living things. Since the middle of the seventeenth century, natural 
history has with increasing frequency been associated with presenting that 
knowledge in a popular rather than a formal scientific manner.250 Predating 
dioramas such as those used in the Akeley Hall of Mammals, other three-
dimensional forms for presenting information about the natural world were 
employed. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries collections called 
cabinets of curiosities were an increasingly popular means for satisfying the 
desire to learn about nature in ways that were visually oriented, which many 
preferred to written scientific texts. A cabinet is a non-specialized collection that 
might contain “such diverse objects as alligators’ skins, chameleons, insects set in 
amber, corals, shells, medals, intaglios, South American feather work, and 
wampum belts [and] representations of mythical creatures (the unicorn, the 
basilis).”251. 
In “Cabinets of Curiosities and the Organization of Knowledge,” literary 
scholar Maria Zytaruk notes, “If cabinets were implicated in new taxonomic 
projects to order the natural world, they also acted as preserves of older, more 
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imaginative readings of nature.”252 Close quote. These “readings of nature” were 
quite subjective; in many collections human preoccupations were influential in 
determining what was understood as the natural order. Zytaruk writes,  
The order that collectors imposed on nature in their cabinets was often a 
precarious one . . . and inhabiting their displays were specific anxieties 
about humankind’s susceptibility to temptation and about the body’s 
inevitable decay. Religious and secular influences lay behind such 
practices as the suspension of crocodiles and other reptiles from the 
collector’s ceiling.253  
The scientific displays were sometimes duplicated in religious settings, and each 
offered mutually reinforcing messages about morality. For example, the cathedral 
of Seville hung enchained crocodile carcasses from their ceilings as emblems of 
evil. These collections were “site[s] for contemplating the body;” museums as 
well as churches were places where visitors contemplated their own mortality.254 
Zytaruk paraphrases Jean Baudrillard’s argument: “through objects, the collector 
is able to mourn for and to transcend symbolically his own death.”255 She 
describes the early modern museums as institutions that perform “the work of 
elegy.” She explains, 
[T]iny arks and Edens, repositories and botanic gardens strove to 
reassemble the scattered products of Creation and thereby to recover lost 
Adamic knowledge. Cabinet collections register, then, the longing of a 
fallen humankind and perhaps, like elegy, functioned as a mechanism for 
consolation. At the same time, the fragmentation occasioned by the early 
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museum and articulated in its exhibits (of carcasses, fossilized teeth, eagle 
claws, disembodied hands) could also be read as a continuation of the 
dispersion and dislocation brought about by the Fall.256 
These cabinets of curiosities evolved into the private collections of scientific 
societies that in the late modern period became natural history museums that were 
accessible to the public. This desire to recreate a lost Eden is the same impulse 
that drove Akeley to create his dioramas. His “cabinets” contained more 
integrated, and yet in some ways just as imaginary, fragments of a world. While 
techniques for preserving animals have been in existence since the sixteenth 
century, there are only a few mounts that predate the 1830s.257 Once the 
technology of taxidermy improved in the middle of the nineteenth century, 
dioramas made with life-like animals became increasingly popular, and museums 
funded hunting safaris to collect specimens for their collections.  
Nature, as Haraway, Morton, and others have explained, is itself a 
historical and culturally contingent idea. And as was also discussed in the 
introduction, according to Harding and Hunter the same is true for science. Both 
are constructs created by human; both are used to fulfill human needs and desires. 
Although there is a material reality, our interpretations of the world, including 
what we emphasize or overlook, is inevitably situated, and represents the 
practices and perspectives of particular individuals and groups, and particular 
situations and experiences. And as Foucault has pointed out, in various epistemes 
“reality” is organized in ways that are not always logical or predictable. Animals 
are another cultural construct. Our understanding of them and relationships with 
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them are inevitably filtered by our own perspectives and situations. Often animals 
are set up as foils, and serve by their contrast to augment or enhance human 
identities and activities.  
In literature a foil is a character that is contrasted with another character, 
typically the protagonist. This character may be either quite different from the 
protagonist (always a human) or extremely similar except for one significant 
characteristic. Depending on the period, the culture, or the situation, sometimes 
the similarities between the animal-foil and the human-protagonist are 
emphasized, at other times the differences are the focus. In natural history both 
written texts and exhibitions are filled with examples of how animals have been 
used as foils in the narratives that humans create about themselves, their 
relationship with nature, and with other animals.258 Within the context of human-
animal relations and especially the taxidermied animals considered in this chapter, 
it is interesting to note that foil also refers to the track of a hunted animal. In this 
narrative or “epistemological space” some species were vilified even as others 
were admired, usually for some anthropomorphized quality. This is true of both 
wild and domestic animals. For example in western cultures we see a dog as loyal 
(and beloved members of our families) while pigs (which are actually more 
intelligent) are described as slothful, gluttonous, and dirty (yet edible). As the 
anthrozoologist Hal Herzog has noted, “some we love, some we hate, and some 
we eat.”259  
Beginning in the nineteenth century, natural museums began developing 
exhibitions designed to appeal to the general public while still retaining their 
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authority as scientific institutions. As opposed to the idiosyncratic nature of 
private collections of earlier times, museums such as the New York Museum of 
Natural History claimed to present science, including natural history, objectively. 
Visitors, scientists and other staff affiliated with the museums believed their 
exhibitions were depicting a scientifically verifiable reality, but as Donna 
Haraway has pointed out, what was presented was profoundly influenced by the 
social and cultural preoccupations of the day.260 This is why Harding called for a 
successor science, one that could challenge the dominant knowledge-producing 
systems and the ideology of objectivity. As Haraway demonstrates in “Teddy 
Bear Patriarchy,” scientific objectivity is very much an ideology. The dioramas in 
Akeley Hall were just as imaginative and creative as the Renaissance cabinets of 
curiosities. Lessons about how humans should behave were conflated with what 
was sometimes unintentionally misleadingly presented as an accurate portrayal of 
the lives of the animals. The wild animals are actually portrayed idealistically 
because the natural world they embody is not the world they actually lived in, but 
one created by Akeley and the museum. 
The discovery guide developed for children, which now emphasizes only 
our current environmental concerns rather than the extensive social reform goals 
for which the dioramas were created, includes the following:  
Scientists and artists at the American Museum of Natural History first 
created dioramas over 100 years ago to educate the public about the 
vanishing wonders of the natural world. They worried that many of these 
animals were being overhunted, or that their environments were being 
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destroyed. Today, many of the places you see in these dioramas no longer 
look like this, and lots of the animals shown here are in danger of 
extinction—of disappearing forever.261 
This text carries a message that has been important to the museum for over a 
century: conservation. The lessons of organicism are no longer articulated or even 
implied. Also absent from these materials is that even as concerns mounted over 
the threat of the extinction of these animals in Africa, they were still hunted and 
killed for this collection. Instead, many Americans in the first part of the twentieth 
century were preoccupied by fears that their own way of life was being eradicated 
by the forces of urbanization, industrialization and, since the 1880s, the increasing 
number of immigrants entering the country; Between 1900 and 1920 over 14.5 
million immigrants came to the United States262 Because of this number of people, 
many of whom were not from northern Europe, as had been the case earlier in the 
country’s history, some feared that traditional American values, and even the 
American “race,” was being threatened. Therefore “nature” was used as a cultural 
tool for resisting social corruption. 
According to H. F. Osborn, a member of the board of trustees during the 
time the Hall of African Mammals was being developed, the primary audience for 
the museum’s message was children. He hoped that young visitors would 
“become more reverent, more truthful, and more interested in the simple and 
natural laws of their being and better citizens of the future through each visit”263 
(emphasis provided). Organicism, with its assertion that the universe functions in 
the same way as an organism, turns animals into metaphors. Both are orderly, and 
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so nature and the wild animals that inhabit it are antidotes for a society seen as 
increasingly disorderly. This view is more philosophical than scientific. 
Organicism can find its roots in Platonic idealism. The philosopher Richard 
McDonough explains, “in contrast with the Darwinian view that the emergence of 
life and mind are accidents of evolution, [Plato] holds that the universe, the world, 
is necessarily alive and intelligent. And mortal organisms are a microcosm of the 
great macrocosm.”264 Haraway notes “The credos of realism and organicism are 
closely connected; both are systematizations of organization by a hierarchical 
division of labor, perceived as natural and therefore productive of unity.”265 She 
also observes, “The relations of life and death in technologies of enforced 
meaning, or realist representation, are not . . . straightforward.”266 The life-like 
animals presented in the dioramas are literally a resurrection of the dead, as will 
be discussed later in this chapter. 
Akeley’s safaris were criticized, but not as we might imagine today, 
because rare and endangered animals were killed. Rather, skeptics believed the 
money spend on these exhibition halls would be better allocated to the life 
sciences rather than social reform. In defense of the expenditures, Osborn defends 
the museum’s decision: 
The exhibits in these Halls have been criticized only by those who speak 
without knowledge. They all tend to demonstrate the slow upward ascent 
and struggle of man from the lower to the higher stages, physically, 
morally, intellectually, and spiritually. Reverently and carefully examined, 
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they put man [sic] upwards towards a higher and better future, and away 
from the purely animal life.267 (emphasis provided) 
Museum board members believed it was appropriate to spend this money to help 
elevate “man,” and perhaps especially at a time when confidence in human 
exceptionalism was being undermined by Darwin’s theory of evolution. The 
“slow upward ascent” which Osborn mentions might also be understood as 
referring to the long evolutionary advancement of white Euro-Americans, whose 
numerical dominance and even status were perceived as being threatened by the 
immigrants.  
As Haraway describes in her essay, the dioramas were designed to present 
a persuasive argument about proper masculine and feminine roles in Western 
societies, the ideals one should strive for in family relationships and, as embodied 
in the animals and especially the males, what character traits one should cultivate 
to be a good citizen. 268 The message embedded in each of the twenty-eight 
dioramas is consistent. All portray taxidermied animals grouped in ways that are 
emblematic of the ideal American family or depict signature animals with good 
character.  
 According to Haraway, each diorama (falsely) presents,  
 [a] vital moment in the narrative of natural history of  . . . . ‘brightest 
Africa.’ Each group forms a community structured by a natural division of 
function; the whole animal in the whole group is nature's truth. The 
physiological division of labor that has informed the history of biology is 
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embodied in these habitat groups which tell of communities and families, 
peacefully and hierarchically ordered. Sexual specialization of function — 
the organic bodily and social sexual division of labor — is unobtrusively 
ubiquitous, unquestionable, right.269  
Also Haraway thinks that for Akeley, “[t]axidermy was the craft of 
remembering this perfect experience” because the “animals are frozen in “the 
supreme moment of life.”270 She points out, “Realism was a supreme achievement 
of the art of memory, a rhetorical achievement crucial to the foundations of 
Western science.”271 In contrast to situated textualities, the places and occurrences 
where “people work on words together to build common ground for the 
articulation and valuing of knowledge,” Akeley relied on a single worldview to 
construct a more “realistic” or actually idealistic world.272 As Hunter observes, 
rhetoric can be used in different ways. It can position truth as that which is 
authoritarian and certain, or it can be understood as situated communication that 
leads to situated knowledges in science.  
The portrayals in the dioramas often have little or no correspondence to 
the ways in which these animals experienced their lives and their deaths. For 
example, in many scenes the “father” protectively stands over the “mother,” who 
in turn often attends to one or more of “their children.”273 These young animals 
typically include a baby and an adolescent. The reality is that these animals (or 
more accurately, the animals from whom these skins were taken) would probably 
not have been related but instead would have been tracked and killed in widely 
diverse locations. Also for some species, the male would not have participated in 
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the rearing of the young and may have not ever even seen them, moving on once 
the female was impregnated.274 And certainly the final moments of their lives are 
never portrayed in this hall. 
As mentioned earlier, fears about the declining “purity” of American “race” 
and the erosion of uniquely American values strongly influenced how powerful 
members of the economic and political elite understood their world. The 
museum’s trustees represented some of the most powerful and wealthy men in the 
United States. These were also the people who had the power to influence what 
kinds of stories would be told in the nation’s institutions. It was not a coincidence 
that interest in eugenics was high in many political and intellectual arenas at this 
time. Osborn was an ardent supporter and believed the Second International 
Congress of Eugenics in 1921 was “[p]erhaps the most important scientific 
meeting ever held in the Museum.”275 Copies of the proceedings were widely 
circulated and sent to members of Congress, and an ever-increasing number of 
politicians and nativists worked to restrict immigration.276 In the years between 
1921 and 1923, members of the Congressional Committee on Immigration made 
several trips to the museum to study its exhibition on immigration. Federal laws 
restricting immigration in order to protect Americans from “submergence by the 
influx of other races” were passed in 1923.277  
Just as with the cabinets of wonder discussed earlier, during this period 
science and religion merged into a seamless whole, along with a dose of politics. 
As Haraway notes, 
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Each diorama presents itself as a side altar, a stage, an unspoiled garden in 
nature, a hearth for home and family . . . Each has its special emblems 
indicating particular virtues. Above all, inviting the visitor to share in its 
revelation, each tells the truth. Each offers a vision. Each is a window onto 
knowledge.278  
The dioramas functioned as “morality plays.”279 For Akeley and many other early 
twentieth century hunters, an animal’s “character” was just as important as its 
physical appearance. In classical rhetoric, ethos refers to the character of the 
speaker. Since in these dioramas, the rhetor is the animal, and especially the male, 
his character had to be flawless. This was essential if the viewers were to be 
inspired to cultivate virtuous habits of thought and action. Since the male was 
considered to be the epitome of his species, it was essential to secure a perfect 
specimen. This included behavior and character as well as physical traits. As 
Haraway notes, “[C]owardice would disqualify the most lovely and properly 
portioned beast.”280  
2. Recreating Eden 
Carl Ackley was a kind of the Wizard of Oz, the man behind the curtain. 
He dedicated his life to recreating an idealized natural world in the heart of New 
York City, and to convincing all who enter the darkened gallery that what they 
were seeing was “real.” Akeley, whom the museum describes as “a dedicated 
explorer, taxidermist, sculptor, and photographer,” is considered the father of 
modern taxidermy. He founded the museum’s Exhibitions Department (an art and 
research program that designs and produces museum installations) and led teams 
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of scientists, hunters, and artists on several expeditions to Africa to collect what 
were then and continue to be euphemistically referred to as specimens. Beginning 
in 1905 until his death in 1921, Akeley worked tirelessly to realize his dream of 
recreating an African paradise in these galleries.281 In addition to creating perfect 
animal mounts, every detail of their habitat is painstakingly recreated, from the 
grasses, shrubs, and trees to the more distant vistas of forests, plains, and 
mountains. For decades these dioramas were celebrated for their realistic 
portrayals, based on the twin foundations of scientific meticulousness and the 
direct encounter with and study of animals in their native habitats.  
Akeley was driven by a passion to literally possess the animals and also to 
disseminate the “truth” about Africa. However, as described above, the stories he 
created are as much about an idealized American way of life as how these animals 
actually lived and died. As Haraway points out,  
Natural history can be — and has sometimes been — a means for 
millennial expectation and disorderly action. Akeley himself is an 
excellent example of a self-made man who made use of the mythic 
resources of the independent man's honest vision, the appeal to experience, 
the testimony of one's own eyes.282  
However, the “testimony of one’s own eyes” is always and inevitably only visible 
through a subjective lens.  
3. Resurrection of the Dead 
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While one fictional element concerns the animals’ lives, another arises 
from their deaths. Although these animals were tracked and killed, death masks 
made of their faces, and their bodies measured and skinned for these displays, the 
violence of the last moments is erased, and any evidence of injury to their hides is 
hidden or repaired. “Natural” history, but not that history, fills the panels 
accompanying the dioramas, the educational literature distributed to children, and 
the content on the museum’s website. Instead the museum directs our attention to 
the “living” animals, not the sculpted armature under the carefully stretched and 
preserved skins. Those bright light-filled eyes, among other parts, are 
manufactured, purchased at a taxidermy supply. Only the skin or hide of the 
animal is irreplaceable. It is the seal of authenticity. 
  If the dioramas are to successfully represent the illusion of life, the killing 
and processing of the animals must be concealed by an indiscernible labor. The 
photographing, sketching, and taking of field notes are emphasized while the 
killing of the animals and processing of their carcasses are passed over. The 
fictions are physically embodied in the meticulous work of reconstructing life 
from each carcass. Death is “ironed out, silenced, deleted.”283 One museum 
professional explains that the animal’s “constructedness needs to be hidden by 
those whose credibility depends upon them. Mounts are intended to be 
‘resurrections,’ as close to life as possible . . . Their meticulous verisimilitude 
renders them uncanny, especially in the context of the habitat diorama, which is 
intended to immerse the viewer entirely in illusion.”284 The “fundamentally ironic 
epistemological structure” as anthropologist Jane Desmond notes, is that in 
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taxidermy, “death is the absolute and always prerequisite to the process of 
creating lifelikeness.” Yet in a museum display, this killing must not intrude upon 
the viewer’s pleasure. Desmond goes on to say,  
The ‘as-if-ness’ of the looking relations, the invitation to imagine as alive 
that which is patently not, creates for the moment an imaginary 
relationship of ‘being there’—for instance, in front of a living, about-to-
charge bear. The ideal viewer completes the imaginary act of resurrection 
that taxidermy invites; the depicted moment is like an excerpt in a play, a 
fictional (yet naturalistic and naturalized) narrative based in and on 
dominant tropes of human–animal relations.285 
This is especially true for young animals. As Desmond observes, “In these cases 
especially, the awareness of the killing that had to occur for the scene to be staged 
must be kept at bay, or the ooohhh factor—the sighing over the cuteness of the 
babies and the endorsement of protective motherhood that it recalls—cannot be 
sustained.”286 By the time Akeley was making the last of his expeditions to Africa 
in the 1920s, the era of hunting safaris mounted by Americans and Europeans, 
along with the development associated with colonialization, had severely depleted 
wildlife populations. During what has been called the “Seizure of Africa,” a 25-
year period ending in 1912, almost the entire continent had been claimed by 
European countries. This seizure was fueled by economic interests and 
nationalism and justified by the belief that Africans were racially inferior. The 
success of the land grab was seen as proof of white European superiority.287  
As a result of the uncontrolled hunting of wildlife and the degradation or 
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destruction of their habitats, it became apparent that many species were headed 
toward extinction. While some colonial administrators considered all wildlife to 
be vermin, many others, motivated by an ethic of sustainable use, sought to 
control the widespread killing of animals. Conservation efforts, including the 
regulation of hunting and the creation of conservation areas, began very late in the 
nineteenth century.288 In 1911 the German government passed hunting legislation 
which gave chimpanzees full protection in Tanzania. Even earlier, in 1896, the 
first general Wildlife Ordinance was enacted. Imperial Governor Hermann von 
Wissmann, wrote in a decree: 
I felt obliged to issue this Ordinance in order to conserve wildlife and to 
avoid that many species become extinct which can be expected for the not 
all that distant future, if the present conditions prevail . . . . We are obliged 
to think also of future generations and we should secure them the chance 
to find leisure and recreation in African hunting in future times. I am also 
planning to create Hunting Reserves in game rich areas in order that 
wildlife can find their refuge and recovery. In such areas hunting of game 
will be permitted only with the explicit prior permission of the Imperial 
Government. Their establishment should also serve science, in order to 
conserve such game species which have already become rare in East 
Africa (emphasis added).289  
The purpose of “refuge and recovery” was so that animals could continue to be 
available for human pleasure and scientific study.  
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As described in the introduction, speciesism, the prejudice or bias in 
favour of the interests of members of one’s own species and against those of 
members of other species, permits the destruction of animals (and their 
resurrection) for human use. From this perspective, animals are not understood to 
have interests, and their emotional and physical experiences are not considered. 
The logic for killing increasingly endangered animals to preserve them for 
museum collections was seen as both justifiable and rational. If these animals 
were on their way to extinction, the focus was on securing a specimen so that it 
could be preserved and shared with future generations. For perhaps any number of 
reasons, the goal of protecting and preserving living animals was not the priority 
that it is for so many people today. Foucault might relate this to the interests of 
those in power. For example, at that time there was broad acceptance of 
hierarchies, including those based on biological determinants and for extractive 
colonial economics, animals were just another resource for the west. Today the 
ability to maintain tracts of land untouched by development is often associated 
with wealth.  
When one reads about Akeley’s life it is clear that he loved Africa and the 
animals that he found there. Although it may seem odd to us today, Akeley 
thought of himself as a conservationist. He believed that it was essential to 
capture a world threatened by humans by participating in the very same activity 
that threatened the animals he was trying to preserve, that is, by mounting hunting 
expeditions. And he was not alone. During the early twentieth century it was 
commonly thought that killing even the rarest and most endangered of animals 
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was necessary so that they could be seen (as taxidermied specimens) by future 
generations. Scientific expeditions sponsored by museums such as the American 
Museum of Natural History, the Smithsonian in Washington, D.C., and the Field 
Museum in Chicago were undertaken regularly, beginning in the 1880s and 
continuing through the 1930s.290  
4. Doomed Anyway 
It was not uncommon for wealthy big-game hunters and scientists to join 
forces. One such group included Akeley, Mary Hastings Bradley, Herbert, her 
husband, and their five-year old daughter Alice. Hastings Bradley wrote a book-
length account of the expedition, On the Gorilla Trail, which was published in 
1922. In the late nineteenth century and well into the twentieth, big game hunting 
— even of endangered species — was widely accepted. Especially if conducted in 
what was considered a sportsman-like manner, hunting was seen as a fair contest 
between a man (usually) and an animal. It was also understood as a rite of passage 
to manhood. “What qualities did it take to make an animal ‘game’?” Haraway 
asks. “One answer is similarity to man, the ultimate quarry, a worthy opponent. 
The ideal quarry is the ‘other,’ the natural self.”291 The concept of an “equal 
contest” governed how the hunt was conducted and often appeared to obviate or 
mitigate any regrets about the animal’s suffering or death. However, hunting 
remained popular even after increasing mechanized access to animal habitat and 
more sophisticated weapons undermined these claims. Although it didn’t 
influence her behavior, Hastings Bradley acknowledges, “The perfection of the 
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modern weapon does not give the gorilla the chance he had in the old muzzle-
loading days.”292  
The expectation that the animals they sought were doomed to extinction is 
clearly expressed in her account of this elephant hunt, as is the absence of any 
distinction between recreational hunting and scientific research: 
We reached a hill above the plains and crept cautiously forward through 
the bush till on the brow we had a splendid view of the elephants. There 
were six of them about two hundred yards below us, five full grown and 
one smaller, all feeding utterly unaware of us, their trunks swinging in the 
bundles of grass, their tusks gleaming against the dark skins. There is 
something prehistoric looking about a wild elephant that makes him seem 
unreal. He is a leftover from another age. His very size is archaic . . . . Mr. 
Akeley picked one for me to shoot at and one for Miss Miller. The men 
were to follow our shots with their heavy guns.  
When he said "Fire," the bull I was trying for was swinging about 
in the brush, and my only chance was the headshot. I tried to place it low, 
guided by the glimmer of the tusks, and I thought I had succeeded, for he 
staggered, and I thought he was down, but he recovered and made off, 
although my husband and Mr. Akeley opened instant fire and Mr. Akeley 
was sure he had placed five shots in the animal.  
Through the cannonading I heard Martha saying, “Mine’s down,” 
and so he was. She had placed a splendid side shot through the ear. She 
started to fire at the black dots of escaping elephants when hers got up 
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again, and was then brought down for good. We cut about in a circuit and 
made our way to him. He seemed enormous as he lay there. There was 
something sad about the helplessness of his great bulk. The only 
reconciling thought is that the elephant is doomed anyway, and this was a 
quick death.  
It was so dark that we turned back immediately to camp. We heard 
the wounded elephant trumpeting and believed we should find him dead in 
the morning. I hoped so, for his sake and my own, for I hated to think of a 
wounded elephant coming to a slow death, and, now that I had wounded 
him, I wanted those tusks of his. But the night rains washed out every 
vestige of track, and the natives sent next morning to reconnoiter could not 
be stimulated by any offer of reward (emphasis added).293  
Here a beginning sense of empathy and the desire for a trophy are in tension with 
each other. This conflict is resolved by the justification that the species is 
“doomed anyway.” The pain of a particular individual is buried in the anonymity 
of the generic animal. “There were moments,” she writes, “when we wondered 
anxiously if there were any gorillas left for us, anything but lone widows and 
undergrown youths. Of course a gorilla was a gorilla, but it was the grown male 
who had given the legend of ferocity to his race” (emphasis added)294  
As is clear from these passages, the boundaries between securing 
specimens for science and collecting trophies was fuzzy at best. As Haraway 
points out, hunting was considered a “tool of science and art.”295 It was not 
unusual for the museum expeditions to be funded in part by wealthy hunters, a 
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practice that few museums would find ethical today. And it was not unusual for 
hunters on non-scientific expeditions to donate the animals they had killed to 
museums for preservation. And although in the field a distinction was made 
between what was done to an animal carcass that was to be used as type specimen 
as distinguished from a trophy in which the individual features of the animal were 
not seen as important animals from both sources ended up in museum displays. 
For example the Northern White Rhinoceros still on display at the Smithsonian 
National Museum of Natural History was one of many animals shot by Teddy 
Roosevelt during the Smithsonian-Roosevelt Expedition of 1909-10. This animal, 
which was on the brink of extinction at the time of Roosevelt’s hunt, is now 
extinct in the wild and survives only in captivity.296 
For the museum collector as for the trophy hunter, “collecting” (a widely 
used euphemism for killing animals) the ideal specimen was the goal. Akeley 
sought out the largest and healthiest male — also the desire of those who hunted 
for sport — and perfect “family” group: a female, a baby, and perhaps an 
adolescent or two. Akeley’s anthropomorphizing impulses extended beyond 
creating expressive family groups. He believed that the animal should possess 
characteristics that would be admirable in a human (courage, loyalty, etc.,) and 
the killing had to be done in a sportsmanlike manner.297 Hastings Bradley, 
somewhat defensively, explains, 
We were not at all bloodthirsty, and we hadn't the slightest desire for 
indiscriminate slaughtering, but we did feel the lure of big game hunting, 
and I was convinced that I was offering any of the animals I mentioned a 
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more than sporting chance in the present state of my shooting. I had shot 
at one elephant, two targets, and three crocodiles in the three months in 
Africa.  
Mr. Bradley particularly wanted a buffalo, Miss Miller [Akeley’s 
niece] and I were eager for lions. Miss Miller already had one elephant to 
her credit [the kill mentioned earlier] and I was hoping for similar luck.298 
While never mentioned in any detail in the book, her companions would have 
included a sizable contingent of people to provide support for the safari. As is the 
case throughout most of the book, they are invisible. The European or American 
hunter was the only one allowed to shoot animals during the expedition. The 
“boys,” as the guides were called, were not to shoot without permission (unless it 
was to save the life of the hunter) although they were often allowed to kill 
orphaned babies. For example, when Akeley was hunting the gorillas for the 
American Museum diorama, he shot a male and a female and the porters speared 
the female’s baby.299 This seems to be another form of distancing. The hunter 
takes on a worthy foe, but is not responsible for the death of helpless animals. 
Early in her book, Hastings Bradley explains her decision to bring along 
her daughter Alice. She describes Alice as “an outdoor child who loved the open” 
and believed “the experience would be an unforgettable part of her life. Our camp 
would be comfortable and well protected,” she writes, and Alice’s “chief danger 
would be the equatorial sun against which a helmet and unceasing vigilance could 
guard her.”300 Akeley believed that safaris could and should be family-oriented. 
He believed this would convince the public that the animals were not wantonly 
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dangerous toward humans, but were only aggressive when defending their own 
families. Although her activities on the expedition are frequently described, 
particularly her interactions with the “natives,” Alice does not appear to have 
been present during the actual hunts. Perhaps this was seen as too dangerous or 
inappropriate for a young child. Nevertheless, Alice was influenced by these 
activities. Hastings Bradley describes a favorite game of her daughter as a 
“violent little pastime called spearing gorillas, which she played with native 
spears.”301 
5. The Giant of Karisimbi 
The emotional distance between the humans and the animals they hunted 
was erratic. For example, in the earlier passage, Hasting Bradley expresses 
misgivings about the suffering of the wounded elephant, but these were quickly 
replaced with regret for the loss of the ivory tusks. Also these emotions did not 
prevent her from continuing to hunt.  
During the same expedition Herbert Bradley shot the silverback gorilla 
that eventually became known as the Giant of Karisimbi. This animal was a silver 
back male gorilla, and its skin was used in the mount that dominates the diorama 
depicting the site of Akeley's own grave in the mountainous rain forest of the 
Congo, today's Zaire. The gorilla was killed in 1921. Hastings Bradley’s account 
of the shooting is filled with oddly juxtaposed observations that betray her matter-
of-fact account of the hunt. Because of its complex dissonance, a substantial 
extract from the original text is included here: 
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There, on the steep mountainside stood a gigantic creature, black 
and shaggy. My first impression was of shoulders incredible shoulders 
huge, uncouth, slouching shoulders. His side was toward us and his back 
was silver gray. We were seeing at last the great beast we had come so far 
to see a male gorilla in his savage haunts. It seemed an eternity before my 
husband fired. I suppose it was only an instant or two. The roar of the gun 
sounded as unreal in the silence as the sight of the gorilla. Immediately 
the gorilla went crashing down into the welter of vegetation. We thought 
him dead and raced down towards him after Herbert, but we then found he 
had made off, leaving a trail of crushed greenery and blood. For a few 
moments the waving bushes gave us the only clue, then he emerged on the 
slopes above and looked back over his shaggy shoulder as the gun crashed 
again, as if trying to  
comprehend this sudden assault upon his solitudes. I shall never forget the 
humanness of that black, upturned face. 
Then he went plunging down the slope, passing near Herbert, who 
put in a finishing shot. The great body struck against a tree and lay still. 
There had been no sound from him, no bark or roar. He had shown no 
instinct of fight, nothing but the rush of a wounded beast to escape. We 
found him dead against the tree, face down, a huge, shaggy, primeval 
thing, like something summoned out of the vanished ages. And the scene 
in which he lay had a beauty that was like nothing earthly . . . . 
	   129	  
All that day the men worked on the gorilla, for Mr. Akeley 
preserved everything for museum and medical records. They paused often 
to photograph the changing clouds and mountains. 
It was a marvelous day! The sheer beauty of it was a spell, and the 
presence of this great gorilla made it seem like a page from the very 
beginning of time (emphasis added).302  
Multiple and discordant strands weave their way through this account: the 
“humanness” of the gorilla, the thrill of the hunt, the Eden-like beauty, a 
sense of displaced time, the vulnerability of the animal, the moment of 
death, and the extensive processing that followed. Hastings Bradley 
describes the pursuit and the gorilla’s attempt to escape in some detail. 
After being shot the animal is found “dead against the tree, face down” in 
a place that “had a beauty that was like nothing earthly.” Passages that are  
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Figure 2. Mountain Gorilla Group Diorama, Akeley Hall of African Mammals, 
New York Museum of Natural History, New York. 
packed with detailed descriptions of action that occurred during the hunt are 
juxtaposed with meditations on the landscape and descriptions of an emotional 
state characterized by a sense of timelessness. Once the processing of the carcass 
begins, the pace quickens. Only one sentence is spent on the time-consuming 
processing required to create a death mask and secure the skin: “All that day the 
men worked on the gorilla, for Mr. Akeley preserved everything for museum and 
medical records.” Even the men doing the process take frequent breaks to look at 
the sky. 
 The raw and violent transgression by the hunters into the animal’s habitat 
brings with it a violence and bloody physicality that is literally unspeakable and is 
displaced by innocuous comments about the weather and the scenery. The abrupt, 
almost filmic, cuts to these redirect our attention away from the killing and 
flaying. While the site of killing is described as sacred — “the scene in which he 
lay had a beauty that was like nothing earthly” — the lengthy skinning of the 
carcass is passed over without comment. She instead notes that the men “paused 
often to photograph the changing clouds and mountains”. These displacements 
and omissions are notable in a text that until this event has been characterized by 
closely-observed and carefully transcribed details. While Hastings Bradley 
mentions that there is still a sense of the now absent “presence of the great gorilla,” 
the energetic writing about the hunt becomes almost languid. As with a cat who 
“plays” with a mouse but loses interest when its prey no longer moves, Hastings 
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Bradley’s energy dissipates. Or perhaps there are other reasons for the sudden 
inarticulateness in her account of this event. 
Many contemporary readers would be disturbed by the apparent 
callousness with which this story is told. Foucault’s concept of the 
epistemological space, which was first described in the introduction, is helpful in 
understanding, why in any given place and time certain ideas, beliefs, and 
behaviors are thinkable — and acceptable —while others are not. Narratives are 
inevitably told from a particular perspective, and this one relates the challenges 
and pleasures of a hunting safari as told by a woman of privilege, yet she is also 
challenging the conventions of a woman of her day. Hastings Bradley is 
obviously making assumptions that she thinks her readers will, for the most part, 
share. She is aligning herself with a dominant male perspective, that of the 
hunter/explorer, and is following the models offered by adventure stories of her 
day. She assumes the story she has to tell is one that is both interesting and 
acceptable. She is writing out of the ethos of her time, and to an audience that 
shares for the most part, an understanding of her motivations and actions. Her 
contemporaries were probably far more accepting of the hunt itself than her 
decision to bring her daughter with her.  
6. Giving Permission 
 The inability to articulate — or perhaps even to recognize — some aspects 
of an experience demonstrates the power of a particular episteme, and also why it 
is so hard to understand when one’s own stance is coming from another time and 
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place. In this example, the violence to the living animal and its corpse is literally 
indescribable, which could indicate, along with the somewhat defensive tone of 
some of the passages, that this is a period of change. According to Foucault, an 
episteme is the “strategic apparatus which permits of separating out from among 
all of the statements which are possible those that are acceptable within . . . a field 
of scientificity, and which it is possible to say are true or false.”303 An episteme, 
again quoting Foucault, makes “certain perceptions, certain statements, certain 
forms of knowledge possible, others impossible.”304 The episteme permits some 
statements to be made (in this example, the hunt and the killing), but prohibits 
others (any description or reflection about the suffering and mutilation of a 
particular animal, and this in spite of the author’s sympathy and identification of 
human-like attributes). As Foucault observes, the unthinkable elements are not 
connected with what is true or false, but rather with what may or may not be 
characterized.305  
 The episteme makes possible a mentality that permits alarming rates of 
animal extinction to go unchecked and factory-farming that generates untold 
animal suffering to be ignored. The words and symbols associated with animals 
exemplify these blind spots. Eating an eagle is inconceivable yet turkey is the bird 
of choice for Thanksgiving. Baby calves at the country fair are adorable, while 
veal is a delicious delicacy. One is displayed for our entertainment, while the 
other, which few people ever see, is removed from its mother just after birth and 
confined in a tiny crate for four to five months before its slaughter, One possesses 
a singularity that makes relationship possible while the other is generic meat. 
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Epistemic principles determine what can be identified by a community, how they 
can be marked, and in what ways they can be ordered: These principles make 
certain perceptions, certain statements, certain forms of knowledge possible, 
others impossible.306  
The gradual shift in attitude toward hunting safaris on the part of the 
general public as well as museum professionals as the twentieth century went on 
has been explained by advances in technology that permit animals to be captured 
on film. Good quality portable cameras that yielded good results in the field were 
just beginning to be available in the early part of the twentieth century. The field 
camera, which Akeley invented and used on his last expedition, was a novelty. 
Yet as Foucault points out any narrative of causality and change is inevitably 
embedded in a particular episteme and therefore suspect. It is only the acceptable 
explanation that we embrace. Now “common sense” tells us that technology has 
led to the gun being replaced by the camera, and that it is foolish to intentionally 
hunt and kill endangered species to “save them” for future generations. However 
as Foucault observes, our thought, “bears the stamp of our age and our 
geography—breaking up all the ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we 
are accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing things, and continuing long 
afterwards to disturb and threaten with collapse our age-old distinction between 
Same and Other.”307  
Hastings Bradley’s perception of the Giant of Karisimbi’s vulnerability, 
triggered perhaps by “the humanness of that upturned face,” caused her to 
reconsider her position to some degree. Her inclination to anthropomorphize 
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certain animals was also an influence in creating this opening. Certainly her sense 
of intrusion into this animal’s habitat softened the barriers between hunter and 
prey, and made possible, at least to some degree, another way of relating to this 
particular individual gorilla, which was later extended to silverback gorillas more 
generally. At the end of her book she writes, 
There is no excuse for keeping the gorilla on the game lists. He is too 
valuable and too rare to be exterminated. He ought to have his own 
preserves and official protection on his mountain heights and if he doesn't 
have them, and that soon, he will go the way that so many great beasts 
have gone the way that all are going fast now in Africa. We estimated that 
not more than seventy-five or a hundred of the gorillas exist in those 
mountains. Though our licenses gave us ten gorillas, we killed only the 
five necessary for the Museum group (emphasis added).308  
This represents a subtle but significant shift in her thinking. While earlier she 
somewhat dismissively categorizes elephants as “doomed anyway,” here she is 
arguing for the preservation of the gorilla because they are “too valuable and too 
rare.” However she still holds on to the justification for killing the gorillas for the 
museum dioramas, essentially for “scientific” purposes. 
  Akeley also acknowledged his regret at the death of that particular 
individual gorilla, something he rarely did. In his own account of the incident he 
wrote:  
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As he [the gorilla] lay at the base of the tree, it took all one’s scientific 
ardor to keep from feeling like a murderer. He was a magnificent creature 
with the face of an amiable giant who would do no harm except in self 
defense or in the defense of his family.309  
As a result, in part at least, of this experience, Akeley persuaded the Belgian 
government to establish what would be the first wildlife sanctuary in Africa. This 
was a radical departure from Akeley’s previous rationale (and one shared by his 
colleagues and the society in general), which was based on the premise that 
hunting and collecting was a means of preserving the soon-to-be-extinct animal 
for future generations. As with Hastings Bradley, this adjustment in his position 
did not signal a complete change in his thinking. Akeley continued his hunting 
and collecting expeditions with the aim of realizing his dream of recreating Africa 
in the exhibition halls of the American Museum. 
 We can now see these animals on TV, videos, and the Internet, where their 
portrayal as singular individuals and bonded family units cultivates emotional 
connections not possible in an earlier age. Although this seems to be the case for 
many wild animals, especially those who are endangered, most human-like, or 
especially charming (and also for our pets), that filmic empathy does not extend to 
the slaughterhouse and factory farms. Undercover films shot by the ASPCA and 
other animal rights groups have not been effective (at least yet) because they are 
not acceptable in our culture. Therefore, they as of yet have not substantially 
reduced what Derrida has called the “unprecedented proportions of this subjection 
of the animal. Such a subjection . . . can be called violence . . . no one can 
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seriously deny the disavowal that this involves.”310 Maintaining the abyss 
between human and animal is a way of hiding it. As noted earlier, Derrida 
believes this is a willful move intended to perpetuate “on a global scale the 
forgetting or misunderstanding of this violence, which some would compare to 
the worst cases of genocide311 
 These animals suffer the violence of objectification made possible by an 
ontology that conceptualizes life using the binary of human and animal. The 
concepts generated by this system erase irreplaceability of other living animals 
and substitute for it a machine-like repeatability. One can see in Hastings Bradley 
the conflict between her expectations about “the gorilla” and her actual encounter 
with a particular individual. Initially she imagines the animal in the abstract. 
When she first sees the animal whose skin in a taxidermied mount is eventually 
called the “Giant of Karisimbi,” Hastings Bradley describes him as “a male 
gorilla in his savage haunts.” Earlier in her book she simply repeats what others 
have conveyed to her: “The gorilla was a terrible antagonist. The great length of 
his huge arms gave him a tremendous reach and he was credited with being able 
to scoop out a man like a soft-shell crab.”312 After her own direct experience — 
one might call it a face-to-face encounter — she reflects, “I shall never forget the 
humanness of that black, upturned face.” Isn’t this the call to accountability 
described by Lévinas? 
7. The Haunts of Animals 
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Bradley Hastings’ written account of her experiences in Africa describes 
what it was like for her to enter into the habitats of the animals. In contrast 
Akeley’s dioramas portray an Eden-like environment of those habitats, but one in 
which the animals are motionless and mute. In both, the ethos (or character) of 
humans and animals is emphasized. Also for both there is also a preoccupation 
with place. Character and place come together in an archaic definition of ethos 
that dates back to Homer. Then it was defined as the place “wherein people dwell 
and bond together.” Ethea, its plural, has also been translated as the “haunts or 
abodes of animals.”313 In his etymological analysis of ethos, Charles Chamberlain 
identifies a metaphorical connection between habitat and habit which melds the 
experiences of life, in a day-to-day sense, with character and place. The earliest 
use of ethos “refers to the range or arena where someone is most truly at home” 
and this influences “all the fine appearances [habits and customs] that people 
adopt.”314 Edmund Husserl also makes this connection, equating ethos with what 
he called the concrete “lifeworld.” He asserted that this lived experience was 
preferable to the more abstract reality of European rationalism.315 Michael Hyde, a 
communication scholar, believes understanding ethos as a place we inhabit 
together permits us to change “the ways discourse is used to transform space and 
time into ‘dwelling places.’”316  
 Recovering the original meaning of ethos can provide a way out of what 
Derrida describes as the “originary violence” of language.317 The absence of this 
ethos — embodied beings sharing habitats and in habitual relationships marked 
by trustworthiness — and the dominance of logocentric and human-centered 
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discourses deny the relational singularity and vulnerability of bodies. Ethos can 
remap a world whose coordinates are over-determined by concepts and logic. This 
definition of ethos resonates with poststructuralist concepts of being: who you are 
is where you are, a singular being whose habits of thinking and acting are 
profoundly influenced, and even molded, by the particular place and time in 
which one lives, as opposed to a heroic and virtuous individual.  
In “Ethos as Location,” Nedra Reynolds notes, “Identity is formed through 
negotiations with social institutions . . . and through one’s locatedness in various 
social and cultural ‘spaces.’”318 It is not just the particular individual who speaks, 
but the location — the socially constructed space — from which that person 
speaks that can be understood as ethos. This can also be understood as a kind of 
negotiation between rhetor and the community. Philosopher Iris Marion Young 
believes that members of a group must acknowledge that they “do not understand 
one another as they understand themselves” and then “accept this distance without 
closing it into exclusion.”319  
What would animal discourse sound like? The rhetorical scholar and 
widely-acclaimed translator of Aristotle, George A. Kennedy, has noted, both 
animals and humans use “signs, including utterances such as howls, cries, and 
human speech.”320 “A Hoot in the Dark,” written by Kennedy in 1992, drew 
criticism because of his assertion that animals use ethos, pathos, and logos as they 
“gesture and preen, sing and growl.” Before Aristotle, Kennedy writes, “the 
energy inherent in emotion and thought, transmitted through a system of signs, 
including language, to others to influence their decisions or actions” was 
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understood as rhetoric.321 As Debra Hawhee observes in her essay, “Toward a 
Bestial Rhetoric,” this “shifts attention from ‘wordy’ language to language 
rendered with calls, tones, facial expressions, and bodies . . . and it posits rhetoric 
as energetic intensity, a movement, or an urge to move others.”322 It creates a new 
kind of discursive environment, one that is more spacious, inviting an 
expansiveness not possible in dialectical or classical rhetorical models that depend 
so heavily on virtue and reason. It is one based on an awareness of self and other 
as it is expressed and embodied in living beings or as the poet Adrienne Rich has 
called it, the “geography closest in.”323 
What might happen if the divisions between nature and culture, and 
human and animal became more permeable? If socially constructed spaces were 
extended to include an array of habitats and habits frequented by all kinds of 
beings? Humans may become much more aware of their connections to other life 
forms. Living things, living together, might begin to communicate with each other 
through various discursive means, including sight, touch, sound, and even smell! 
The discourses we now use, and especially the artistic ones, could help to create 
the pathways to expand the ways in which all of us understand expression and 
communication. Acknowledging different sites and multiplicity of identities 
created by simultaneous membership in different groups also opens up the 
discursive field, especially if, as Kennedy has proposed, animals (or at least some 
of them) can engage in rhetoric. This could foster a much greater awareness of 
unequal power relationships among members in a community, both human and 
not. 
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Reynolds defines ethos as something that isn’t comprised of “measurable 
traits displayed by an individual; rather, it is a complex set of characteristics 
constructed by a group, sanctioned by that group, and more readily recognizable 
to others who belong or who share similar values or experiences. This notion of 
ethos, therefore, includes the social context surrounding the solitary rhetor.”324 
Communications scholar Karen Burke LeFevre describes “that socially created 
space, in the ‘between,’ the point of intersection between speaker or writer and 
listener or reader” as a place of creativity and invention.325 This affirms its spatial 
and social nature. It is one that does not need to be limited to a particular 
individual, group or site, but can also exist in the “in-betweens,” in the contacts 
between various life forms, especially if our understanding of discursive 
communities is expanded to include all life forms.  
Animal encounters, such as the one that Derrida famously describes with 
his cat, occur in what philosopher Anthony Calarco describes as a “contretemps, 
in a time out of joint, prior to and outside of knowledge and identification.” The 
scene of nonknowing in which one finds oneself exposed to the other animal is 
somewhat akin to madness, which is why Derrida calls it a “deranged 
theatrics.”326 Derrida describes this as a time, “impossible to determine, for the ‘I,’ 
whether it is conceived in terms of the subject, cognito, transcendental unity of 
apperception, transcendental ego, or self-consciousness—is not fully there to 
synthesize and make sense of the experience.”327 Calarco concludes, “Animal 
ethics is not simply a matter of theoretical consistency and rationality.”328 
The experience of contretemps and the decentering of the human subject is 
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evident in Hastings Bradley’s encounter with the gorilla. Earlier, as her husband 
takes aim before shooting, time is described as an “eternity” that occurs “in a 
second or two.” Other indicators that time is out of joint include the use of words 
such as “primeval” and “vanished ages.” The temporal and sensory confusion 
described by Hastings Bradley suggests that the deadly violence here triggered a 
response in which the presence of the gorilla decenters what up until that point 
had been an anthropocentric realm, and eventually lead to a reexamination of 
what the human-gorilla relationship should be. It was “the presence of this great 
gorilla” that made the day “seem like a page from the very beginning of time” 
rather than the successful achievement of their long-sought goal. Tragically 
enough, the unprovoked killing of an animal that only sought solitude in his 
remote habitat evoked from Hastings Dudley a response that challenged what 
Derrida has described as transcendental violence, or the “reduction of the other to 
a real moment in my life.”329  
 
8. Beyond “Wordy” 
In “Violence and Metaphysics,” Derrida takes up Martin Heidegger’s idea 
of “letting be.” As Sarah Wood explains in her analysis, “Letting be is not the 
same as ignoring or letting alone. It means an opening of thinking toward what is 
nameless, towards Being before social organization and therefore before ethics. 
So letting be is what would make ethics possible. Letting be may allow 
comprehension, but it also acknowledges the form of an existing thing or person 
that cannot be transformed into an object of understanding.”330  
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Enlarging our “wordy” language to include an animal rhetoric could offer 
an antidote to what Jacques Derrida has identified as “the violence of concepts.” 
He writes, 
Truthfully, one does not have to wonder what this encounter is. It is the 
encounter, the  only way out, the only adventuring outside one’s self 
toward the unforeseeably-other. Without hope of return . . . there is no way 
to conceptualize the encounter: it is made possible by the other, the 
unforeseeable ‘resistant to all categories.’ Concepts suppose an 
anticipation, a horizon within which alterity is amortized as soon as it is 
announced precisely because it has let itself be foreseen. The infinitely 
other cannot be bound by a concept, cannot be thought on the basis of a 
horizon; for a horizon is always a horizon of the same, the elementary 
unity within which eruptions and surprises are always welcomed by 
understanding and recognized. Thus we are obliged to think in opposition 
to truisms which we believed—which we still cannot not believe—to be 
the very ether of our thought and language.331 
Derrida argues that a human-animal ethics is awakened when we recognize the 
“embodied exposure of animals, their finitude and vulnerability” rather than 
particular capacities and traits. In his analysis of Derrida’s animal ethics, Calarco 
identifies this awakening as one that is “an interruptive encounter with animal 
suffering that calls for and provokes thought.”332 The artists whose work is 
discussed in the chapters that follow enter into that “interruptive encounter.”  
Derrida looks at how language, and more specifically concepts both create 
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and limit meaning within particular contexts or events. Enlarging discourse to 
include both body and place can create a complex and embodied situation that can 
help us become aware of our anthropocentrism, if not step outside of it. Becoming 
sensitive to the ways in which language continually defers meaning suggests that 
there is another place, a habitat, outside of language. If the human is decentered, 
possibilities opens up for what Derrida describes as a “joyous affirmation of the 
play of the world, and of the innocence of becoming, without truth, and without 
origin which is offered to an active interpretation. This affirmation then 
determines the none center otherwise than as loss of the center.”333 This way of 
making meaning, tries to “pass beyond man and humanism.”334 To seek out 
encounters which support “adventuring outside one’s self toward the 
unforeseeably-other,” even if one may not be able to move beyond, as Derrida 
puts it, “the horizon of the same” or elude the truisms “which we still cannot not 
believe.” 335  
Akeley loved Africa and the animals there. Although the dioramas are his 
attempt to “realistically” recreate this world, he never gained a truly intimate 
knowledge of it, but instead created a mirror of his own values and desires. 
“Nature” as represented in these dioramas, is an idealized human society. Just as 
visitors to the museum look at the dioramas, so Akeley and Hastings Bradley 
looked at the African mammals and never experienced what Derrida has called 
the “interruptive encounter.” Instead of being in dialogue with the other living 
beings, the animals became life-sized puppets, a means to a human ends. Whether 
they were positioned as worthy adversaries during the hunt or as taxidermied 
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mounts in the museums, the animals were only allowed to say what the humans 
wanted to hear. At this time most people would not think that an “abyss of 
noncomprehension” between humans and animals even existed, and if they were 
aware of one, it certainly was not a problem. 
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Chapter Two 
Representing Relationship: Animal Actors 
 “What a lonely species we are,” Diane Ackerman observes in her essay, 
“Why We Love Zoos.” She describes us as continuously “searching for signals of 
life from other galaxies, adopting companion animals, visiting parks and zoos to 
commune with other beasts . . . . We flock to zoos for many reasons, not least to 
shed some of the burden of being human.”336 Zoos and circuses often provide the 
only opportunities for most people living in post-industrial urban societies to 
come into contact with animals. According to The New York Times more than 150  
 
Figure 3. Craig Barister, Azy with Girl, The International Orangutan Center, 
Indianapolis Zoo, Indianapolis. 
	   146	  
million people visit zoos and aquariums annually in the United States, and 
worldwide there are hundreds of millions of visitors. About fifty percent are 
families, but a significant number are adults without children.337 As with all 
encounters between species, how do we make sense of these encounters? The 
answers to this question are indeterminate, situation-specific, and dependent on 
economic, scientific, and social factors.  
1. Ruler of Nature, Lord of the Wild 
Menageries, private collections with a history dating back to 2500 BCE 
were the exclusive domain of royalty and the very wealthy.338 In his essay, “Zoos 
and Eyes,” Ralph Acampora writes, “in its days as a private garden, the zoo was a 
powerful symbol of dominion: It projected an imperial image of man-the-
monarch—ruler of nature, lord of the wild.”339 Early zoological societies, which 
were only open to members, sought to separate the scientific study of animals 
from more “vulgar” exhibitions. However the support of a public which paid to 
see the animals turned out to be a financial necessity.340 As mentioned in the 
introduction, in “Why Look at Animals?” John Berger notes that the animals in 
these royal menageries were a “symbolic representation of the conquest of all 
distant and exotic lands,” an expression of national pride and power.341 Animals 
in the royal menageries symbolized the importance of their owners or military or 
colonial dominance. The animals may have been given as gifts by other rulers for 
special occasions, to mark agreements, or collected during foreign campaigns.  
While the animals were expensive, this didn’t prevent their abuse. For 
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example, James I staged a match between a bear and a lion, neither of which 
attacked the other and so the spectacle was disappointing for viewers. James I also 
sent a tiger to a public arena (known as a bear garden) in London to be baited. 
Bear baiting was popular in England until the nineteenth century. In these events, 
a bear would be chained by its neck or leg to a post in a pit and dogs would be set 
on it. The last know example of lion baiting in England occurred in a match 
between two lions and six dogs in 1825. (Fortunately, the lions —named Nero 
and Wallace — survived.342  
At the beginning of the nineteenth century rapid industrialization and 
urbanization in Europe and North America reduced contact between humans and 
domesticated animals.343 The first modern public zoo was established in Paris in 
1783 after the leaders of the French Revolution removed the animals were 
removed from royal menageries. Others sprang up in major urban centers, 
including London and Berlin. While contemporary zoos are public, and 
emphasize missions of education and conservation, Acampora believes the same 
principle of domination continues, in that the animals are used to fulfill fantasies 
of impossible encounters and “powerful presumptions of mastery and control.” 
The meaning of the animals, he believes, is shaped by “the perversions of a 
patriarchal gaze.”344 
 The imperial gaze, the pursuit of knowledge, or the exoticism and 
wistfulness evoked by an imaginary Eden are evident in the design of 
contemporary zoos. One example is the Indianapolis Zoo, which has recently 
constructed a 20 million dollar orangutan exhibit. According to Mike Crowther, 
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President and CEO, “To engage, enlighten, and empower children and families, 
we need exhibits that bring people close to animals. In return, we owe the animals 
in our care a habitat where they can lead enriched, fulfilled lives.” (my italics). 
The intention is dual: The animals will seemingly be free to go about their daily 
lives even as they will simultaneously be available to human audiences. Crowther 
goes on to describe the exhibit’s central feature, the Hutan Trail, as  
an ingenious interpretation of an orangutan highway through the forest . . . 
the cables and bridges of the Hutan Trail allow orangutans to leave the 
Atrium and travel to different places  . . . over the Zoo, and over the heads 
of Zoo guests. Perhaps most importantly, the Hutan Trail allows 
orangutans to make choices such as where they go and with whom they 
associate or avoid.345  
Crowther refers to the central element in the new exhibit as “a soaring Tower of 
Hope” for both people and orangutans, a startling romantic metaphor for human-
orangutan relations.346 Certainly large and stimulating environments are 
improvements over the more cell-like cement and bars of earlier zoos. Still there 
is a robust argument about whether zoos can justify holding animals in captivity. 
On the one hand, the animals are preserved and protected. However it is also true 
that significant money and resources are directed toward simulating natural 
habitats even as native ones are destroyed by human development. 
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Figure 4. Kelly Wilkinson, A nine-year-old orangutan swings along ropes, Myrta 
Pulliam Hutan Trail, The Indianapolis Zoo, Indianapolis.  
While the new exhibit is presented as one that offers freedom and replicates 
nature, the animals were placed in the enclosure for six months before opening it 
to the public. Primates will pound continuously on the glass walls, attempt to 
dismantle structures (by unscrewing bolts, etc.), and engage in various other 
behaviors as they try to break out of any new enclosure. Therefore any new 
exhibit requires a period of observation so that modifications can be made as 
needed to prevent escape. The intensity of their efforts, and especially the 
repeated pounding on the glass, is upsetting to zoo visitors. An acclimazation 
period allows the animals to adjust to their new enclosure and also prevents the 
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public from being exposed to potentially upsetting behaviors such as excessive 
pounding on the plate glass as animals figure out the limits of their new 
environment. Public viewing is allowed only after the animals have adapted. 
Inevitably, the human narrative about the Hutan Trail and the orangutans’ 
reactions to it diverge. While the designers of the exhibit try to create the best 
possible zoo environment, frequently the best is not defined by what animals need 
and want. Instead there is often an uneasy tradeoff between what visitors desire 
and the ideal environment for animals.  
2. The Linguistic Abyss 
The dominant view in Western societies is that animals do not have 
language. It has long been defined as a system of arbitrary symbols (i.e., words, 
either written and spoken), a privileged form of expression limited to humans. 
One of the barriers to cross species communication is of course that this definition 
excludes all other species, which is why historically we go to zoos and circuses to 
look at animals. While other forms of communication (i.e., touch, nonverbal 
sounds) exist, these have always been assigned a lower, and even unintentional 
status. For example, the communications of nonhuman animals are perceived as 
unintentional and assumed to be instinctual. Again, the human relationship to zoo 
animals is only across that “abyss of noncomprehension” discussed earlier.347 The 
cages operate as frames that both isolate the animals from their native habitats and 
allow viewers to easily impose their own perceptions and preoccupations upon 
them, as evidenced by the “Tower of Hope” metaphor. As discussed in the 
introduction and noted by Berger, the lives of these animals are erased and 
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replaced by our daydreams about them.348 If we are lucky, they look back at us, 
and certainly exhibition designers do all they can to ensure this happens. The 
inarticulate visibility of the animals makes it easy to turn them into objects for 
fulfilling our human needs and desires.  
Unlike the barriers posed to communication encountered by people who 
do not speak the same language, which can be rectified by learning a new 
language or by a translator, Berger observes that understanding the language of 
animals demands an “exceptional being” such as Orpheus who was able to 
communicate with animals through music.349 Examples from contemporary 
popular culture include the fictional Harry Potter, a magician in training who can 
talk with snakes, and a proliferation of professional “whisperers” who can 
communicate with cats, dogs, horses and even wild animals. The endurance of 
these myths and popularity of contemporary practitioneers (regardless of the 
veracity of their claims) demonstrate the desire to cross not only the so-called 
abyss human and animal, but also the one between nature and culture. As 
Ackerman and Berger observe, humans are irresistibly drawn to the edges of a 
domain they have so carefully constructed. Yet those edges might be fuzzier than 
one might think. For example, horses have learned develop communication 
strategies based on human clues and share work-related relationships with 
humans.350 Communication, after all, is as they say, “a two-way street.” 
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3. Wild, Domestic, Tame, Feral, Exotic  
Humans have rich and often contradictory ways for categorizing other 
species. Some of the animals on display at zoos are wild, but others are not. It 
would be a mistake to assume that domestic and wild have clearly defined traits. 
While it may seem obvious to state that orangutans are not domesticated, but 
rather wild and even exotic animals, these categories are both more complex and 
less stable than might be assumed. For example, dogs, cats, sheep, and cattle are 
domesticated in that they are dependent on humans for their care. Through 
centuries of selective breeding, their appearance and behavior have been altered 
and along with this, their ability to survive in the wild. Through domestication the 
human environment now represents the “natural” life conditions for many 
species.351  
In contrast, wild animals have not been bred to live under human control. 
However some domesticated animals do end up living successfully live in the 
wild as feral animals. Other animals raised for commercial use, such as ostriches 
and raptors, are semi-domesticated. Still others, such as Asian elephants, are wild 
but have been captured and tamed for human use for thousands of years. As 
elephant conservationalist Richard C. Lair observes,  
[M]any wild-caught elephants quickly and easily form intimate bonds with 
their keepers even though their wild temperament has never been modified 
through selective breeding. Some elephants form such warm and 
affectionate bonds with man [sic] as to deceive the observer into thinking 
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that this animal must have been made truly domestic. Many other 
elephants in domesticity, however, remain unremittingly wild, hostile . . . 
Clearly, a domesticated elephant is simply a wild animal in chains — but a 
wild animal frequently gentle and intelligent enough to be totally 
trustworthy as a baby-sitter to watch over human infants. What adjective 
best describes such animals when kept by man [sic], particularly in 
relation to their wild congeners?352 
Taming and domesticated are two different processes. In addition, it is not always 
the case that a wild animal is ferocious, aggressive or untrainable. Because these 
captive elephants have never been bred selectivity, they have the same genetic 
traits and many of the same behaviors as untamed animals. Lair believes many of 
these elephants could successfully live in the wild, something not true of truly 
domesticated animals. 
In addition to the 16,000 captive elephants in Asian countries, there are 
large captive groups in European and North American zoos and circuses.353 In 
these parts of the world, elephants are exotic (non-native) species. While often 
perceived as wild, exotic animals may in fact be long-domesticated. In North 
American and Europe, zoos typically exhibit what visitors perceive as exotic wild 
animals such as elephants and camels. While the elephants are actually wild but 
possibly tamed or trained, camels, which are native to desert areas of Asia and 
northern Africa, have been domesticated for about five thousand years.  
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Another category, feral, refers to once tamed or domesticated animals that 
now live in the wild. One example of a feral population is the 700,000 Dromedary 
(single hump) camels in Australia. Although extinct in the wild, these camels are 
descendants of nineteenth century domestic herds. Another example are mustangs, 
descendants of the domesticated horses the Spanish and others brought to the 
“New World.”354 While these animals were once considered wild, now they are 
labeled feral and currently under the control of the United States government’s 
Bureau of Land Management.355 There are also some herds in Canada. In another 
twist, the Spanish Mustang Registry, established in 1957, asserts the Spanish 
Mustang is a distinct breed, primarily domesticated and not feral, and should not 
be confused with the feral horses under the control of the federal government.356 
Purebred domestic animals, whose lineage can be traced from generation to 
generation, horses may be either livestock or pets. Others object to the term pet, 
and prefer to describe these as companion animals. 
Horses have long-evoked an array of contradictory or incongruous 
meanings for humans. This is evident in both the nineteenth century circus acts 
and hippodramas and also in contemporary performances. Throughout their long 
history of service to (or control by) humans, horses have been abused, taken-for-
granted, or celebrated. Long domesticated, horses symbolized freedom. Beasts of 
burden that were often badly abused — a sight not uncommon in nineteenth 
century cities, they were simultaneously admired as god-like.  
The narratives told by displays and performances involving animals 
express beliefs about identities (theirs and ours) and also what kinds of 
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relationships are possible between us. Often the emphasis has been on human 
mastery, obedience, and subjecting the animal to the will of humans. Historically, 
in acts which involved horses for example, the human was front and center, and 
animals were celebrated for their service to human causes or for their 
anthropomorphic qualities. In contrast, in a number of contemporary 
performances humans and horses appear to be engaged in equitable partnerships, 
as will be discussed in the last chapter. 
Considering the ways in which humans categorize animals offers insight 
into the changing relationships between us and them. These categories are 
depended on human economic, social, and political interests. For example, in 
England a camel might be perceived as a rare and exotic wild animal and a highly 
valued asset to a zoo, in Australia as a feral animal that has become a nuisance, 
and in northern Africa as long-domesticated and commonly used for labor. 
Mustangs simultaneously (and even in the same country — the United States) can 
be labeled as a feral animal whose overpopulation harms the environment and 
therefore must be culled, a valuable purebred horse, a pet, livestock, or symbolic 
of the free and wild spirit that epitomizes the American frontier. 
All of these categories describe relationships from a human perspective, 
one in which the standard is the animal’s position with respect to a particular 
society’s worldview. While zoos today emphasize their scientific and educational 
missions, as Gayatri Spivak observes in “Can the Subaltern Speak?” knowledge is 
a product that expresses the beliefs and values of those producing it. In the 
postcolonial discourses that Spivak critiques, the other is always positioned in 
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terms of its lack measured by an ideal imposed by another group. In the same way, 
all nonhuman species are evaluated according to a human measure and found 
lacking. These shortcomings then serve as a rationale not only for human 
dominance, but too often for the abuse of animals by humans, including the 
destruction of environments essential for an animal’s survival. As Spivak writes, 
“a project understood in essentialist terms must traffic in a radical textual practice 
of differences. The object of the group’s investigation . . . is a deviation from an 
ideal . . . which is itself defined as a difference from the elite.”357 While the group 
to which Spivak refers is the subaltern, the framing she critiques is one that has 
also been applied to animals. Rather than focusing on what animals lack 
(symbolic language, culture, moral reasoning, and so on), exploring what these 
differences cannot tell us offer pathways for consideration that have up to now 
too often been in the shadows. At the least, as Spivak points out, “[O]ne must 
nevertheless insist that the colonized subaltern subject [and I would add animal] is 
irretrievably heterogeneous.”358 The exhibition of animals in zoos expresses not 
only our interest in animals, but how we create binaries between us and the exotic 
other, which sometimes may be another culture, and sometimes nature itself.  
4. The Early Modern Circus Horse 
Just as with zoos, and also as seen in the natural history diorama discussed 
in chapter one, the circus ring presents very particular kinds of interactions 
between human and animals. Approximately seven million Americans attended a 
circus performance in 2012. The early modern circus, which came into being in 
the late eighteenth century at about the same time that public zoos were being 
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established, was associated with the theatre. However during most of the 
twentieth century circus was considered a coarser form of popular entertainment. 
Over the past few decades, the pendulum is beginning to swing back. For example 
the Arts Council of England has recently defined circus as a “supremely physical 
and visual artform that exists in its own right; not a an adjunct to theatre or dance. 
It has a very specific relationship with the gaze of the audience and with the 
involvement of participants, which means it is one of the most accessible artforms 
that exist today.”359 The report also notes that this is not a widely-shared view. 
 In “The Classification of Circus Techniques” Hovey Burgess observes, 
“The modern circus is by no means a direct descendant of the ancient Roman 
circus. Roman circuses, such as Circus Maximus, were architectural structures 
designed primarily for chariot races.”360 In 1768 Philip Astley, an Englishman, 
and his wife Patty founded what was considered to be the first modern circus. 
Using the skills acquired during his service in a cavalry regiment during the 
Seven Years War, for several years Astley offered equestrian lessons each 
morning and performed riding tricks in the afternoon in an open ring near what at 
the time was the outskirts of London. 361 Astley built the New British Riding 
School or Amphitheatre Riding Ring, near the Westminster Bridge in 1773. Just 
as with the theatre, there were a variety of seating options, including the pit, 
boxes, and galleries.362 During the same period Astley expanded his performances 
to include first acrobats then cavalry-style horsemanship, clowning, and vaulting. 
All were typical offerings of the period.  
 Astley’s unique contribution, which earned him the distinction of being 
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Figure 5. Unknown. Print illustrating Astley's Royal Amphitheatre, Victoria and 
Albert Museum, London. 
the founder of the modern circus, was his signature format, a ring approximately 
42 feet in diameter. As Astley had discovered, this dimension provides an 
“optimum balance between centrifugal and centripetal forces for a man attempting 
to maintain his balance on the back of a galloping horse.”363 In addition the ring 
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provided the audience with a much better view of the performance than a straight 
line. While the modern and Roman structures were both circular arenas 
surrounded by tiers of seats, Astley’s building was designed for we now call the 
circus: an exhibition of equestrian, acrobatic, and other performances. Other early 
modern circuses would also house their performances in theatre-like permanent 
structures.  
Through emphasizing similarities with the theatre, these early circus 
owners wished to distinguish themselves from the rowdy entertainments of 
country fairs and town festivals, or more brutal activities such as cock fighting or 
bear baiting. Horses, which were increasingly perceived as status symbols by the 
English gentry, embodied this distinction. Humans who owned or controlled 
horses, and especially well-bred and well-trained animals, were associated with 
superior classes. As part of this public relations campaign, cultural historian 
Marius Kwint notes, horses “became a pliant rhetorical device as well as a 
practical instrument for performing astonishing feats. Horsemen had long served 
as emblems of conquest — of nurture over nature, of reason over passion —and 
indeed of civilization itself.”364 Astley used horses (among other devices) to align 
his circus with educational, patriotic, and cultural institutions and distance himself 
from nomadic performers and their offerings, which were often perceived as 
disreputable, and inappropriate for those aspiring to middle class status in a 
rapidly urbanizing society.365 In contrast, horses were associated with the nobility 
and the cavalry; both groups were highly respected in an age when militarism and 
imperialism were celebrated. The skillful equestrian performances and riding 
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lessons offered by Astley brought audiences and aspiring students closer to the 
elegant, highly trained steed which exemplified these values. 
Americans had a different relationship with the circus and with horses. 
There were few cities in early nineteenth century America large enough to support 
a resident circus. At the same time, the frontier was rapidly expanding. Although 
also associated with wealth and military prowess, for thousands of Americans 
horses provided access to opportunities afforded by westward expansion. Circus 
were also on the move, offering diversion and a chance to gaze at the unusual and 
the exotic in large but rural nation. In 1828 Joshuah Purdy Brown began using a 
portable canvas tent to house his circus. About the same time, traveling 
menageries were added to circus performances. Finally rather than being owned 
by a family of performers, these circuses were run by businessmen. The 
combination resulted in an American form of circus that distinctly differed from 
the European model.  
One of the most famous American circuses, P.T. Barnum’s, began as a 
traveling museum, menagerie, and circus in 1871. P.T. Barnum had a museum 
background, and, according to Deborah Walk, curator at the Ringling Museums, 
tried to promote his circus as an educational institution.366 Eventually this became 
a multi-ring circus; the menagerie and the museum became a sideshow that 
featured human and animal oddities.367 A decade later Barnum formed a 
partnership with James Anthony Bailey. After Barnum’s death, Bailey took 
became Barnum & Bailey’s “Greatest Show on Earth” on a European tour, which 
led to the establishment of tented traveling circuses with menageries in Europe.368  
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In both Europe and the United States, as horses were replaced by other 
forms of transportation, the appeal of equestrian acts diminished. While exotic 
animals had made occasional appearances in the circus, by the end of the 
nineteenth century wild animal acts, acrobats, aerialists, jugglers, and clowns 
became increasingly popular. 369 In the late twentieth century, in large part due to 
the efforts of animal rights activists, circuses have come under increasing scrutiny 
and criticism for their treatment of animals, especially wild species. These reports 
of animal abuse further diminished the reputation of the circus. The use of exotic 
animals were replaced in the “new circus” by an increasing emphasis on human 
performers and/or the use of domestic animals, especially horses, which were the 
focus of the early modern circuses.  
 Beginning in the nineteenth century, an increasing awareness of various 
forms of abuse in the training and care of zoo and circus animals led to calls for 
reform. While I will not be directly addressing these reform efforts, I want to 
acknowledge them as an influence in our changing perceptions of animals and 
how they are treated. In its campaign to pass legislation to protect exotic animals 
in the United States, Animal Defenders International, a nonprofit organization 
founded in 1990 that focuses on the use of animals in entertainment and 
laboratories, identifies the primary causes of animal suffering in circuses. These 
include insufficient space, being transported for extended periods, the inability to 
exercise or act normally, stress from abnormal conditions (including having 
solitary animals being housed with other animals, being separated from family 
members, or keeping predators and prey in close proximity), physical abuse, and 
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the development of health, behavioral, and psychological problems from all of the 
above.370  
In large part due to the efforts of animal rights activists, circuses have 
come under increasing scrutiny and criticism for their treatment of animals, 
especially wild species. These reports of animal abuse further diminished the 
reputation of the circus.371 While the traditional three-ring animal circus is still 
popular, caused by shifting artistic and animal rights-influenced values has led to 
what is called the “new circus,” which only presents acts with domestic animals 
or focuses solely on human acts. In addition to changes in the animal acts, the 
new circus’ identification with the performing arts has resulted in a shift in artistic 
and commercial attitudes in these companies.372  
 The replacement of exotic animals in the new circus with an increasing 
emphasis on human performers and/or the use of domestic animals, especially 
horses, is reminiscent of the early modern circuses. Some such as Cirque du Soleil, 
founded in 1984, do not include any animal acts while others, including the Big 
Apple Circus, use only domesticated animals. In spite of these efforts to rethink 
the circus, the spectacular nature of many “new circus” performances cause them 
to be categorized as entertainment rather than art forms for various reasons, 
including the circus’ emphasis on commercial income, the “perceived class based 
nature” of its appeal, a lack of artistic quality, and animal rights issues.373 As an 
increasing number of visual and performing artists use living animals in works 
that are shown in galleries, museums, and other venues, it is useful to keep in 
mind how these artworks and especially how animals are treated, echo or diverge 
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from what has been done with and to animals in circuses and zoos.  
In contrast to the contemporary new circus format, the older circus’ 
connections with theatrical productions such as the hippodramas were not only 
due to its architectural forms, but also its practices. As noted by A. H. Saxon in 
“The Circus as Theatre: Astley's and Its Actors in the Age of Romanticism,” 
while tumbling, juggling, rope dancing, trick riding, and the exhibiting of trained 
animals can be traced to antiquity, Astley was the first to bring these acts together 
to form “a distinct entertainment of sufficient magnitude to stand on its own.”374  
In Astley’s England, circuses and other entertainment venues were legally 
prohibited from offering, “legitimate drama,” defined as a five-act play with 
dialogues in prose unaccompanied by music. However circuses and theatres alike 
had dramatic companies. The dramatic companies associated with the circuses 
were allowed to perform burlettas (brief comic operas) and pantomimes. The 
circus also had equestrian companies and units which offered what we now 
consider the traditional circus acts. Sometimes the performances by these groups 
were presented separately; at other times there would be overlap in the 
increasingly popular hippodrama, which inserted equestrian displays into 
dramatic productions.  
In addition to melodrama, other forms of hippodrama included the 
reproduction of military campaigns, Easter or Christmas religious spectacles, and 
eventually, comedic stories. The hippodramas included music provided by an 
orchestra, spectacular costumes, compelling backdrops, and various special 
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effects. In some productions the horse was the star of the show, acting as the 
protagonists responsible for saving a child or identifying a villain. The 
hippodrama quickly became the feature, typically opening the program. This was 
followed by “Scenes in a Circle” (acrobats, clowns, strongmen, gymnasts, etc.). 
Closing the evening, and appearing on the increasingly popular proscenium stage, 
would be a “pedestrian” melodrama, a burletta, or a pantomime.375 
 By the beginning of the nineteenth century hippodramas, initially a circus 
offering, became increasing popular and eventually found their way into 
“classical” theatre. One of the most famous hippodramas was “Mazeppa and the 
Wild Horse of Tartary,” based on the poem by Byron and first staged by Astley in 
1831.376 In the story a young man, apparently a commoner dares to become 
romantically involved with a woman betrothed to a nobleman. His punishment? 
He is lashed naked to the back of a wild horse that is then released into the wild. 
The young man survives, eventually reunites with his lover, and is recognized as 
the rightful heir to the throne. The hippodrama concludes with the restoration of 
order (Mazeppa survives his ordeal in the wilderness and assumes his rightful 
position as Prince of the Tartars). In a later production, at Whitechapel's Pavilion 
Theatre in 1861, it is the young woman, played by the American actor Adah 
Isaacs Menken who, nearly naked, is bound to the horse in what became a far 
more erotic sequence.377  
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Figure 6. Echo Press, Mazeppa: Fannie Louise Buckingham, Indianapolis 
Museum of Art, Indianapolis. 
 Mazzepa’s move from Astley’s circus to Whitechapel Theatre 
demonstrates both the popularity of hippodramas and the impact they had on 
“classical” theatre. An earlier example of the influence of hippodramas on theatre 
occurred in 1811, when a new production of Blue Beard, a play by George 
Colman the Younger at Covent Garden used trained horses from Astley's Circus 
in two acts. While audience were enthusiastic, theatrical productions that used 
living animals (in addition to horses, dogs were popular along with the occasional 
elephant) drew criticism and praise. A contemporary review by Leigh Hunt’s in 
The Examiner captures both: 
If it were possible to present the public with such exhibitions and at the 
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same time cherish a proper taste for the Drama, they [horses] might even 
be hailed as a genuine improvement in representation; for if men, and not 
puppets, act men, there seems to be no dramatic reason why horses should 
not act horses. But . . . [t]hey are too powerful a stimulus to the senses of 
the common order of spectators, and take away from their eyes and ears all 
relish for more delicate entertainment. The managers and the public thus 
corrupt each other; but it is the former who begin the infection (emphasis 
added).378  
Following the revival of Blue Beard, Timour the Tartar, which also included 
horses, drew intense criticism from reviewers, in part because it was a new work 
(as opposed to a revival where innovative additions were more acceptable). 
Further, since Blue Beard’s success had restored the theatre to a secure financial 
footing, it was perceived by supporters of classical theatre as driven by greed 
rather than by a more pardonable effort to save the theatre from financial ruin.  
As Michael Gamer, an English Romantic scholar describes it, “In 
commissioning a new play solely for the purposes of exhibiting equestrian 
spectacle . . . the management of Covent Garden crossed a number of ideological 
lines.” The classical or legitimate theater had been overcome by the “illegitimate 
forces of pantomime and the circus, and all the expected dualisms of reason and 
madness, authority and misrule, and good and evil, follow.”379 The inclusion of 
living animals (in this case, the horse) in a production, contaminates legitimate 
theatre. The criticism arises not from the horses’ capacity to successfully perform 
their roles, but from the “powerful stimulus to the senses.” In the theatre, the 
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spoken word is important. Substituting sensuality or pantomime, as was done in 
the hyppodramas, threatened theatre’s artistic foundations. Madness, misrule, and 
evil follow. Living animals on stage — horses performing as horses — are more 
compelling than the spoken word. Horses, animals without language, embody the 
“illegitimate forces of pantomime.”380 As the nineteenth century progressed, 
hippodramas became less popular. Exotic animals such as elephants and lions 
were introduced and gradually become more prominent than horses in these 
dramas and also in circus acts more generally.381  
 
 
5. The Way Things Work 
As discussed in the introduction, in Circus and Culture: A Semiotic 
Approach Paul Bouissac thinks of circus acts as a form of language.382 He 
assumes that the acts deliver a uniform message that is understood in the same 
way by audience members because the code used is one which everyone interprets 
in essentially the same way.383 The codes, which include objects, costumes, music, 
lighting, the ring, the types of acts, sounds, the use of natural materials (or not), 
and the actions performed by humans and animal, and the relationships between 
these codes create “rules of compatibility” which govern the way things are 
supposed to work in everyday life.384 The “way things work” include expectations 
about relationships between humans and animals. Sometimes the rules of 
compatibility are challenged and then tacit understandings about the way things 
are, about what’s normal, are disrupted. For example, rules of compatibility are 
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challenged when in traditional circus acts, a horse makes its trainer look foolish or 
an elephant answers the telephone. In these situations, once the punch line has 
been delivered, order is restored.  
From a semiotic perspective, the performances are texts written in a code 
of constant and variable units. These units might include material elements, 
processes, and the relations between materials and processes. Together these 
elements and their variations may create a narrative or evoke an emotional or 
cognitive response from the audience. The use of costumes is an example. An 
acrobat dressed as a tramp may elicit a humorous response from the audience, and 
successful completion of the maneuvers may seem to come in large part through 
chance. In contrast an acrobat dressed in a traditional leotard costume may 
successfully complete the same program, but evoke a response of admiration and 
a sense that the performer possesses superior skill and intelligence. 
Props are read the same way. On one level, a chair serves a specific 
function and conveys style on the social and aesthetic levels, but the chair 
assumes additional meanings in other contexts. In a circus a chair may become a 
weapon for a lion tamer, a clown’s musical instrument, or a difficult object to 
juggle.385 In the same way, he points out that animals can also become 
“polyvalent” elements. A horse may serve as a platform for a bareback rider or “a 
‘superhuman’ actor, able to make a fool of its trainer.”386 In many of these 
examples, a shift in context or relationship results in a new identity or relational 
properties, even if the basic element (chair, horse, or acrobatic prowess) remains 
the same. In all of these examples the object (i.e., chair or horse) is a tool used by 
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the human performer in ways that eventually reaffirm his or her superiority. Any 
other outcome would diminish the audience’s sense of pleasure in the show. 
In his semiotic-based analysis, Bouissac describes a hegemonic model, or 
as what Bakhtin might have described as the official language. Bouissac does not 
account for the intrusion of informal or centripetal forces that might create 
alternative readings of the act. The rules of compatibility in this structuralist 
analysis imply there is broadly accepted norm and any other interpretation is a 
misreading. While it is true that circus performances are elaborately constructed 
narratives that involve intense training and rehearsal, and draw from traditional or 
standard models, the actors, both human and animal, and their audiences are 
always unique and particular individuals. Even the most standardized of codes 
will be expressed and perceived in various ways, depending on each individual’s 
own preoccupations, experiences, and motivations. While these acts are 
historically and culturally grounded, just as with any form of communication, 
socio-economic class, personal history, and an array of other factors will be in 
play.  
Yet norms do exist. They can frame performances in ways that foreground 
some readings and exclude others. For example, while audiences for the early 
“modern circus” which began with Astley may have anticipated seeing animals 
behave in unusual or extraordinary ways, and understood this as evidence of 
human – or even more specifically racial or ethnic — superiority, in the 
contemporary performances considered in the final chapter, the emphasis is on 
creating an environment where horses are encouraged to engage in “natural” 
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behaviors. Yet in both, the animals are being trained and handled in ways 
designed to achieve specific outcomes. 
Bouissac observes, “The circus [or theatrical performance more generally] 
freely manipulates a cultural system to such an extent that it leaves the audience 
contemplating a demonstration of humanity freed from the constraints of the 
culture within which the performance takes place” (emphasis added). However 
not only is what is imaginable culturally bound, but also what we imagine nature 
to be is also a cultural construction. As Pierre Vost, another scholar of the circus 
and author of The Circus and the Music Hall, observes, “Circus and vaudeville 
are not only brilliant and fascinating forms of spectacles but also, and above all, 
very precise and very lucid ones. They are very meaningful; to content ourselves 
with a passive enjoyment is to insult our intelligence.”387  
6. Creating Oppositions 
Nature and culture are thought of as opposites, and yet an increasing 
number of theorists think that nature is a product of culture. While it is widely 
accepted that culture plays an important role in the development of human 
identity, culture’s role in establishing the identity of animals and of nature — that 
is, how nature is defined — has been recognized relatively recently. Nature has 
often been “identified” as simply whatever is outside of culture, although 
increasingly scholars such as Haraway, among others, challenge these boundaries. 
Nature is increasingly recognized as a cultural construct. Nature and animals have 
also been traditionally identified as a resource for humans. In part this last point is 
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based on an assumption that humans have intrinsic value (or more intrinsic value) 
while other animals have either instrumental value or less intrinsic value.  
Traditional circus acts play off of the binaries of culture/nature and 
human/animal. Sometimes these are reaffirmed, sometimes challenged. Culture is 
a perpetually elusive term. This word has had a long and varied history, and one 
in which its meaning has not remained constant. According to the critic Raymond 
Williams, a foundational theorist in the field of cultural studies, “Culture is one of 
the two or three most complicated words in the English language . . . mainly 
because it has now come to be used for important concepts in several distinct 
intellectual disciplines and in several distinct and incompatible systems of 
thought.”388  
In the field of anthropology, culture can be defined as the social 
circulation of meaning, with the meaning embedded in various cultural products. 
According to the anthropologist Bronisław Malinowski,389 “Culture is a well 
organized unity divided into two fundamental aspects—a body of artifacts and a 
system of customs. More recently Clifford Geertz,390 another anthropologist, 
defined culture as “an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in 
symbols.” Culture is a text that can be interpreted through producing “thick 
descriptions” which capture the point of view of participants in a ritual or an event. 
In Geertz’s semiotic approach, according to the philosopher Jesse Prinz, 
“behavioral practices are described in sufficient detail to trace inferential 
associations between observed events” and to recognize that events have different 
meanings and consequences depending on the social groups.391 These “observed 
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events” could include circus acts, performances, and also the forms of preparation 
and training associated with these activities.  
Media scholar John Fiske provides a definition that may be especially 
relevant. According to Fiske culture ranges from, 
the social circulation of value and pleasure, to the processes of forming 
social identities and social relationships, and to entering into relation with 
the larger social order in a particular way and from a particular position. 
Social relationships are personal, social relations are structural, and the 
former turn the latter into the lived experience of every day life.392  
As Raymond Williams notes in his book, Keywords, the Latin root word Colere 
was a verb that meant inhabit, cultivate, protect, or honor with worship. By the 
early fifteen century, the English word culture meant the tending of natural 
growth such as crops or animals. In the sixteenth century a metaphorical use of 
the term referred to individual human development. Over the next two centuries 
culture began to be understood as a more abstract and general process. Williams 
quotes Milton, who wrote in 1660, “spread much more Knowledg and Civility, 
yea, Religion, through all parts of the Land, by communicating the natural heat of 
Government and Culture more distributively to all extreme parts, which now lie 
num and neglected.” 393 Civilization and civility were often associated or 
interchangeable with culture over time. The German cultur, which eventually 
became kultur in the nineteenth century, was a synonym for civilization. Kultur 
also took on an Enlightenment-influenced meaning associated with a secular 
process. The German philosopher Johann Gottfried von Herder observed, 
	   173	  
“nothing is more indeterminate than this word, and nothing more deceptive than 
its application to all nations and periods.” 394 Resisting the implied superiority of 
European culture, Herder wrote,  
Men of all the quarters of the globe, who have perished over the ages, you 
have not lived solely to manure the earth with your ashes, so that at the 
end of time your posterity should be made happy by European culture. 
The very thought of a superior European culture is a blatant insult to the 
majesty of Nature.395    
As Williams observes, Herder was the first to recognize that culture is plural. He 
observed there are numerous cultures existing not only in different counties and 
periods but also even within a single country.  
During the Romantic movement the term was positively associated with 
national and traditional ways of life, in opposition to and as a critique of 
civilization, which was then associated with mechanization and industrialization. 
During this period culture was associated with the spiritual, and civilization with 
the material realm. During the nineteenth century both culture and civilization 
were associated with what G. F. Kelmms characterized as the “human 
development from savagery through domestication to freedom.”396 Culture can 
then refer to “a general process of intellectual, spiritual, and aesthetic 
development,” a meaning which emerged in the eighteenth century; or beginning 
in the nineteenth century, a particular way of life (of a people, a period, a group, 
or humanity in general; and finally, beginning in the late nineteenth century, as 
“the works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity” (emphasis 
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added). 397  
Raymond Williams observes, “Faced by this complex and still active 
history of the word, it is easy to react by selecting one ‘true’ or ‘proper’ or 
‘scientific’ sense and dismissing other senses as loose or confused,” something 
that has been done by North American anthropology, as is evident from the 
discussion above.398 Although this is perhaps necessary in a discipline, as Said has 
noted, it creates a field that somewhat arbitrarily includes or excludes other ideas, 
meanings, and possibilities. But especially since this term is also widely used in 
public discourse, maintaining an awareness of the term’s variable meanings and 
associations, whether positive or negative, is necessary for recognizing, as 
Williams notes, “complex argument about the relations between general human 
development and a particular way of life, and between both and the works and 
practices of art and intelligence.”  
Williams points out that an awareness of culture’s multiple meanings can 
keep alive the “central question of the relations between ‘material’ and ‘symbolic’ 
production.” Also, as he notes, doing this can sensitize us to the “alternative views 
of the activities, relationships and processes which this complex word indicates. 
The complexity, that is to say, is not finally in the word but in the problems which 
its variations of use significantly indicate.”399  
     The human and animal acts presented in circuses provide an opportunity to 
explore our society’s behavioral practices with respect to human-animal 
relationships in ways that expose how the nature/culture framing impacts the 
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“lived experience of everyday life.” In the nineteenth century performances 
considered here the horse is subservient to culture (i.e., a tool to be used for 
economic or military purposes, or in the case of the wild horse of Mazeppa, 
destroyed by it). In contemporary works horses are presented as somehow 
superior to, or outside of, or free of culture. Yet because performance is itself a 
cultural product, the horse is always already part of culture (as defined above) and 
simultaneously assigned an insider and an outsider status. Further, humans 
participate in culture and yet as animals cannot be considered as separate from 
“nature.” Finally, many scientists, including evolutionary biologists, primatologist, 
neurologists, and others have demonstrated that “nonhuman” animals have 
“culture.”  
Any potential for increasing insight or initiating change is mediated, 
according to Bouissac, by rules that govern the circus’ “ritualistic manner that 
tempers this transgressive aspect.” So while the circus can challenge the cultural 
norms, because it is contained within a narrowly proscribed frame of time and 
space, its threat is often contained or neutralized. Yet the potential challenge to 
the status quo, according to Bouissac, is why circuses are “semireject[ed]” by the 
dominant culture and generate an ambivalent response characterized by a mix of 
repression and fascination. While the content presented by circus acts by its 
nature is set apart from daily life, the challenges posed are minimized because the 
it is viewed as something for children and other “individuals who have not been 
fully integrated into a culture,” including those with a “marginal status or unique 
status, such as poets or artists.”400 While Bouissac’s reading of the circus acts 
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assumes a somewhat unambiguous alignment between what is being expressed 
(even if it is intended to undermine dominant norms) and its reception by an 
audience, Williams approach opens up possibilities for more varied reactions. The 
differing reactions to and relationships with culture, in all of its various meanings, 
is especially relevant to the circus, which over the past two centuries has operated 
in a grey zone marked by various attitudes toward high art and popular 
entertainment, and also toward human and animal relationships. 
 Zoos, which are often perceived as objectively presenting animals are, as 
Bouissac observes, a “pedagogical discourse that contributes to a general system 
for interpreting the animal world. In this respect, it is a replica of the current 
zoological myths of the contextual culture, i.e., an evolutionary perspective that 
stresses specific differences along a hierarchical scale leading to the final, radical 
gap between animals and humans.”401 This system has changed over time, with 
older zoos collecting one-of-a-kind animals or “monogamous families” while 
contemporary zoos focus on an ecological or behaviorist approach. While 
acknowledging their contributions to zoology and efforts to maintain objectivity, 
Bouissac believes zoos can be understood as myth-making enterprises, “systems 
of collective interpretation of the experience of the ‘world’” that seek to establish 
clear-cut categories and non-ambiguous relations.402 
In contrast, Bouissac asserts that circuses “creat[e] confusion between the 
animal species” and “promot[e] ‘unnatural’ behavior on the part of animals.”403 
Examples include acts where one animal impersonates another (a horse acts like a 
bull, a dog acts like a lion) or humanization of animals (a horse moves its head to 
	   177	  
indicate yes/no, or a chimpanzee plays a musical instrument). Even more 
transgressive are acts that imply boundary-crossing intimate relations, such as the 
photograph from the University of Amsterdam Library’s Circus Collection, which 
reminds one of the series of photographs made by Carolee Schneemann that 
depict her kissing her cat.404 One distinction Bouissac makes between the two is 
that because (although this is changing) zoos present individual species in 
isolation from one another and their native habitats, they “organize experience in 
a network of discontinuous categories.” In contrast circuses “compensate for the 
inadequacy of the system with respect to the actual experience of everyday 
life.”405 Because of this Bouissac believes the circus restores “biological 
continuity denied by contextual culture”406 His thesis is that circus performances 
articulate something that is “not-said” in culture. However he is not talking about 
the radical difference of the horse or animals more generally, in the sense of a 
profoundly unknowable “other,” but rather about the transgression of unspoken 
boundaries between human and animal. 
Because these acts follow long established rules governed by tradition, 
Bouissac associates circus with rites, which he defines as “not concerned with 
generalization, but with variety and individualness. They emphasize exceptions 
and dissimilarities with the use of the same artifacts and gestures in the contextual 
culture.” Rites and circuses are characterized by the “prestige of uniqueness and 
repetitiveness in performance.”407 Both use symbols that have an affective impact 
on the audience. A number of performances by artists using animals possess the 
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same ritualistic traits, including Beuys’ I Like America and American Likes Me, 
which is discussed in a following chapter. 
In “The Animal Apparatus: From a Theory of Animal Acting to an Ethics 
of Animal Acts,” Michael Peterson asks, “How are animals made to mean?” 
Echoing Berger’s description of zoo cages, Peterson notes that performances with 
animals also employ framing. Animals are taught behaviors which are then 
presented in a series of framed units which add up to a narrative. The animal 
apparatus consists of “framing trained behaviors in a ‘non-animal narrative,’” that 
is, a human narrative is wrapped around units of trained behaviors in ways that 
lead to the “constructions of social relations between humans and animals.”408  
For example in Mazeppa the “wild horse” travels along pathways that 
diagonally cut across the stage, carrying his “helpless” captive. 409 As number of 
audience members at the time noted, the stagehands often had to coax the amiable 
horse to “act the part,” to showing more energy and spirit. The human melodrama 
of danger and exile and ultimate triumph in this case did not seamlessly blend in 
with the simple and often too quiet crisscrossing of the stage by the horse with its 
human burden. As Peterson accurately observes “the horse’s docility was . . . vital 
to making the play work at all;” and that was something well understood by 
audiences. The presence of a real horse on stage was enough to “make meaning” 
so it was not necessary for animal’s actions to be convincing. If however the 
horse misbehaved (i.e., truly acted wild), it was not disruptive to the performance 
but an enhancement which surprised and often delighted the audience (and most 
likely terrified the actor). In the later and more popular productions, when it is 
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Mazeppa’s lover that is bound to the horse, the action is compelling because of 
the very real and physical juxtaposition of female human flesh and horseflesh — 
the visceral presentation of enmeshed female and animal sexuality — and not 
because of the quality of the acting. It is the sheer physical reality that makes the 
living horse irreplaceable. Not clear – is it that the female body is nearly naked? 
Or is there a cultural association between female and animal that is at work here. 
Either way you need to be clearer. 
Peterson also notes, “Much human culture about nonhuman animals, 
including performance and especially live performing animals in 
anthropomorphic frames, works to ‘humanize’ humans and ‘dehumanize’ 
animals.”410 Peterson believes that using animals can make “art safe” because 
they seem to "demand only a simple emotional response.”411 Furthermore, these 
frames and narratives are representations of animals, not an unmediated encounter 
with an animal, such as it is. Peterson concludes that simply by their very 
presence animals “matter as themselves” in artistic performances. 412 It is worth 
considering what “themselves” means here. It is not the horse as a particular 
individual animal, or even as a more general set of traits and characteristics that 
describe a species, but how “animal” is framed, and what “animal” means to the 
audience. Other ways of using living animals in artistic performances involve 
assigning anthropomorphic or symbolic roles. For example in a circus act one 
horse may be trained to act differently from others in the group. The behaviors are 
framed in ways that encourage the audience to read this behavior as humorous, 
independent, or rebellious. Another, and one that is relatively new, is to create an 
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encounter where the human interacts with the animal in ways that affirm its 
“natural” inclinations and behaviors.  
The various forms of communication which occur between the trainer, the 
human performer, and the animal during rehearsal are typically based on a set of 
cues which become increasingly subtle over time. By the time the act is publicly 
performed, these cues may be imperceptible to most spectators. This has never 
been a one-way street, in that the human trainers and performers are aware of and 
react to the animal’s responses. However, while the animal’s reactions may cause 
humans to make adjustments to the training process, the desired outcomes 
typically remain the same. 
What Bouissac concluded about the circus, can be applied to 
hippoddramas. other theatre performances. These narratives can affirm, 
temporarily invert, or challenge widely-accepted beliefs about animals, including 
their intellectual abilities, their capacity to feel and express emotion, and whether 
or not they possess characteristics such as dignity, a sense of justice or fair play, 
and so on. However, just as with human actors, what is portrayed on stage (or in 
the ring) is not an unmediated encounter with the animal, such as it is, but rather a 
well-rehearsed sequence of actions that typically embody and express human 
thoughts, desires, and emotions. 
Bahktin’s theory of carnival provides a tool for thinking about these kinds 
of potentially transformative performances.413 Unlike the circus and many artistic 
performances, there isn’t a separation between performer and spectator in carnival. 
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However because it only occurs during limited and specified times, carnival is set 
off from “normal” life.” During this period, categorical distinctions are blurred or 
inverted. While for carnival this occurred between various groups of people, the 
same is true for the animal acts and performances considered here. Engaging in a 
cross-species dialogue has the potential to enhance mutual understanding. 
 Another similarity with Bakhtin’s theory is the challenge posed to binary 
oppositions. Bakhtin applied his ideas of the carnivalesque to the polarities that 
existed in medieval life. Carnival is a period of freedom from oppressive poverty 
and domination, a time when roles were reversed. The peasant could be king, for 
a time, and a common household item could become a powerful weapon. In 
performances which feature living animals, long-standing polarities between 
nature and culture, and especially between animal and human are being 
interrogated. While the carnivalesque may be understood as a kind of release 
valve, to lessen tensions without permitting change, these “as if” experiences have 
the potential to have long-term effects on the culture. Do they really? The mere 
fact that these performances present living animals and human beings in close 
physical proximity to each other and the audience has a material and physical 
reality that can impact how people think and act toward animals in their daily 
lives. How can you be sure they don’t simply reinforce stereotypical behavior and 
ideas? 
At the least, how nonhuman animals are treated and presented in circus 
venues can affirm the rules of compatibility or create openings for the 
reconsideration of human-animal identities and relationships. Bouissac’s book, 
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published in 1976, focuses on a semiotic analysis of training and performance and 
makes no mention of the now widely-expressed concerns about the treatment of 
animals. It’s interesting to note that Peter Singer’s influential book, Animal 
Liberation (which was briefly discussed in the introduction), was published just a 
year earlier. It focuses on the treatment of animals in research and raised for food. 
There is no mention of the circus. And People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals (PETA), founded in 1980, did not begin their circus campaign until 2006. 
Bouissac’s ideas provide us with a glimpse into how circus animals were viewed 
at a time when few people were concerned about the ways in which these animals 
are treated in this environment. 
Bouissac, writing in the late 1970s, observes that the circus is “a kind of 
mirror in which culture is reflected.” While Bouissac’s analysis of animal training 
and performance is insightful, it must be noted that his theoretical framing is 
narrowly focused and time-specific. While he is concerned with placing the circus 
within a larger cultural context, he does not extend his consideration of circus 
animals to include the quality of their lives overall, or the prevalence of abusive 
techniques that has now come to light. That this is the case affirms Bouissac’s 
assertion that circuses are both a “representation of the contextual culture” and “a 
metacultural discourse” about our beliefs and behaviors.414  
Although, his analysis is marked by a preoccupation with biological 
continuity or discontinuity, especially with respect to language, Bouissac’s 
observations about how communication operates in these human-animal acts 
comes out of a system of binary codes that seeks to establish and maintain a set of 
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stable categories. This provides insights about how the animal-human and nature-
culture oppositions are not only described but formed by how language is defined 
and used.  
He notes that the messages used in these performances: 
• position either the human or the animal as superior or inferior in relation 
to each other,  
• extend to include substitutes for “natural” (by which he means human) 
language, and  
• substitutive gestures and autonomous gestures are translated into human 
language by viewers.415 
As a result of these manipulations, animals speak in a language that the audience 
can understand. On the one hand, these acts suggest that animals can speak, that 
they have a point of view; on the other hand, the “words” they are saying have 
literally been put in their mouths. Humans are speaking for the animals. 
Nevertheless, these manipulations shift the cultural system in ways which leave 
“the audience contemplating a demonstration of humanity freed from the 
constraints of the culture within with the performance takes place.” According to 
Bouissac, this accounts for the ambivalent response to the circus. Enthusiasm is 
countered by repression. The maintenance of the cultural status quo requires that 
the circus be relegated to a form of popular entertainment which no mature adult 
would take seriously. Only children and fools dream of running away with the 
circus.416  
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 While Bouissac sees the circus as challenging established cultural norms, 
he does not see that the language system he describes here actually relies on the 
very cultural structures he is critiquing, especially the assumption that there are 
binary linguistic codes that are used in uniformly accepted ways. In contrast, 
Bakhtin and later post-structural theorists lay the groundwork for deconstructing 
these linguistic oppositions. Instead they want to expand conceptual frameworks 
and establish a more flexible and varied dialogic system, one which eventually 
moves beyond assigning fixed meanings to the written or spoken codes. They also 
include more elusive and transitory modes of sensory communication, including 
movement, touch, smell, nonverbal sounds, and even taste. 
 
7. The Comedy Horse 
There are two major types of circus acts involving horses. The liberty horse act is 
one in which horses appear to move freely in the ring, without either riders or 
harnesses, while an educated or comedy horse act is one in which the horse 
matches the human performer in intelligence and other traits traditionally assigned 
to humans. The first step for the educated or comedy horse act is to select a horse 
which demonstrates intelligence and the right personality, neither too timid nor 
too spirited. Next the trainer establishes basic ties by providing pleasurable 
connections based on gustatory, tactile, and auditory messages (i.e., giving the 
animal treats, pats and scratches, and speaking in soothing tones.) The training for 
the act begins as the trainer uses rewards (gustatory, tactile, auditory) and 
coercion (tactile, auditory) to attain the desired behaviors. Once these are 
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established, the visibility of the stimuli (reward/coercion) is reduced so that 
eventually only the subtlest hints are needed. At this point the trainer can now 
control the horse’s behavior.417 Since horses also send messages, the trainer must 
be sensitive to a horse’s appearance, sound, touch and smell. Trainers need to 
have a thorough knowledge of the horse’s biology, including the ability to 
distinguish between controllable and uncontrollable responses, expressions of fear, 
anxiety, aggression, and identification rituals.  
The goal, as Bouissac notes, is to “integrate, perfectly, the gestures of the 
training code with the paralinguistic gestural code of a natural [human] 
dialogue.”418 Paralinguistic expression is the nonverbal accompaniment to spoken 
language. As David Abercrombie, a scholar of phonetics, observed, "We speak 
with our vocal organs, but we converse with our entire bodies.”419 So for example, 
a horse may be trained to nod its head in apparent agreement or disagreement with 
the performer’s verbal statements. In the narrative of the act, these movements 
create the illusion that the horse has a knowledge of human language and can 
accurately respond to a series of questions or statements. This creates a double 
disjunction, separating the horse from other horses and affirming its special 
relationship to the human.420 
 “Dynamite, International King of Laughter” is example of a comedy horse 
act that was popular in the late 1960s and early 70s in the United States. In this 
routine Dynamite, free of any saddle or bridle, enters the ring chasing a cowboy 
(his trainer, Dany Renz). The “drunken” cowboy carries a saddle and bridle. The 
horse repeatedly nips the cowboy’s buttocks throughout a sequence in which the 
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cowboy attempts to saddle the animal. Eventually the cowboy is successful, but 
then can’t manage to mount or ride the horse. The horse then chases the man out 
of the ring. Upon returning, the man falls down and the horse comes to his aid, 
helping him to stand. After jointly bowing to the audience, the cowboy whispers 
something into the horse’s ear, causing the horse to “laugh.” The horse then 
chases the man out of the ring, which indicates the continuing superiority of the 
horse. As Bouissac points out, the horse attacks the man whenever it is treated 
like a horse, but helps the man when it is treated as if it is human.421 The drunken 
man is portrayed as beast-like, while the horse is humanized. In addition to the 
inversion of the traditional roles of horse and human, the act references and 
reworks Western film narratives where the domination of the cowboy is always 
emphasized. While the narration relies on visual and physical sequences, the use 
of verbal language (the horse understands and responds to the joke the cowboy 
whispers into his ear) establishes the humanity of the animal.422 In spite of the 
role reversal, standard categories about human-animal identities and relations 
remain unchallenged. These two are the exception to the rule. The drunken man is 
a failed cowboy and the horse is an exceptional individual, not a typical 
representative of its species. 
8. The Liberty Horse 
Liberty horses are riderless and perform in response to verbal commands. 
The liberty horse act was introduced in the 1920s and remain popular today. The 
number of horses is even and there is an emphasis on symmetrical patterns. All of 
the horses are either alike or different. There is a tension between the group and 
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the individual through shifts in position from the center (where the anonymous 
horse becomes a star, however briefly) to the periphery.  
For example, in a modification of the traditional “Maximum/Minimum 
Act” (which typically uses one color for ponies and another for the horses), the 
trainer Andre Vasserot treated each of the six pairs as unique, identical in color, 
shape, and trappings. As the performance begins, the pairs are announced, one by 
one, with the horse entering the ring first, shortly thereafter followed by a 
matching pony. In one instance, a black horse enters but the pony does not. Its 
solitude stands out in the arena of matched pairs. The pony arrives “late,” just 
before the last pair is announced. The animal appears to “rush” to its proper 
position, and harmony is restored. Then the horses together perform a series of 
pirouettes, sequences of patterns at a canter, and jumps, intermittently pausing to 
bow or stand on pedestals.  
In the abstract patterns created by the animals (as matched horse-pony 
pairs or divided into a set of ponies and another set of horses) the only asymmetry 
was the gap created by the missing pony. Although its absence was brief, the pony 
(which was black) has a large impact on the audience’s perception of the rest of 
the performance. The pony is a “black sheep” which has disrupted the harmony of 
the whole, and is perceived as being “penitent” as it “hurries” to take its proper 
position.423 Individual transgression, as embodied in the pony threatens the 
collective harmony of the group. Bouissac identifies this as a visual enactment of 
the tensions which arise in Western societies where individual freedom and 
conformity are competing values. 424 
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In both types of acts the animal is understood from solely anthropocentric 
perspectives and concerns. Both acts are primarily visual narratives, performed in 
ritualistic manner within the traditions of a particular institution, and designed to 
enact and appeal to human audiences. Dynamite’s “human-like” intelligence is 
exceptional for his species, and the pony is perceived as remorseful: the animal-
other is recognized as having human characteristics. While the hand of the human 
trainer is ideally invisible in each act, the animals’ movements and expressions 
are crafted and controlled by their human trainers. Unlike the zoo, the audiences 
have come to see the acts, not the animals as such. 
9. Savage Behavior 
During the rapid urbanization and industrialization of nineteenth century 
England, there was increasing awareness and criticism of the cruelty and abuse 
directed to children and working animals. While most activists focused on 
children, some directed their attention toward the abuse of working animals. 
Some extended their criticism to the methods used by animal trainers. Kwint 
refers to a 1785 Morning Herald story about “[t]he encrease of learned animals of 
the brute species, as horses, dogs, pigs, &c. must touch the feelings of every 
humane heart, when it is known that the tricks they perform are taught by the 
most excruciating torture.”425 In response, Kwint points out, circus horsemen, 
including Astley, “added notions of effective progress through ‘rational’ training 
techniques and the enlightened understanding of animals.” For example, Astley 
claimed that anyone who learned these techniques could “prevent the savage 
behavior that left animals liable to punishment.”426  
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In 1822, just before Parliament passed the first animal protection act, 
Astley presented “The Life, Death and Restoration of the High-Mettled Racer,” a 
story about a thoroughbred’s harsh treatment after his racing days ended.427 This 
performance foreshadows Black Beauty, a story by Anna Sewell that was popular 
in both England and the United States. Published fifty years later, in 1877, this 
book depicts the typical hardships experienced by a working horse as he or she is 
passed from owner to owner. Sewell’s intended audience was carriage and cab 
drivers, and she hoped that reading the book would cause them to be more 
compassionate toward their animals. Black Beauty, told from the horse’s 
anthropomorphized perspective, led to heightened awareness of the abuse endured 
by these working horses in England and the United States.428 Astley publically 
affirmed that animals should be treated well, yet his actions didn’t always align 
with his words. 
 This chapter has provided a look at human-animal relations in the period 
preceding the animal rights movement 1970s and the dissemination of ideas 
generated by poststructural theory and postcolonial studies. As was true of the 
dioramas discussed in chapter one, at this time zoos were designed primarily for 
people, with far less attention paid to the needs of the animals they housed. While 
the dioramas and zoos displayed wild or exotic (non-native) animals, the early 
modern circus used horses in equestrian displays or theatrical dramas. The exotic 
element, if there was one, was supplied by the physical contact of human and 
animal bodies in close relationship with each other, as was the case with many of 
the hippodramas.  
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 While animals may perform, as Peterson explains, they do not act. Unlike 
human actors, animals are not intentionally creating illusions. In each of these 
situations, the animals are positioned in symbolic matrix that has been created by 
humans. Each animal’s behavior is controlled and sequenced in ways that are 
meaningful for the human narratives built around them. In Bouissac’s structuralist 
analysis of the circus, animals are simply units that are part of complex linguistic 
codes used by trainers and performers. As Peterson points out, they are “made to 
perform” and “made to mean.” In the chapters that follow, informed in part by the 
animal rights movement, changing ideas about how language works, and the role 
of “the other” in ontology and ethics, relationships between humans and animals 
in western societies began to change. Advances in evolutionary biology and 
genetics also contributed to this shift.  
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Chapter Three 
Means to an End: The Symbolic Animal 
 In May of 1974, as the plane approached the North American continent, 
Joseph Beuys covered his eyes. Upon his arrival at the JFK International Airport 
he was wrapped in felt and transported by ambulance to an art gallery in lower  
 
Figure 7. I Like America and America Likes Me, 1974 (arrival by stretcher), 
(Performance 1974), René Block Gallery, New York City. 
.  
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Manhattan. Through isolating himself in the felt cocoon Beuys was cutting 
himself off from American culture and focusing on the sole purpose of his visit: a  
healing encounter with a “wild” coyote. It was Beuys’ intention to communicate 
with the “Coyote” for eight hours each day for three days in a room that had 
essentially been converted into a cage. The performance, which was open to the 
public, also marked the opening of Berlin art dealer René Block’s new gallery in 
New York City.  
 Beuys, who was also a founding member of the Green Party in Germany, 
clearly cared about relations between humans and animals. The performance in 
New York, Coyote: I Like America and America Likes Me, appears to be a 
genuine effort to turn away from typical forms of communication with other 
human beings, such as lectures and conversations, which he perceived as 
inadequate, and reach out for new ways of relating to others, including animals. 
1. Art, Action, and Animals 
 I Like America and America Likes Me was one of a series of actions or 
ritualized performances based on Beuys’ theory of Social Sculpture. For Beuys, 
art is action; Social Sculpture is the activity of living in a society. As Beuys 
explained, 
My theory depends on the fact that every human being is an artist. I have 
to encounter him when he [sic] is free, when he [sic] is thinking . . . . 
These concepts – thinking, feeling, wanting – are concerned with sculpture. 
Thought is represented by form; feeling by motion or rhythm; will by 
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chaotic force.429 
Beuys believed living is a creative act and that society is a work of art. Because 
everyone lives and acts within a social setting, everyone is an artist, and so 
capable of using creativity to change society. Although the senses play a role, 
conceptual thinking and language are the foundation: 
THINKING FORMS – how we mold our thoughts or / SPOKEN FORMS 
– how we shape our thoughts into words or / SOCIAL SCULPTURE – 
how we mold and shape the world in which we live: SCULPTURE AS 
AN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS; EVERYONE AS AN ARTIST. / That 
is why the nature of my sculpture is not fixed and finished. Processes 
continue in most of them: chemical reactions, fermentations, color 
changes, decay, drying up. Everything is in a STATE OF CHANGE.430 
Social Sculpture is movement and action; static form impedes change and limits 
thinking. Therefore the objects that come out of the art-making process are simply 
artifacts, the remnants of the artistic process.  
 According to Mark Rosenthal, a curator and critic who has studied Beuys’ 
work extensively, Social Sculpture and the actions (ritualized performances that 
were associated with it) sprang from Beuys’ intention to create works that would 
“affect society.”431 Actions were not rehearsed and did not have a script, but 
Beuys would plan the sequence of movements (often using a score) and specify or 
provide all of the objects used in the Action.432 Art was “therapeutically capable 
of effecting personal, social, and political change.”433 However, the ritualized 
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Actions (however indirect the means) had explicit personal, political, and social 
goals. In spite of Beuys’ efforts to avoid scripted performances, I Like America 
and America Likes Me was not an open-ended dialogue or encounter with a 
member of another species. Instead predetermined roles limited the possibilities 
for opening up new ways of understanding and experiencing the world.  
2. The Coyote from New Jersey 
 The “wild” coyote that had been brought into the gallery for this Action 
was assigned the role of “Coyote,” the symbol of a human-animal interface. In 
fact, the coyote in the performance was not from the west, but an eastern coyote 
named Little John that was owned by a man from New Jersey. Beuys explained 
that he intended to make “contact with the psychological trauma point of the 
United States’ energy constellation: the whole American trauma with the Indian, 
the Red Man. You could say that a reckoning has to be made with the coyote, and 
only then can this trauma be lifted.”434 (In	  addition	  to	  the	  damage	  inflicted	  on	  Native	  Americans,	  Beuys	  believed	  American	  capitalism	  and	  the	  country’s	  involvement	  in	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  were	  other	  sources	  of	  trauma.) Beuys 
explained that Native Americans believed “the coyote was one of the most mighty 
of a whole range of deities. He was an image of transformation, and like the hare 
and the stag in Eurasian myths, he could change his state from the physical to the 
spiritual and vice versa at will.”435 Because of these associations, the coyote 
embodied the destruction wrought by European colonizers on the North American 
continent and its indigenous population. David Williams, a scholar of 
performance theory and practice, explains, “Beuys staged himself as a sick man 
	   195	  
separating himself from the world to seek and present a tentative, reconciliatory 
healing for himself and the coyote through their encounter: a mutual creative co-
evolution, a conjunction oppositorum.”436 
 In Between Dog and Wolf: Essays on Art and Politics, David Levy Strauss 
describes the coyote as “the wild and untamed, an unacceptable threat to 
husbandry, domesticity, and law & order . . . . Like the American Indian, he was 
the Other in our midst, and we did everything we could to eliminate them 
both.”437 In the almost 25 year span between Beuys’ performance and the 
publication of Strauss’ book, the long war waged by humans against coyotes 
continued. Efforts to eradicate the animal have included: 
poisons such as strychnine and thallium sulfate, leg hold traps, cyanide 
“coyote-getters” designed to explode into the coyote's mouth, snares, den-
hunting to destroy pups, aerial hunting from planes and helicopters, “dying 
rabbit” calls to guns, sterilization baits, sight-running hounds, toxic collars 
on sheep, and “Compound 1080” sodium monofloroacetate), hailed as 
“the best, most species specific, most foolproof predator poison ever 
developed by man.”438  
As Gerry Parker, a research biologist, notes, not only are these efforts futile, but 
also humans actually aided in expanding the coyote population by pushing back 
the frontier and opening up the forests. And Starker Leopold, a distinguished 
zoologist, observed “If biologists were asked to devise a plan to produce bigger, 
smarter, and more widely-distributed coyotes, they would no doubt recommend 
doing more or less what had been done . . . remove many predators that competed 
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with the coyote, eliminate some of the coyote’s traditional food sources, but then, 
thorough our agricultural and waste disposal practices, provide it with new and 
more varied edibles.”439 Beuys made the right choice in using the coyote as the 
scapegoat that symbolizes the abuse inflicted on those who resist the dominant 
culture. At the same time, it’s clear that the coyote is not simply a victim, but also 
a highly adaptable and skillful animal. It’s interesting to note that the powers 
Beuys assigned to this animal extend beyond the spiritual and symbolic realm, as 
is evident in coyote’s resilience in the face of human efforts to eradicate it. 
 While it is true that coyotes prey on livestock, and sometime have a 
significant impact, humans have played a major role in acerbating the problem 
through creating breeds that are docile, gain weight rapidly, are not able to run 
quickly, and do not protect their young as effectively as wilder animals do.440 
Sheep are especially vulnerable. Many biologists recommend that the centuries-
long and unsuccessful efforts to exterminate coyotes be replaced by more 
effective measures including using breeds with stronger flocking instincts, 
effective fencing, avoiding remote pastures or those near coyote cover, removing 
coyote cover, and moving animals to barns or corrals near homes (and having 
ewes lamb in these more protected locations), using guard animals, and accepting 
that some loss to predators is a “natural tax.” While Beuys was critical of Western 
science and imperialism, which he perceived as a monolithic whole, this critique 
of Western agricultural practices by biologists show that in fact societal 
institutions and forces are more nuanced than he believed, and in this case the 
scientists may actually be Beuys’ allies, in that they are calling for methods that 
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are less intrusive with respect to the natural world. 
 Beuys wanted to bond with Little John in order to heal a rift between 
humans and nature. He tried to do this through spending a sustained period of 
time in close physical proximity with the coyote. Doing so, he believed, would 
forge close emotional and spiritual bonds. Yet his lack of knowledge about the 
natural history of Little John, his physical needs, his preferences, and even his 
perceptions maintained the very divide between human and animal that Beuys 
wished to heal. Science, undeniably, has caused great harm to animals, but it also 
offers opportunities to avoid misunderstandings and even abuse. Several examples 
of this are offered in the following paragraphs. 
First, as with many colonizing forces, Beuys did not understand Little 
John’s history and identity. As Strauss points out, “Beuys embraced the coyote as 
the progeny of the paleo-Siberian, Eurasian steppe-wolf that came across the 
Bering Strait 12,000 (or more — some estimates go as high as 50,000) years ago 
and adapted to its New World home. Coyote carried the paleo-Asiatic shamanic 
knowledge with him, spreading it throughout the North American West and into 
Mesoamerica.”441 However the western coyote is not the descendent of the 
Siberian wolf, an animal associated with transformation in the shamanic tradition. 
The reverse is true; the coyote is the ancestor of the Russian wolf. Canus latrans 
(or barking dog) originated on the American continent during the Pleistostcene 
Epoc, about two million years ago, and then spread via the land bridge across the 
Bering Strait to Russia.442  
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Originally living in what is now the Central United States, Northern 
Mexico, and southwestern Canada, coyotes spread to the eastern part of the 
continent only after predators such as the wolf were eliminated by European 
settlers. In the twenty-first century, and in spite of long-standing and continuing 
efforts to exterminate them, their numbers have rebounded and their range is 
larger than any other wild animal in North America.443 Because Beuys thought 
that the coyote was “an animal of the steppes,” he believed the coyote “elucidates 
the principle of movement and later becomes the image for the whole ‘Eurasian’ 
story.”444 Beuys misidentifies the origin of this species (and also Little John in 
particular, since he was an eastern coyote, a different species. Also, rather than 
being threatened by settlement, the coyote thrived. Nonetheless, as art historian 
and critic Mysoon Rizk notes, “With coyote as America’s stand-in, Beuys 
signaled a pre-European, pre-literate era along with the American frontier’s 
scapegoat par excellence.”445 
 In previous actions and drawings Beuys repeatedly identified himself with 
the hare. He had used dead hares in two earlier actions and a living white horse 
was in Titus/Iphigenia. Animals served as a bridge between earthly and spiritual 
realms. He described them as "figures that pass freely from one level of existence 
to another.”446 Strauss explains,  
In Beuys’ iconography the Hare symbolizes birth and especially 
incarnation. Though fertile, the Hare represents the vulnerability and 
finiteness of humankind. Like the Hare, Beuys is careful. He always uses 
felt and fat to insulate and protect. He moves slowly and deliberately, 
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approaching Coyote carefully. In the Coyote action, Beuys/Hare is 
burrowing in, wanting to be born into Coyote’s world. Coyote Old Man is 
the long survivor, found painted on paleolithic cave walls as already 
having been around a long time. “I know what happened after the before 
and before the after,” he says. Hare comes to Coyote to learn how to 
survive.447 
In the mythical world of this Action, the Beuys/Hare is a student of the coyote. If 
Beuys/Hare were to be born into the world of an actual coyote, he would have to 
learn how to survive quickly, or be eaten. 
 Why is it important for me to insist that the material reality has as much 
weight as the mythical? Consider the animal’s perspective. Little John’s 
experience of this event was grounded in a more immediate and physical reality. 
The coyote was separated from spectators by a chain link wall, which also 
prevented him from removing himself from Beuys’ presence. Little John 
maintained almost constant eye contact with the artist, In addition Caroline 
Tisdall, Beuys’ biographer and a personal friend, observed that the coyote’s “back 
was never turned to the people watching from behind the barrier”448 In videos 
taken at the time the coyote appears graceful, wary, and extremely alert. Beuys, 
needless to say, was also quite attentive to the animal’s movements.  
 Eastern coyotes resemble German Shepherds, are about two feet tall at the 
shoulder, four-to-five feet long from the tip of the nose to the tip of their tail, and 
weigh between 30-45 pounds. The more fox-like western coyotes typically only 
weigh between 20-25 pounds. As Little John demonstrated during his encounter 
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with Beuys, coyotes are very adaptable. They have learned how to live in close 
proximity to people, and now are common in suburban areas and even cities. 
They are omnivores, eating just about anything, and will adjust their social 
customs and breeding habits to accommodate the circumstances. Karl Devine, a 
naturalist, observes, “Coyotes have adapted to humans better than any wild 
animal that has ever existed.”449 In written accounts and videos of Beuys and the 
coyote this is evident in how the animal is responding to its predicament. 
 In contrast to their western counterparts, eastern coyotes are more social 
and less aggressive with littermates and mates. Coyote packs are usually family 
groups that include the mated pair, the young of that year, born in March or April, 
and a few adolescents from the previous year. The male will stay with the same 
female until their offspring is raised, and sometimes for several breeding seasons, 
and assist. Solitary coyotes look for their own territory and once they establish it, 
will find a mate and begin breeding.450 Because he had been captured and was 
living on a ranch in New Jersey, at the time of his forced participation in Beuys’ 
Action, hopefully Little John was not separated from his mate. If that were the 
case, May (the month of Beuys’ performance) would have been an especially 
busy time for him. The pups, born from mid-March to mid-April, would still be in 
the den and fully dependent on their parents. The young coyotes don’t leave the 
nest until they are six-to-nine months old. Little John’s capture, if it had happened 
that spring, would have greatly diminished the chances of the pups’ survival. 
 Two realities clash here. One is the human and environmental challenge 
faced by particular and living coyotes; the other is a performance based on a 
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narrative drawn from a mythic past but designed to address a contemporary 
political and social human conflict. Beuys was seeking to escape the constraints 
of hegemonic culture, and especially the constraints it imposed on opportunities 
for addressing social problems. However, binding himself to symbol and ritual, 
and isolating himself from the lived reality of other beings — literally and 
mentally wrapped in a felt cocoon — only created different constraints. If each of 
these concept-driven worlds were used to illuminate the other, perhaps insights 
could be gained. This missed opportunity for juxtaposition seems a curious 
omission, given the artist’s interest in strengthening connections between art and 
science, or intuition and logic.451 It is a demonstration of the challenges of being 
aware of, much less embracing, conflicting conceptual realities. 
 Although rich in sensory experiences, the materials, sounds, and 
movements in this Action were understood and narrated through an 
anthropocentric perspective in which any in-depth awareness of and sensitivity to 
the animal’s experience was absent. What was being done to the animal — the 
unequal distribution of power — was obscured by the myths of Coyote and Hare, 
Human/Animal, Nature/Culture, and Artist/Shaman. To “see nothing of America 
other than the coyote” meant not to see the coyote except in a narrow framing 
imposed by the artist’s interests and not the coyote’s.452 This created a system of 
signifiers and signifieds that inadequately addressed, distorted, or erased 
experiences related to coyote life in general and Little John’s in particular. Beuys 
inadvertently ended up reenacting a continuing pattern of domination and 
oppression. 
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3. Colonizing the Coyote 
Beuys brought a “Eurasian staff” (a tall walking stick with a curved head) and a 
flashlight into the enclosure and arranged to have 50 Wall Street Journals 
delivered each day. In addition, Beuys recounts, “[T]here was the felt I brought in. 
There was the hay the coyote brought in. These elements were immediately 
exchanged between us” (emphasis added) .453 Beuys’ account of what he provided 
and what was brought in by the coyote — and the exchange of these materials — 
suggests this is an encounter in which each participant is acting freely. It would be 
more accurate, but less evocative (both poetically and politically) to state that just 
as with the Wall Street Journals, the flashlight, and the staff, the coyote and the 
hay were also brought in as props. Furthermore, since Beuys conceived the idea, 
his confinement was self-imposed. He was free to determine the duration of the 
event and the length of each day’s performance. He was free to leave, and did so 
at the end of each day. This was not a choice given to the coyote, which didn’t 
even have the option of concealing itself from Beuys or the spectators, something 
that is typically offered today to zoo animals as a way of relieving the stress of 
being on exhibition.   
During the performances Beuys moved in ritualized ways that included 
three principle stances. The first was a “hierarchical one, upright and distant;” the 
second was bowing to the coyote in a devotional gesture; and the third was lying 
down.454 During all three movements, Beuys was wrapped in felt and held the 
staff, which protruded from the opening at the top of the dark form, (and further 
increasing its height and power from the coyote’s perspective). Tisdall describes 
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Little John’s responses anthropomorphically. She notes the coyote “reacted 
particularly strongly when the felt figure was lying prone and motionless, nosing 
at it anxiously, poking it solicitously, pawing at it like the anxious friend, or 
avoiding it with a wary suspicion.”455  
Coyotes see lying down as a submissive gesture, and prone figures as 
potential prey or carrion. This is probably why the coyote approached Beuys 
during these periods. Beuys explained that he jumped up when the “atmosphere 
had become a little restless” in order to restore harmony and maintain “the simple 
circling rhythm again.”456 As soon as he stood up, Beuys struck the equilateral 
triangle he was wearing three times. Ten seconds after striking the triangle, a 
twenty-second blast of tape-recorded turbine engines roared; this would provide  
 
Figure 8. Joseph Beuys, I Like America and America Likes Me, (Performance 
1974), René Block Gallery, New York City.  
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an additional destabilizing experience for the animal. Then Beuys would take off 
his gloves and toss them to the coyote. 
Coyotes have their own precise set of rituals designed to maintain 
harmony in the pack, which is often about six animals — typically the mated pair 
and offspring. Positions of relative dominance and submission are clearly 
communicated to avoid disputes. In a coyote’s vocabulary the standing and 
bowing movements may have been perceived as gestures of dominance and the 
loud noises that immediately followed this movement would have been startling 
or even frightening. In fact, unexpected sounds are one of the non-lethal means 
recommended to repel coyotes and protect livestock. In many images from this 
extensively photographed performance the coyote is displaying neutral or 
submissive gestures, not dominant ones such as raising his hackles, holding his 
head high with neck arched and ears pointed foreword, or fluffing out his tail a 45 
degree angle.457  
What Beuys defined as “restoring harmony” also communicates 
dominance to a coyote. Experts advise people who encounter coyotes, something 
that is increasingly common even in urban areas, to stand upright, appear as large 
as possible, and maintain eye contact. This is the only safe way to relate to an 
adult coyote.458 The encounter between the two might have been peaceful 
because, intentionally or not, Beuys managed to keep the upper hand and coyotes 
avoid conflict. Also, coyotes fear new things and tend to be reclusive, and Little 
John, as a captive coyote, was to some degree socialized to humans and assumed 
a submissive role. For the artist, the triangle symbolized an elevated form of being 
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in the spiritual sense. Here, Beuys’ abrupt physical elevation, combined with the 
sudden noise, establishes his dominance.459 
Another example of cross-species differences involves the much-noted 
treatment of the copies of the Wall Street Journal which were brought into the 
enclosure each day. Coyotes use urine and droppings, rather than aggression, to 
mark their territories, and so Little John would always urinate and defecate on 
them.460 He was literally claiming them for his own with his scent. However 
Beuys and other observers understood this action in a very different sense, 
interpreting it as a rejection of American materialism. In addition to the title, I 
Like America and America Likes Me, there were many ironic aspects to this 
performance. 
 Beuys celebrated animals as symbols of natural grace, renewal, and 
incarnation.461 In several Actions he almost literally colonized the bodies of dead 
hares as he gave “voice” to animals, identified them as “collaborators” and 
manipulated their bodies. In The Chief – Fluxus “the artist lay prone, microphone 
in hand, encased in a roll of felt, his furry companions at either end; one ‘hooked 
up’ to a length of copper rod, also coiled in felt; it, in turn, aligned with a rod 
against the wall . . . . Both animal and dead, hares appear incapable of testifying, 
yet Beuys as transmitter coaxes, if not exactly their voices then his own thinking/ 
vocalized dialogue, as much ingredient as fat, felt, body parts, copper, or speaker” 
(emphasis added).462 In How to Explain Pictures to a Dead Hare, a three-hour 
action performed in 1966, Beuys cradled the body of a hare while showing it his 
drawings. Tisdall describes the performance: “Helping his lifeless mate ‘paw’ the 
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works on view, Beuys mouthed explanations and imperceptible whispers, later 
explaining: In putting honey on my head I am clearly doing something that has to 
do with thinking. Human ability is not to produce honey, but to think, to produce 
ideas. . . .The idea of explaining to an animal conveys a sense of the secrecy of 
the world and of existence . . . Even a dead animal preserves more powers of 
intuition than some human beings with their stubborn rationality.”463 Beuys 
explained that this Action was “a complex tableau about the problem of language 
and about the problem of thought, of human consciousness and of the 
consciousness of animals, and of course the ability of animals.”464 In Eurasia, 
34th Section of the Siberian Symphony, Beuys tied a dead hare’s body to wooden 
sticks. His intention, according to Willoughby Sharp, an artist and long-time 
collaborator with Beuys, was to ‘‘indicate the meaning of space . . . the sign of 
transitoriness, fleetingness,’’ with the hare ‘‘on the move.’’465 Rizk writes that 
“the redemptive hare invokes a heterogeneous dream of ‘aggregate’’ Materia. 
Being ‘crucified,’ the hare’s mobility remains sustained through Beuys and 
Audience tunneling thought on its behalf” (emphasis added). 466  
4. Intentions and Impositions 
 Beuys wanted to maintain close relationships with animals because he 
believed he could learn from their intuitive intelligence, yet at the same time, both 
intentionally and inadvertently he maintains a clearly demarcated power 
differential. In the statement below Beuys’ intention to establish a congenial 
relationship exists in an uneasy tension with the establishment of his own position. 
There is an assumption that the one (whose authority is assumed) can speak for 
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the many. Also, although he plans to show the coyote a path to freedom and 
suggests the coyote has a parallel power, freedom is something possessed by the 
artist — not the animal. Although the artist has the upper hand, the animal’s 
cooperation is necessary.467 Beuys explains, 
My intention was firstly to hold together and retain in the West powers, 
and then to appear as a being representing the group soul area. I wanted to 
show the coyote a parallel power, but I also wished to remind him that it 
was now a human being who was speaking with him . . . . What I tried to 
do was to set up a really oscillating rhythm. First of all to remind the 
coyote of what you could call the geniality of his particular species, and 
then to demonstrate that he too has possibilities in the direction of freedom, 
and that we need him as an important cooperator in the production of 
freedom. (emphasis added)468  
In this statement Beuys also seems to speak from three positions. The first is in a 
formal political capacity (one who can hold and retain power with regard to the 
West); the second is as a representative of a spiritual community (the group soul 
area); and finally as a particular individual (a human being who is speaking). The 
coyote is placed in a contradictory position. Held in what is essentially a cage, a 
gallery in New York where he is on display to all visitors, the coyote is both the 
token of his species (a thing) and a cooperator (a free agent) in the production of 
freedom. Within this single statement about the Action, Beuys identifies the 
possibility of at least five voices. However, the Action and the interpretation of its 
meaning and significance is monologic. The artist states what it means in a 
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unilateral way, and does not engage in discourse with the coyote or the viewers. 
He is the actor, the coyote reacts, and the viewers passively observe. While the 
quirky mix of materials, clothing, and irrational actions seem to critique Western 
culture, the performance is essentially a grand narrative in which the hero 
courageously spends time with a wild beast in a redemptive quest. What is lost 
here, and this re-examination seeks to open up, is the hidden heteroglossic 
richness — the coexistence, tensions, and conflicts — that, as Mikhail Bakhtin 
noted, are always present.  
I Like America and America Likes Me was organized around concepts 
based on symbols rather than singular and particular animals. It assumed at that 
time that there were distinct conceptual categories, including nature/culture and 
animal/human that today are being increasingly questioned. The singular and 
particular is erased by the weight of a generalization—an emblem, a stereotype. 
Beuys is rightly celebrated for the challenges he posed to the establishment, and 
in ways that demonstrated the value of the irrational and the intuitive, it is his 
process that opened up new ways of engaging in political and cultural critiques. 
The object of his criticism, and his position in relation to it, remained trapped in a 
binary opposition. This perspective is offered with the gift of distance, and the 
work done in the intervening years by philosophers and theorists. Of course it is 
Beuys, and all of the other social reformers who were so active during the sixties 
and seventies, all of those who sought to reform through taking oppositional 
stances, that paved the way for these insights.  
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 It is also important to remember that Beuys was working in a period that 
predated the animal rights movement which became more prominent in the late 
twentieth century, and also before ethnologists, biologists, and other scientists 
began challenging our assumptions about the social, emotional, and even ethical 
lives of animals. When Beuys was creating works with animals, both living and 
dead, the assumption that humans have the right to use animals for their own 
benefit was not often questioned. While one might wonder if he was attempting to 
raise these questions in his performance, there is no evidence of this in I Like 
America and America Likes Me or any of his other work with animals. Even if 
there was, the treatment of Little John is questionable. Although Beuys thought 
that animals possessed great intrinsic value because of their connection with the 
natural and spiritual realms, at the same time, he used them as a means to an end. 
In some sense, just as he appropriated the role of shaman from another culture, he 
was appropriating animal bodies, both dead, as in his performances with the hares, 
and the living, as in his action with Little John. This is reminiscent of an imperial 
worldview in which a more powerful being believes it has access to a truth denied 
to others, and therefore the right to take what it needs, justifying the action by 
asserting that this exchange will actually benefit the Other, which is perceived as 
lacking.  
Foregrounding the unequal power dynamics at play here reveals, however 
unintentionally, that Beuys recreated a colonial structure in which an outside force 
caused a native dweller to be forcibly removed from his home. In addition, since 
the benefits arising from the dislocation and the imposed “exchange” that 
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followed all went to the “colonizer” what was set up was essentially an extractive 
economy. The coyote was neither treated as an individual animal with particular 
needs and interests, nor as a member of an integrated community but merely as a 
means to an end. The coyote was not recognized as a subject but only as a 
resource for realizing the vision of Beuys, the artist/shaman. For all of these 
reasons one could argue that this was a reenactment of colonial processes rather 
than one designed to heal ruptures between animal/human, nature/culture, or 
victim/oppressor.  
As mentioned above, coyotes possess a healthy sense of neophopia (the 
fear of new things) and are extremely wary. They prefer not to be seen, which 
helps them elude predators both animal and humans. Their stealthful habits are 
one reason they have earned the reputation for being wily. In no small way this 
accounts for their continued existence in spite of centuries of human effort to 
eradicate them. In the west, they prefer open grasslands; in the east they keep to 
the edges of woods and hedge rows.469 In order to avoid people, urban and 
suburban coyotes are more nocturnal than rural ones.  
Relocating an animal against its will, even to a location within its native 
habitat, is harmful. The sheer stress of being in unfamiliar territory can result in 
the animal’s death.470 There is no question that all of the responses of Little John, 
who found himself enclosed in a room without any cover, unable to escape, and 
easily visible to human eyes, would cause distress, although this seems to have 
been only infrequently noted by the artist, spectators, and commentators. This was 
not something that was common knowledge at the time, and it unlikely that Beuys 
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was aware of the toll he was exacting on the coyote. Instead, Beuys assigned a 
great deal of power to the coyote, who was in fact a wild animal. Therefore the 
focus was on Beuys’ willingness to be in the enclosure with a wild animal, which 
was seen as heroic and mesmerizing. Strauss observes, “it took a good deal of 
courage for Beuys to put himself in vulnerable contact with the more dynamic and 
chaotic force of Coyote.”471  
Tisdall described the animal’s behavior after Beuys left: “Little John 
behaved for the first time like a caged and captive animal, padding up and down 
with the true wolf’s swing, back and forth, sniffing, searching, whining and 
scenting the air with fear. While she attributed this to the loss of the bond 
established with Beuys, a more likely explanation is that the change in routine 
ramped up the coyote’s anxieties.472 Beuys seems to have developed some 
affection for the coyote. Tisdall notes that he “took his leave of Little-John, 
hugging him close without concealing the pain of separation.”473 In contrast, 
according to a video taken at the time, Williams notes that Beuys attempted 
unsuccessfully to hug the coyote, which shied away.474 
At the end of the encounter, Beuys once again was wrapped in felt and 
returned by ambulance to the airport to fly home to Germany. In some ways, this 
is the ultimate imperialist gesture, to arrive, control through domination, and then 
leave, insulated from any exposure to the native culture. Or is he consciously 
mimicking the European intrusion into Native American cultures, and to their 
being treated “like animals”? Yet if he is, he is also reenacting an intrusion into 
the life of a being less powerful than himself, the life of Little John. Beuys later 
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explained: “I wanted to isolate myself, insulate myself, see nothing of America 
other than the coyote.” The question is, did he ever actually “see” the coyote?  
If Beuys thought that this experience would be enjoyable for or benefit 
Little John, it was short-lived. Tisdall notes after the artist left, “The man who 
owned the coyote . . . came in with a big iron bar because this was a very wild and 
dangerous animal . . . . He put the animal back into a cage and took it back to the 
ranch in New Jersey.”475 After the Action, Little John reverts back to his “animal” 
status—he is “wild and dangerous.” As Williams points out, the iron bar, a 
“clumsy instrument of apparent domination and potential violence as a coda to the 
encounter rather undoes the narratives of interspecies communication and 
cooperation.”476 One also wonders if the coyote associated the staff that Beuys 
always carried with the “big iron bar” used by the owner to control the animal. 
Beuys was right. Animals are not free. 
Unlike dogs, which have had 10,000 years of domestication, coyotes are 
wild animals.477 Little John was in a dangerous situation. Although captured and 
“owned” by a person, coyotes can only be inadequately domesticated and 
therefore these animals have a bleak future. They are “too used to humans . . . to 
make it in the wild, and too wild to make good pets.”478 As with all wild animals, 
increased contact increases the likelihood that they will lose their fear of humans. 
Feeding them increases this tendency, and with predators such as coyotes, may 
result in the animals becoming more aggressive toward humans. Not only is it 
dangerous for people, but also the resulting change in animal’s behavior will 
usually result in its being caught and killed. Wildlife experts warn, “A fed coyote 
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is a dead coyote.”479 Befriending a coyote will be dangerous to the animal. It 
lessens the wariness that is essential if wild animals are to co-exist with humans. 
One expert warns, “Even if you love coyotes, never let them know it.”480  
 Strauss asserts that Beuys’ intentions were “primarily therapeutic” in 
healing “the schism between native intelligence and European mechanistic, 
materialistic, and positivistic values.”481 Yet from my perspective, as someone 
concerned with the impact of the artist’s behavior on the animal, the coyote is 
appropriated by Beuys for a political and social agenda that is essentially centered 
on human concerns, with little apparent awareness of the impact on this particular 
animal or with any effort to use “social sculpture” to bring attention or awareness 
to the way that coyotes as a species have been treated by humans. Of course, I am 
looking at this work 40 years later, and during a time when human-animal 
relations receive far more attention than they did in the early seventies. Also, 
deconstruction has provided insight into the ways in which language, and 
especially the violence imposed by concepts, I have a very different perspective. 
Relying on conceptual thinking rather than responding to the immediacy of the 
situation can result in unintentionally cruel or hurtful behavior. Because a symbol 
refers to something else, not the thing in itself (or in this case, being as a 
particular and singular entity), Beuys does not notice that he is essentially 
reenacting the colonial past by imposing his will and his thoughts on another 
living creature which may have his own wants and needs. The animal has been 
captured and brought to the gallery. Its participation is not voluntary. Beuys is 
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free to come and go. The coyote remains a captive, under the control of the New 
Jersey rancher, and Beuys for a time.  
More than ten years later, in an account of the work that appeared in The 
New York Times on the occasion of Beuys’ death, the legend continued to grow. 
Three days had turned into two weeks, and the symbolic Action remained as 
compelling as ever: “Between them, harmony reigned . . . . Man and pariah were 
mates . . . . A strand of Beuys's hair and a twist of the coyote's hung side by side 
on the wall. The nearness of man and animal could be read as a metaphor for 
open-mindedness and freedom from prejudice in all human affairs — and for a 
readiness to embrace an unfamiliar country in its every aspect.482 
5. The Inadequacy of Language 
Beuys created The Political Party for Animals in 1966. It was intended to 
permit humans and animals to engage in dialogue. This exchange would allow the 
humans to be energized by the animals’ “soul powers, feeling powers, [and] 
powers of instinct and orientation” thereby accessing abilities which had either 
been lost or undeveloped.483 Rizk notes, “Beuys sought to enable full political 
representation while never clarifying how diverse species might reach consensus 
or convey respective interests.484 The New York performance, framed as a 
communication between human and animal, posed the same dilemma. Although 
the coyote responds and/or reacts to Beuys’ presence and ritualistic actions, its 
preferences or interests are not considered in any significant manner. Yet in spite 
of the considerable difficulties regarding fair or even adequate representation, the 
concept of a political party for animals is one way of challenging the traditional 
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divide between “animal” and “human.” Strauss identifies this gesture as one that 
can be traced to today’s animal rights movement.485  
 Beuys’ “Energy Plan for Western Man,” a series of lectures given in the 
United States earlier in the same year as I Like America and America Likes Me, 
emphasized the need to move beyond “rationalist, positivist and material thinking 
in the West” and “encompass all the invisible energies with which we have lost 
contact.”486 Strauss notes that because the content of these exchanges remained 
constrained by the audience’s lack of familiarity with Beuys’ ideas, it did not 
often result in any substantive discussions. Beuys saw it as a failure and perhaps 
this accounts at least in part for his decision to engage in a non-verbal Action with 
the coyote.487 Also, there appeared to be significant tension between some of 
Beuys more utopian ideas, especially those concerning the role of materialism, 
and the values of his American audience. 
 According to Tisdall, Beuys believed, “Language is not to be understood 
simply in terms of speech and words. That is our current drastically reduced 
understanding of language, a parallel to the reduced understanding of politics and 
economics. Beyond language — a verbalization — lies a world of sound and 
impulses.”488 Rizk describes the relationship between Beuys and the coyote as an 
“immersion in interfaces occupying neither the category of human nor animal, but 
some third or fourth ‘‘incalculable’’ domain, where one can evade language’s 
limitations, entrapments, and forms of cultural hegemony.”489 In spite of his 
search for another domain, his reliance on fixed structures, such as myths and 
symbols, and oppositional ideological stances, Beuys fails to extend language 
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beyond the logical/rational/European model that he is critiquing. Rather than 
engaging in a dialogic exchange, that includes many voices —novelistic and 
heteroglossic — Beuys remains constrained by the modernist cult of the artist’s 
heroic narrative. He sets himself up in opposition to his culture but does not also 
recognize his own position within it. 
 Both Jacques Derrida and Beuys are aware of the inadequacy of language, 
and each in his own way seeks to address it in his work. Derrida asserts that 
human relationships with the “animal,” opens up questions related to “living, 
speaking, dying, being, and world as in being-in-the-world.”490 As mentioned in 
the introduction, Derrida recounts an encounter in the bathroom with his cat. 
Startled, he wonders, “Who I am—and who I am (following) at the moment when, 
caught naked, in silence, by the gaze of an animal . . . I have trouble, yes, a bad 
time, overcoming my embarrassment.”491 He goes on to reflect that this 
experience is “The point of view of the absolute other, and nothing will have ever 
given me more food for thinking through this absolute alterity . . . than these 
moments when I see myself seen naked under the gaze of a cat.”492 The other (in 
this case, a particular cat) has been assigned a place outside of language. “The 
animal” is the category of the not human that includes all other living beings. All 
other differences are obscured by this concept. As previously discussed, the very 
word “animal” marks what Derrida calls the “rupture or abyss between those who 
say . . . ‘I, a human,’ and what . . . he [or she] calls the animal or animals.”493 To 
resist this conceptual violence Derrida replaces animal with animot in an effort to 
resist the erasure of differences implied by the singular noun. Derrida wants to 
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draw attention to what he describes as “a multiplicity of organizations of 
relationship between living and dead, relations of organization or lack of 
organization among realms that are more and more difficult to dissociate by 
means of the figures of the organic and inorganic, of life and/or death.” 494 
 Ultimately both Derrida and Beuys are seduced by language, by concepts 
(in Derrida’s case) and symbols—also a form of conceptualization (in Beuys’) 
that draw them away from a more direct engagement with their respective animal 
partners. Although the cat is a powerful presence at the beginning of Derrida’s 
essay, The Animal That Therefore I Am, as Donna Haraway points out, “the 
animal was never heard from again in that long essay.”495 And in spite of the 
considerable amount of attention given to Beuys’ actions, the coyote is in service 
of the artist’s agenda. Just as Derrida’s cat is never heard from again, at the 
conclusion of Beuys’ action, scant attention, if any, is given to whatever happened 
to Little John afterward.  
 Philosopher Cary Wolfe asks, ‘‘What modes of thinking the animal other 
are possible in what Derrida has called the ‘spatial arts’ that may too readily be 
foreclosed in the domain of language?’’496 Beuys sought to use this art form to 
engage with the animal other. However his opportunity for engaging the animal 
other with openness and genuine wondering is obscured by the moral concepts 
and abstract symbolism that he imposes on the experience.497 In spite of Derrida’s 
interest in animals and the considerable contribution he has made to thinking 
about the relationships between humans and other living beings, as Haraway 
observes, he missed the opportunity for an “other-worlding” offered by the 
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“intersecting gaze.” Was it that he did not become curious about what the cat 
“might actually be doing, feeling, thinking, or perhaps making available to him in 
looking back at him that morning.”498 Or, on the other hand, perhaps Derrida did 
not presume to know what his cat was thinking. Beuys, in contrast, assumed that 
he could speak for the animals. 
 With its multiple sensory experiences and discourses, art can open up new 
perspectives. Yet, as an exploration of this work by Beuys demonstrates, one 
cannot assume that this can be done simply by rejecting science and logic, or by 
using only non-verbal signs and symbols. It is difficult if not impossible to escape 
our anthropocentric orientation, since it informs, in its many and varied ways, the 
human experience of the world. Looking and listening for what is not present, and 
especially for whose voice(s) are not being heard, is one way of moving outside 
of our inevitably narrow framings. As Bakhtin has noted, polyglossia offers an 
opportunity to free consciousness from “the tyranny of . . . [one’s] own language 
and its own myth of language.” Including and listening to others is necessary: 
“Only knowledge of a language that possesses another mode of conceiving the 
world can lead to the appropriate knowledge of one’s own language”499 To 
imagine Coyote: I Like America and America Likes Me as an art form that is more 
like a novel than an epic tale so as to bring in as many voices as possible is a 
worthwhile undertaking. Its erasures and omissions are our own, still, today.  
Most accounts of the performance written at the time, and for years after, did 
not attempt to provide an account that includes the animal’s experience, or 
describe where he came from or what happened to him afterwards. In part because 
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of the work of Derrida, Foucault, Harding, Haraway, and Spivak more attention is 
paid to diverse perspectives, includes those that have in the past been overlooked 
or intentionally disenfranchised. It is clear that Beuys felt free to speak for the 
coyote, rather than attempting to understand how his artistic decisions affected the 
coyote.  
In his analysis of Beuys’ work Verwoert argues, 
On the one hand he incessantly attacked traditional notions of the 
authority of the work, the artist, and the art professor, with his radical, 
liberating, and humorous opening up of the concept of art with regard to 
what a work, an artist, or a teacher could still be and do beyond the 
functions established by tradition, office, and title. On the other hand, 
however, it seems that in the presentation of his own interpretative 
discourse, Beuys regularly fell back on the very tradition of staging artistic 
authority with which he was trying to break.500  
As Verwoert observes, Beuys “conferred on himself the mandate to express 
collective needs.”501  
 While critical of his authoritarian stance, Verwoert believes Beuys’ 
artwork is nevertheless resistant to “conclusive interpretations” because of the 
tensions inherent in the use of materials, the qualities that time, and space bring to 
his performances. For example Coyote: I Like American and America Likes Me is 
a complex piece even though it does not fulfill its programmatic claims. While 
Verwoert believes the photographic documentation is misleading because of how 
it represents the relationship between Beuys and the coyote, the performance itself 
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not only raises important questions about the possibility of co-existence, but 
demonstrates this throughout the duration of the performance. Verwoert writes, 
“through everything he does, the coyote demonstrates his utter indifference to the 
artistic allegory being constructed around him and, in doing so, destabilizes it.” 
Instead the performance is about the ways in which two unequal characters, for 
whom communication constantly fails, somehow find a way to deal with each 
other and with the failure of their communication simply because they live 
together in close proximity.”  
In demonstrating the “impossibility of a symmetrical exchange between 
 
Figure 9. Caroline Tisdall, Joseph Beuys Coyote (sic), (Performance 1974), René 
Block Gallery, New York City.  
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two divided worlds of experience” however unintentionally, Verwoert 
thinks, a pragmatic lesson is learned: “what collective violence destroys, one 
person alone cannot heal.” At best, one small thing or another may be resolved on 
the level of daily coexistence, but only if one side is prepared to face and live with 
unclarified conditions. Beuys claims he is seeking to heal the genocide inflicted 
on Native Americans by the United States. Buchloh and the art historian Donald 
Kuspit believe an attempt to come to terms with the catastrophe of the Holocaust 
drives much of Beuys’ work. Yet the particular material conditions of this work, 
and especially the use of a living animal, demand that we consider what was 
happening then and there, in that room in the gallery in New York City.  
As the relationships between humans and other animals becomes an 
increasingly important consideration, understanding the relationships between 
artists and the living animals they work with can provide unique insights into the 
ethical and aesthetic nature of our relationships. The challenge is to remain aware 
of our anthropomorphic natures, and also not become too overly tangled in the 
inevitable snares set by language and habits of thinking. As is clear from the work 
considered so far, it is quite easy to deflect our attention from what is before us 
and turn it back onto ourselves. How do we humans get out of the way? Can we 
ever really hear what the animals have to say?  
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Chapter Four 
Object or Actor: An Insect Aesthetic 
 Cockroaches, as creatures that “live in the shadows” are seen as very 
different from us, and because of this were a powerful metaphor for the AIDS 
community in the work of artist and AIDS activist David Wojnarowicz. The Latin 
origin of the word cockroach is pline, one who flees the light, and certainly during 
the period in which Wojnarowicz was working, the gay community was pushed 
into the shadows.502 Nathalie Blanc, Director of Research at the National Center 
for Scientific Research in Paris, notes that cockroaches are imagined as dark and 
consequently, “as animals which one closely associates with technical objects.” In 
other words, they are unnatural, a characteristic that is still, but less frequently, 
applied to homosexual activity. She goes on to say,  
The pipes of buildings, the interstices of the building, faults of all kinds, 
are their house; the cockroach nests there and hides there when it is hunted, 
the better to invade familiar spaces. It is thus an animal of the shade. It 
stands at the margins of the familiar world. It can be used to represent 
objects which are not there, that is to say, to invent new objects from those 
that one already knows. When it comes to cockroaches, the imagination, 
	   223	  
as a powerful engine for the introduction of new elements into public 
space, is activated to an extraordinary degree.503 
Blanc describes the cockroach as having a “double exclusion” because of its 
association with poverty and dirtiness. The insect is used as a metaphor for “social 
infamy” because its “animality and its autonomy feed the representations 
concerning its mobility in the building and the way in which it penetrates the 
apartments and hides there.” Therefore people believe that the insects, or 
metaphorically speaking, the diseases and groups associated with cockroaches, 
come from structural flaws or from strangers. For example, in Paris cockroaches 
are associated with Arabs, a group that is often the target of discrimination. 
Cockroach infestation represents an invasion; it “passes everywhere; it is like 
water, a small crack is enough.” 504  
“Metaphors are nourished above all by aesthetic experience . . . ” Blanc 
argues, and foster “a poetic and imaginative entry into reality; [a metaphor] 
expresses a consciousness of the relations that link us to the environment.” These 
relations can be positive or negative. Blanc believes it would be possible “to unite 
the aesthetic and the ethical by the awakening of a more or less pleasant relation 
to the world.” The first artist considered in this chapter, David Wojnarowicz, 
plays off the negative associations with cockroaches to draw attention to 
homophobia and AIDS while Hubert Duprat, whose work is discussed later, uses 
insects in a process by which humans and insects work “collaboratively” to create 
aesthetically beautiful objects.  
 
	   224	  
1. Non-Charismatic Mini-Fauna 
David Wojnarowicz, a New York artist who died of an AIDS-related 
illness in 1992, used animals, and especially cockroaches, as metaphors in his 
politically oriented artworks, which were responding to the AIDS crisis and the 
lack of public support. In 1988-89 he used a photo of a natural history museum 
diorama depicting the slaughter of buffalo as a stand-in for people living with and 
dying from HIV/AIDS.505 Earlier in his career, in the 1980s, Wojnarowicz created 
works with cockroaches, with whom he identified. He called them “non-
charismatic mini-fauna,” in contrast to the buffalo, a “charismatic megafauna.”506  
Sociologist Linda Kalof explains, in her essay, “The Human Self and the 
Animal Other: Exploring Borderland Identities,” that it is widely accepted that 
human identity is formed in social relationships within particular historical and 
cultural contexts, but it is less acceptable to think that relationships with 
“nonhuman others” are also influences. She notes,  
Because of the human penchant for conceptualizing self-other, same-
different, and culture-nature as binary oppositions, animals are not 
considered part of the human identity equation. This dualistic thinking 
fosters a hyperseparation in which differences between humans and 
animals, or culture and nature, are emphasized and magnified.507  
	   225	  
 
Figure 10. David Wojnarowicz, Untitled (Buffalo) 1988. 
We tend to offer help to those we perceive as similar, but because animals are 
seen as dissimilar, maltreatment can be justified. Kalof concludes,  
The most important factor in determining our attitudes toward animals is 
how similar to us we think they are . . . . It comes as no surprise that 
dislike of dissimilar distanced others is closely linked to racism and 
sexism, in which marked categories of people metaphorically resemble 
animals.508  
Despite the considerable gap between humans and insects, due to their size and 
their reputation as pests, most people set “bugs” apart from all other “animals.” 
While they are often viewed as faceless collectives, sometimes insects are as 
metaphors for other people, and some can even see themselves in the insect 
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“mirror.” In these cases, as Haraway has said, “We polish an animal mirror to 
look for ourselves.”509  
Susan Sontag writes about the use of metaphors in Illness as a Metaphor 
and AIDS and Its Metaphors. In both books she explores the ways in which 
diseases are conceptualized as unnatural. While both cancer and AIDS are 
described as invasive, in the early years of the AIDS epidemic it was also seen as 
a punishment. This is because the groups most strongly identified with the disease 
at that time were homosexual men and intravenous drug users, both of whom 
were condemned by mainstream society. While public empathy and the funds 
needed for care and research have grown as fears about the disease have been 
eased by increasing knowledge and education about the disease, in the 1980s 
people with AIDS were often marginalized at best, or even shunned. The majority 
of people who have died from AIDS in the United States have been from the gay 
community. As a result, attitudes toward the disease were intertwined with 
preexisting condemnations of gay life. In addition to being stigmatized by what 
some defined as immoral sexual practices at the time, the spread of the disease 
through contact with bodily fluids increases the likelihood that intravenous drug 
users would contract the disease, thus further criminalizing it.510 
 As art historian Mysoon Rizk explains, “cockroaches are readily conflated 
with pests, vermin, and disease, in spite of fastidious grooming practices . . . the 
unwelcome order of 4,000 species remain subject to entrenched human 
characterization as disease transmitters even though according to one reference 
book ‘less than one percent of cockroach species . . . are significant pests.’”511 
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The artist claimed that he sought “coexistence” with arthropods, including 
cockroaches. In a videotape on “how to make cock-a-bunnies” the videographer, 
Sophie S. Breer, asks Wojnarowicz if he wishes to “take the ‘s’ out of pest.”512 It 
appears that Wojnarowicz replies in the affirmative. On the other hand many of 
these insects were injured or died as a result of his manipulation of them. For his  
“cockabunny” project he glued paper rabbit ears and cottontails on cockroaches. 
All of the insects died, probably from the process of attaching the materials. In 
cockabunnies at a PSi (Performance Studies International) opening, and those 
insects met the same fate. The artist, who in many other instances seemed to be 
quite kind-hearted, justified the killing of the insects, saying that this has long 
been an acceptable response to a home infestation. However the deaths caused by 
his activities in many cases were more prolonged than those that would have 
occurred through more traditional means.  
 Rizk suggests that Wojnarowicz may have been paying tribute to Joseph  
  
Figure 11. Sophie S. Breer, Stills from Waje’s Cockabunnies, 1981. 
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The younger artist called his PSi interventions an “action” and the transformation 
of cockroaches into bunnies suggests the hares that Beuys used for inspiration in 
many of his works.513The cockroach often is used as a metaphor for the outsider 
and the marginalized, and so was an obvious choice for Wojnarowicz, who was 
preoccupied with the theme of “Illegitimacy	  [which was] closely associated with 
being designated abject or diseased.”514 Rizk notes “the manipulated creatures 
embody the poignant poetics of ontological discomfort experienced firsthand by 
the queer artist from Jersey.”515 In his obituary in The New York Times, the critic 
Michael Kimmelman describes his work as “distinguished by its rage and its spirit 
of personal longing. His paintings, photographs, installations, performances and 
writings railed against the status quo as they also mourned death.”516 Ironically 
Wojnarowicz’s abusive treatment of the cockroaches is a reenactment of the 
abuse suffered by many gay people at the hands of homophobic heterosexuals.  
2. Returning the Gaze 
In liberal humanist societies human beings, as individuals, are granted 
moral status and the accompanying rights and protections. The animal rights 
movement has tried to extend that status to animals, and has attained some 
success in those efforts especially for mammals. Insects rarely if ever are included 
in these discussions. Although some insects possess characteristics such as the 
capacity to communicate with each other and respond to certain stimuli in their 
environments, insects are rarely perceived as having the attributes necessary to be 
granted the same rights as individuals. They are instead a collective. While, for 
example, there might be some sympathy for the right for butterflies to exist, and 
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so efforts to protect their habitat would be supported, the argument that a butterfly 
had the right to life would appear odd to most people. And as for the many insects 
which are considered pests, few oppose efforts to kill or even exterminate them 
altogether. As Giovanni Aloi observes, perhaps this is because, unlike mammals 
such as Derrida’s cat, insects can’t “return the gaze.”517 Although some insects are 
more highly regarded than others by the general public and artists alike, few 
people in Western societies think twice about killing insects, either individually or 
in a wholesale manner.  
Conflicts about social boundaries associated with race, ethnicity, gender, 
and sexual orientation, including their construction, maintenance, and defense, 
have been a significant part of human activity for thousands of years.518 
Wojnarowicz’s use of cockroaches, as mentioned above, was a searing critique of 
the public’s attitude toward AIDS. Over the past few decades these discriminatory 
attitudes have been challenged by, among others, Feminist, Postmodern, and 
Postcolonialist critiques, and by the Women’s and Gay Rights Movements. 
Many premises upon which European philosophical traditions sought to 
establish universal truths or principles have been undermined or discredited.519 
This broad intellectual movement and the theories associated with it, philosopher 
James Bohman explains, have “practical consequences [which] are assessed and 
verified in democratic practice and solved by inquiry into better democratic 
practice.”520 The process is not so much one of cause and effect as a dynamic 
where theory and pragmatics are not distinct fields but co-actors in on-going 
processes. Most recently, the concept of “the other” has expanded to include not 
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only other humans, but also, to the degree that our anthropocentric orientation 
permits, other animals.  
The advent of Animal Studies in the 1990s was sparked in part by these 
earlier social and intellectual movements. Jacques Derrida’s essay in which he 
describes his discomfort under the searching gaze of his cat is cited by many as a 
turning point. This ‘return of the gaze,’ notes Giovanni Aloi, editor of Antennae, 
“extensively contributed to the revisioning of the animal (mammals that is) from 
object to subject.”521 
 One reason for this is that contemporary philosophy is skeptical of the 
ideology of objectivity and universal narratives. “Perhaps the most characteristic 
tenet of postmodern critical work,” J. L. Lemke explains,  
is that everything that European philosophy and science has held to be 
fundamentally true at an abstract or programmatic level (ontology, 
epistemology, metaphysics, logic) is in fact a contingent, historically 
specific cultural construction, which has often served the covert function 
of empowering members of a dominant social caste at the expense of 
Others. It dismantles the most foundational procedures and assumptions 
whereby prior European philosophical traditions sought to establish 
universal truths or principles.522  
This in turn has led to an affirmation of the legitimacy of multiple perspectives 
and the value of situated knowledge. Building on the work of Haraway, Hunter, as 
discussed in the introduction, defines situated knowledge as that which arises 
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from a “deep context,” situated rather than isolated, concerned with “the concrete 
other” rather than the autonomous self, and valuing “logic or situated textuality” 
rather than “abstract rationalistic structures.”523 When linked to the concept of the 
other, this can include not only an array of human perspectives, but to the degree 
that our anthropocentric orientation permits, animal perspectives. However in 
Wojnarowicz’s work, the standpoint is that of the AIDS activist, and in the 
understandable intensity of that position, other standpoints can be easily pushed 
aside, and overlooked. Also, if animals or insects are used symbolically or 
metaphorically instead of being recognized as life forms with their own needs and 
interests, they become a means to an end. The ways in which Wojnarowicz used 
these insects is a painful and vivid expression of how gay men, especially during 
the early years of the AIDS epidemic, experienced the world. 
3. The Missing Piece 
Since the modern period began, science has studied nature and animals as 
if a pure and objective knowledge is possible, as if humans could step outside of 
nature and their own animal selves to attain a detached and outsider worldview. 
The processes related to the generation of knowledge and to developing solutions 
to political and social problems, if understood in this way, could be compared to 
constructing pieces for an elaborate jigsaw puzzle. The pieces of knowledge 
produced by science, philosophy, and art, among other disciplines, are constructed 
to fit into openings whose boundaries are determined by economic, social, 
political, and even religious forces. We create the pieces of data we need to fill 
the holes we have created.  
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 Yet since these forces change over time, the pieces of data that we need to 
fill those holes change too. In fact, the holes themselves change. This creates 
some fairly unstable ground upon with to construct knowledge. Therefore the idea 
that knowledge can be something that is fixed, pure, or objective is suspect. 
Therefore, as Donna Haraway points out, scientific knowledge is always situated 
knowledge. It is always partial and incomplete, and relies upon other perspectives. 
It is also always contingent on any number of actors. From a different disciplinary 
perspective, Foucault has also investigated the ways in which knowledge is 
contingent. He writes about a situated perspective; however it does not arise from 
particular individuals or groups, but is historically and geographically based.524  
Based on the work of these thinkers and others, our knowledge about 
“nature” is now more widely understood as historical and culturally contingent 
and so are our knowledge about and relationships with the “animals” which 
inhabit it. This is not a denial of physical things and processes, but instead a 
reminder that what we can know is inevitably caught up not only in our own 
interests, but also in how we, as animals ourselves, experience the world. 
However since humans are not separate from nature, but of it and in it, our 
observations and explanations are always partial, based on what can be seen from 
where we stand, in every sense: physical, cultural, and temporal.  
 
4. Changeable Narratives 
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 A traditional puzzle is a set piece, an all-at-once image with any missing 
pieces clearly identified. In contrast, narratives are dynamic and temporal works 
in which not everything can ever be presented all at once. While a puzzle is a 
metaphor for one form of relationship, one in which all of the pieces lock together 
to form a cohesive whole, narratives are another thing altogether. They are 
slippery. Also in a narrative, your understanding of the plot and of the characters 
is contingent on where you are in the story. Animals, as we understand them and 
our relationships with them, can best be understood as characters in a narrative 
that is continuously being rewritten even as it is unfolding. Animals have 
typically appeared in a supporting role to the protagonist, serving as a foil in the 
stories that humans create about themselves and their relationships with nature 
and with other animals. The traits they are assigned (by us) typically highlight our 
traits and behaviors rather than their own. They are the back drop that allows the 
human-jewel to shine.  
Wojnarowicz used the cockroaches as foils in artworks that engage critical 
political and social issues in a human centered narrative. In a curious kind of 
reversal, in the work of the French conceptual artist Hubert Duprat, the insects are 
the protagonists and create the jewels while the human role is a supporting one. 
The insects are the manufacturers and the artist who is both their captor and their 
devoted attendant, must ensure all of their needs are met in order for the 
artmaking process to continue. Duprat, a French conceptual artist, asserts that he 
collaborates with caddis fly larvae. The jewel-bedecked outcomes invite a 
reconsideration of the life cycle and activities of this insect, and also obscure the 
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differences between the work of a human artist and the work of an insect.525 The 
reactions of viewers and critics suggest that it is the process as much as the 
aesthetic outcome that draws them to these works.  
 Duprat is meticulously attentive to the caddis fly larvae’s perspective, 
wants, and needs. He has carefully studied what they need to thrive and ensures 
that these conditions are met during the art making processes which they, 
unknowingly, participate in. While, at first glance, his work may not seem as 
socially or politically oriented as that of Wojnarowicz, closer consideration will 
reveal that his interactions with the insects may very well be informed by an 
environmentalist sensibility and an acute social justice. The process involves an 
intimate knowledge of the life cycle of the insects, and fastidious care of their 
needs while they are in captivity. Duprat collects the larvae in mountainous areas 
from January to April. The insects are placed in aquariums where the water, 
which is kept at 40 degrees centigrade, is oxygenated and circulated. This 
“artificial winter” prolongs the larvae's period of case-building. The artist 
removes the cases already made by the insects in the wild by taking off the cap at 
the rear end of the natural case and pushing the tiny animal forward with a blunt- 
tipped instrument. This causes the larva, which attaches itself to the case with two 
hind hooks, to release itself from its protective covering.  
Next the vulnerable juveniles are placed in a “gold-filled environment” to 
form new cases. Using a spiral movement, each larva binds first binds the gold 
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Figure 12. Hurbert Duprat, Untitled (Caddis Worm Larvae), Undated 
flashing as it creates a new case with a silk thread. They are then moved to 
various aquariums, each one filled with different jewels, including turquoise, 
opal,.lapis lazuli and coral, rubies, sapphires, diamonds, and pearls. Instead of 
using grains of sand, plants, or other organic materials typically available in their 
ecosystem, they bedeck themselves with jewels instead. These casings, held 
together with a threadlike silken material excreted by the animal, protect their 
fragile bodies. By moving the larvae from tank to tank at specific intervals, 
Duprat controls which materials are used to make the rings that form the casing. 
He also controls the placement of particular jewels by damaging the newly-made 
cases in particular spots. The larva will then repair the damage with whatever 
materials are currently available, in this case the jewels selected by Duprat.526 At 
that point, just as in their native habitats, the cases are disregarded by their 
builders but may be appropriated by other larvae, which will adjust them to suit 
their own needs through changing the size or form of the casing.527 
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When the insects are exhibited they are shown at eye level in small 
aquariums that also maintain the same winter-like conditions. Since they are only 
active in the dark, at night, after the exhibition closes, the animals are moved from 
the exhibition tanks to tanks filled with the materials used for the construction of 
the cases. Visitors to the exhibition do not see the actual process of case-building 
but only the outcomes of that activity. Duprat states, “I have not turned the caddis 
worms into circus animals, nor have I put the manufacturing process on display.” 
Clearly the artist wishes to distinguish his work from activities designed for 
entertainment.528 Also, although he is undoubtedly manipulating the animals for 
his own purposes, Duprat is making every effort to enter into what the Swiss 
biologist Jakob von Uexküll (whose work was discussed at length in the 
introduction) would call the caddis worm’s umwelt and to attend to their well-
being, both in the short and the longer term. 
In an interview with philosopher Christian Besson, Duprat describes his 
interest in archaeology and natural history, and his boyhood years spent in the 
country where he spent time with hunters and fishermen. He maintained 
aquariums to store the water scorpions, water-striders, newts, tadpoles, pond 
skaters, planorbid snails and caddis worms he collected. In the early 1980s the 
artist got the idea of providing the caddis larvae with gold spangles after watching 
gold panners in the Ariège River in southwestern France.529 Caddis flies belong to 
the order of Trichoptera, which has 895 species in Europe, and resemble primitive 
butterflies but have an aquatic larva. All caddis flies have caterpillar-shaped 
aquatic larvae which use mineral or plant matter or a combination, to make 
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casings. 530 The tube-shaped case uses minerals as ballast in flowing water, and 
plant matter to trap an air bubble so that the insect can develop on the surface of 
stagnant water. The case’s appearance mimics the natural environment and 
protects the larva from predators. The entire body of the insect undergoes 
metamorphosis during nymphosis, which takes place within the case. 531 
The cases now constructed by the larvae appeared only after a lengthy 
evolution of the insect. Their ancestors were widespread some 200 million years 
ago but didn’t have larvae that built casings. When they first constructed shelters, 
these were fixed and only later became “mobile homes” about 150 million years 
ago, at which point the carnivorous larvae became vegetarians. Early case 
construction was a rough combination of grains of sand, plant fragments, shells, 
and bits of fish bones. Over the course of 50 million years the larvae built 
increasingly diversified and well-made shelters. Case-building Trichoptera are 
now widespread throughout the world. Not only do the larvae use different 
materials, but they also arrange these in a very a precise way. The caddisfly 
larva's cases reveal the history and the evolution of their instinct for building, one 
that dates back to the age of the dinosaurs. Yet today, because the larvae are very 
sensitive to water quality, they are very susceptible to environmental threats posed 
by pollution.532  
Duprat has been profoundly influenced by scientific theory and process. 
He describes the influence of various scientists, beginning with the work in 1834 
of François-Jules Pictet, an entomologist from Geneva. Pictet also conducted 
experiments with the caddisfly larvae, but with scientific rather than artistic 
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intentions. He was interested in seeing if the insects would use foreign materials 
rather than what was typically available in their environment.533 Jean-Henri Fabre, 
one of the founders of the field of ethology, the study of animal behavior, 
conducted similar investigations. Fabre compared the caddis larva to a bricklayer, 
noting just as “when the mason uses bricks to construct the narrow flue of a 
factory chimney, he stands in the middle of his turret, and gradually lays new 
courses by revolving on his own axis” so the caddisfly uses the same process in 
the construction of his tube.534  
Duprat is familiar with the activities of Canon C. H. de Labonnefon, a 
scientist, who in 1923 provided the insects with little glass beads. In describing 
his observations Labonnefon used a metaphor from the performing arts. After 
bedecking itself with the beads, he noted the caddis larva case looked like “the 
many-coloured appearance of a magnificent Harlequin's costume.”535 Duprat is 
also knowledgeable about more recent experiments, and most especially those of 
Christian Denis, who has recorded effects on the casings arising from alterations 
in the natural habitat, including the gauge of sand grains and brightness of light. 
Denis also worked with the insects beginning with the period of egg-laying, 
which was unique. Everyone else had worked with older larvae that already had 
cases. While many species, including the caddis worm, have been described as 
having the capacity to construct shelters, humans rarely think of animals as 
creatures that wear clothes of their own making.. Yet the caddis worm may be so 
named because it does actually create what could be understood as a garment for 
itself. References to “cados worm” and “cadis worme” appeared in the mid-
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seventeenth century.536 Cados and cadis may be a blend of earlier words for 
various kind of fabric. The Old French cadaz, the “coarsest part of silke, whereof 
sleaue is made” and the Irish cadas or cotton were in use in the early thirteenth 
century.537 By the mid-eighteenth century, after the caddis worm was so named, 
caddis was used to refer to soft lint and also to ribbons. 538 
Although an admirer of Denis’ work, Duprat notes the “aesthetic nature of 
the outcome is of no concern in all recent scientific literature.” The distinctive 
boundaries between art and science of the modern period began during the 
Enlightenment. The philosopher Christian Besson notes that this was not only true 
for science, but also for philosophy. He reminds us of the divide Kant established 
between art and nature: 
Kant’s distinction between works of art and those of nature leave us in a 
quandary. The production of the artifact within nature herself poses a 
problem — even more so when an aesthetic aspect is involved. Whether 
the insect is a craftsperson or whether, more generally, nature is a creator 
of forms, the consideration, within nature, of an aesthetic dimension is the 
stumbling block of science . . . in [Duprat’s] diversion of the caddis 
worm’s behavior, in [Duprat’s] artistic manipulation, the effect is twofold. 
From a biological viewpoint, a random event triggers self-organization. 
From a human viewpoint, the experimenter’s intent produces this 
effect . . . . 539 
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It is clear from this discussion that one of Kant’s preoccupations was to clearly 
delineate differences between, for example, culture and nature, as well as human 
and animal. Besson goes on to note that the question is not so much whether it is 
the insect or the artist that creates the work, but both. The caddis worm is doing 
what it does, regardless of the interference of the artist and the insect might be 
considered “merely the executor of the artist’s project.” The result is a “doubly 
exposed object” which is both natural and artistic.540  
5. Self-Worlds 
 As discussed in the introduction, Uexküll believes that all animals, even 
insects, offer us the opportunity to “stroll into unfamiliar worlds, words strange to 
us but known to other creatures, manifold and varied as the animals themselves.” 
Animals, including insects, are not machines but can act on their own volition. 
They have the capacity to perceive and act, and inhabit their own worlds, which 
he called umwelts. If we are to “unlock the gates that lead to other realms” we 
need to recognize this and attempt to be aware of, if not actually to perceive and 
understand, the perceptual world of animals and to recognize that animals have 
their own reasons for acting in the ways they do.541  
Uexküll’s example of the female tick has been repeatedly considered by 
philosophers interested in questions related to ontology and phenomenology. 
Uexküll describes the insect in dramatic terms: “Out of the vast world which 
surrounds the tick, three stimuli shine forth from the dark like beacons, and serve 
as guides to lead her unerringly to her goal.” Buchanan, who also refers to this 
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example, notes, “The moon, weather, birds, noises, leaves, shadows, and so forth 
do not matter to the tick. They may belong to the umwelt of other organisms that 
live in the midst of the tick, but they do not have any meaning for the tick 
itself.”542 After mating, the tick, although blind, responds to photoreceptive cells 
on her skin and climbs upward. Clinging to a leaf or branch, she may wait for up 
to eighteen (human) years before responding the smell of sweat from a passing 
mammal (let’s say the dog that accompanies you on that walk through the 
meadow). Drawn to the dog’s heat, the tick drops from her perch and seeks a bare 
patch of skin to feed on its blood. This will trigger fertilization of her eggs by the 
sperm. After this event, the tick will die. Uexküll describes this as “not an 
exchange of forces between two objects, but the relations between a living subject 
[the tick] and its object [the dog].”543 Although this world may be described as 
poor (a characterization picked up by Heidegger, who is familiar with Uexküll’s 
work) Uexküll understands it as a guarantee of the “unfailing certainty of her 
actions, and security is more important than wealth.”544  
Uexküll uses the metaphor of a soap bubble to describe his concept of the 
umwelt in the following passage: 
We may therefore picture all the animals around us, be they beetles, 
butterflies, flies, mosquitoes or dragonflies that people a meadow, 
enclosed within soap bubbles, which confine their visual space and 
contain all that is visible to them . . . . The fluttering birds, the squirrels 
leaping from branch to branch, or the cows that browse in the meadows —
all remain permanently surrounded by their soap bubbles, which define 
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their own space.  
Only when this fact is clearly grasped shall we recognize the soap 
bubble which encloses each of us as well. Then we shall also see all our 
fellow men [sic] in their individual soap bubbles, which intersect with 
each other smoothly, because they are built up of subjective perceptual 
signs. There is no space independent of subjects. If we still cling to the 
fiction of an all-encompassing universal space, we do so only because this 
conventional fable facilitates mutual communication. 545 
Uexküll concludes that not only time, but also space is subjective. Instead of a 
universal reality, he describes a subjective universe, a complex matrix comprised 
of the perspectives of all living things. Even time and space are based on 
perception. For example, during the period that the tick is suspended, waiting for 
her prey, time does not exist. Operational space, which is used by some, but not 
all animals, is an embodied experience measured in “directional units” (right/left, 
up/down, forward/back) and will vary depending on the characteristics of the 
animal’s body.546 Tactile, auditory, and visual space, which are used to identify 
location and manage navigation, are also particular and subjective orientations. In 
addition, because space is dependent on each animal’s experience, the horizon 
will vary. Since animals are capable of acting and perceiving, this is “not an 
exchange of forces between two objects, but the relations between a living 
“subject” (the animal) and its object.” 547 For example, in the world of a tick, it is 
the subject and its object is the dog. The stimulus of heat given off by the dog is 
perceived by the tick, which then performs the action of dropping from its perch 
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onto its prey. This sequence is neither mechanistic nor instinctual. Each creature 
is free to act according to its perceptions, unconstrained by internalized or 
external social, economic, or political forces. The fascinating section above seems 
to echo the introduction more than most. 
 As discussed in the introduction, the philosopher Brett Buchanan calls this 
the beginning of an onto-ethology, in which being is understood based on the 
“actual behavior of living beings.”548 Also Uexküll is optimistic about our ability 
to enter into the umwelt of other species. Conversely, exactly forty years later in 
“What Is it Like to Be a Bat?” the philosopher Thomas Nagel argues that while 
we might imagine an approximation of what it is like for a human be a bat, we can 
never actually experience what it’s like for a bat to be a bat.549 Nagel denies 
humans the ability to appropriate the life experience of an “other” as one’s own. 
Unlike Uexküll, Nagel is living in a postcolonial era and so his thinking is 
informed by social and political contexts that have demonstrated how hard it is to 
set aside one’s own worldview and truly enter into and understand even that of 
another human being. 
Uexküll has also been identified as a forerunner in biosemiotics, which 
studies how signs are communicated through living systems.550 This kind of 
semiotic system takes the biological dynamics described above a step further. It 
includes but is not limited to the relationship between the animal and its 
environment, but also extends to others who are capable of “interpreting the signs, 
be they other animals or humans.”551 Buchanan suggests that what Uexküll 
describes is an “intersubjective theory of nature.”552 Organisms can only be 
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understood within their environmental context.  
For Duprat the caddisfly larvae are not symbols or metaphors, but living 
beings that must have specific physical needs met or they will die. At the same 
time, he creates a story about his relationship with them, but struggles to define 
what that is. Are they collaborators? Workers? Or victims of his manipulations? 
Also there are questions about whether the work is art or artifact. Nevertheless, in 
his acknowledgement of the ambiguity of the relationship Duprat recognizes his 
dependence on the larvae. In his treatment of the insects it is clear that Duprat is 
aware of the lifeworld or Umwelt of these tiny animals, and that his own umwelt 
overlaps with theirs. 
In “The Discourse of the Novel” Bakhtin argues that stylistics imprison 
artistic works into a “dungeon of a single context” because isolating genres 
prohibit the exchange of “messages with other utterances.”553 Similarly, isolated 
activities within narrow behavioral or disciplinary boundaries erase not only 
possible discourses between them but also the integration that can support rich 
and vibrant ecologies. It is interesting to think of Duprat and the insects as 
interacting in a way which permits a cross-species exchange of materials and the 
creation of a new kind of aesthetic object which otherwise would not be possible. 
This results in what Besson has called a “doubly exposed object, like a double 
exposure: a scientific-cum-artistic palimpsest.”554 How different from the double 
exclusion of the cockroach described above! 
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Although Mikhail Bakhtin was referring to the complex forms of 
communication that occur in the novel, his ideas address a vast communicative 
territory. Rather than dividing the world into the phenomenological and the 
semiotic, or focusing on the boundaries where the two meet, Bakhtin’s 
heteroglossic theory can be applied to interactions between and across species. 
Just as Uexküll offers an explanation of the natural world that challenges a 
universal reality, Bakhtin challenges the unity of language. Instead he asserts that 
both can better be understood within conditions that acknowledge internal 
stratification, social heteroglossia, and a variety of individual voices.555  
The interruption or intrusion of difference produces unanticipated effects 
that dislodge repetitious patterns and create discursive opportunities. Art making 
as well as discourse can be a kind of relational and navigational activity in which 
no one is sure what the next step will be or how to define the relationship, which 
creates opportunities for discovery and creativity. Bakhtin writes,  
This place – the place of encounter between the utterance and an alien 
word – is where something new can enter the discourse. In contrast, the 
passive understanding only makes demands such as greater clarity or more 
persuasiveness that leave the speaker “in his own personal context, within 
his own personal boundaries” (emphasis added).556  
He goes on to say, “an active understanding assimilates the word into a new 
conceptual system that establishes a series of complex interrelationships, 
consonances and dissonances with the work and enriches it with new elements  
. . . . The listener is a specific conceptual horizon which can cause the speaker to 
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construct his utterances on the “alien territory” of the listener’s “apperceptive 
background.”557 Artists working with living animals might also imagine their 
actions as occurring on the animal’s alien territory. As our conceptual horizons 
shift, so do our relationships with animals. 
6. L’Animot 
Derrida does not exclude insects when he raises “the question of the 
animal,” which he believes must be grappled with if we are to “awaken . . . to our 
responsibilities and our obligations with respect to the living in general.” As 
Derrida points out, raising these questions does not mean that animals are to be 
treated on human terms, “ignoring or effacing everything that separates 
humankind from other animals.”558 However that does not absolve one from 
“taking into account a multiplicity of other living things that cannot in any way be 
homogenized, except by means of violence and willful ignorance within the 
category of what is called the animal or animality in general.”559  
Through replacing the all-encompassing and generic word animal (all 
living beings that are not human) with animot, which sounds like the French 
plural for animal (animaux), and drawing attention to the ways in which a word 
(mot) determines what can be thought, Derrida seeks to affirm “the existence of 
‘living creatures,’ whose plurality cannot be assembled within the single figure of 
an animality that is simply opposed to humanity.”560 This recognition of “the 
thing, as such, as what it is in its being” complicates our relationship with “the 
Animal” considerably. Derrida suggests that this confusion in and of itself is a 
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crime. He goes further. “Do we consent to presume,” he writes, “that every 
murder, every transgression of the commandment ‘Though shalt not kill’ concerns 
only man?”561 Can living beings other than humans be murdered? Or only killed? 
 While I wouldn’t charge that the artists considered in this chapter are 
guilty of murder (or conversely, dispute it), how the insects are used and treated 
does raise some ethical dilemmas. How does one interact in ways that do not 
reinscribe the too familiar relations of colonialism or sexism or manipulation? 
Instead of assigning rights, which inevitably leads to a hierarchical structure in 
which some beings have them and others don’t, it may be helpful to move away 
from the concept of a social contract. Rather than asking what, if any, 
responsibility does the artist have to these tiny creatures, what if one were to 
consider the quality of the relationship? Is it really equitable? Who is benefiting? 
Are the animals being treated as beings in their own right, or as artist materials? 
What is being communicated by their presence in the works, and by our 
fascination with them?  
 One way into these questions is, as Bakhtin suggests, through language. 
Another, one proposed by Uexküll, is though the body and its relationship with its 
environment. Derrida suggests that both matter, along with the recognition of the 
particularity, for example that very particular situation of the cat in the bathroom 
with Derrida, cause just the disruption needed to create an opening. Artists, 
philosophers and scientists, each from their various perspectives, point to the 
necessity of considering other ways of being in relation with the multiplicity of 
beings. 
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Chapter Five 
Biophilia, Biophobia: Repositioning Relationships 
 In her American Cockroaches project Catherine Chalmers explores the 
relationships between humans and animals, and especially those which are 
especially disconcerting. She chose cockroaches “because everyone hates 
them.”562 Why? According to Chalmers, there are any number of reasons: 
They’re nocturnal, coming out at night when we are asleep and vulnerable. 
They also operate in numbers, whereas we see ourselves as individuals. If 
we find ten in the kitchen, we know there are hundreds more behind the 
walls that we can neither see nor get at – a hidden enemy is horrifying to 
us. And by mutating quickly they can genetically outwit the technologies 
we throw at them . . . . Cockroaches outnumber us, we can’t control them, 
and they don’t share our values.563 
As far as the general public, and even scientists, are concerned, Chalmers is dead 
right. Many university extension services publish bulletins advising homeowners 
on how to eradicate roaches. Often these documents include language such as: 
“Cockroaches are repulsive and objectionable to most people simply by their 
presence”564 or “Many people are repulsed and/or disgusted by the simple 
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presence of cockroaches.”565 A brochure distributed by the World Health 
Organization describes them as “pests because of their filthy habits and bad 
smell.”566  
 Cockroach phobia is also a topic discussed on social media. One person 
describes her response in this way:  
Yes! I have it! I tell you, they are evil creatures, and they can smell fear 
like dogs or horses. I lived in a house once where there were cockroaches 
at night in the summer, lurking in the dark. eeek. [sic] Whenever I 
accidently saw one I totally freaked, started crying, and left the house until 
someone had killed the thing. Super childish, I know, but they are so nasty 
and scary. Don’t know of any name for it, but that doesn’t mean it's not a 
legitimate phobia, unreasonable and silly like the rest of them, but very 
real to me. yuk [sic].567  
Scientists and health care professionals take the phobia seriously. For Chalmers 
this all adds up to a fascinating opportunity to explore our relationship with them.  
The first work by Chalmers which attracted significant public and critical 
attention was Food Chain. Created in the nineties, it is a series of photographs 
which investigates moments in the lives of various insects, reptiles, amphibians, 
and small rodents, including caterpillars, praying mantises, and mice. A reviewer 
for The Guardian succinctly summarized the subject matter of the project (which 
included gallery exhibitions and a book, Food Chain: Encounters Between Mates, 
Predators, and Prey) as “Death nourishes. Sex kills. Hunger is brutal.”568 While it 
attracted much criticism for the staged deaths of prey being eaten by predators, for 
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Chalmers exposing the death that is inevitably a part of life was exactly the point. 
She wanted to capture the “basic mechanisms of the natural world.” 569 
Through using a studio setup with white backdrops and a macro lens, 
Chalmers made photographs and videos of creatures eating and being eaten in 
human sized scales. For example, in one scenario, 
Baby mice, fed to snakes and frogs, are the size of human newborns. The 
deaths of these “pinkies” — blind, hairless, vulnerable — are particularly 
chilling. The baby strains vainly, then relaxes into submission as the snake 
wraps itself around her tiny form, first caressing then gobbling. 570 
In the photograph the baby mouse is the size of a human baby. While this image 
was one that viewers found particularly disturbing, Chalmers believes it is 
because in the West “It's easy to eat a hamburger and never have killed a cow.” 571 
Chalmers’ work dissolves that distance. She raises all of the creatures used in her  
Figure 13. Catherine Chalmers, Baby Mouse. 
	   251	  
 
 
 
Figure 14-16. Catherine Chalmers, Frog and a Baby Mouse. 
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work and developed an affectionate attachment to some species. In another 
interview with Chloé McFeters, a freelance writer and artist, Chalmers shared her 
feelings about what she was doing. She recalls,  
It was hard. Before I fed a praying mantis, my favorite insect, to my frog, 
I’d procrastinate for hours – clean the bathroom, scrub the floor – anything 
to delay putting the two together. But dealing with these conflicting 
emotions and thoughts led me to the heart of many issues. Why would I 
choose one side or another? Was that appropriate or even relevant?572 
In “The Guardian” interview Chalmers also reflected on her reaction: 
At first, I was horrified that I was raising animals to eat each other. I felt 
that was beyond what someone should do. I'd never killed an animal 
before in my life, and throughout this project I never did, myself . . . . 
Every time I reached into the cage of mice, there would be a pile of little 
pinkies. They all looked the same and I could reach for one or, in a half-
inch, reach for another. That was unsettling. I didn't like being the one to 
choose. Part of me felt bad playing God, and the other part felt I was doing 
a good job raising my snake.573  
The ambivalence caused by the conflicting values is obvious. In response to this 
dissonance, Chalmers both denies killing the animals and acknowledges that she 
is the one deciding who will live and who will die. At the same times she is 
undeniably the agent of a particular animal’s death, something she is willing to 
look at, and to share with us in the interview. As a justification Chalmers points 
out, “Just because my snake lives and eats in SoHo doesn’t mean it can or should 
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become a vegetarian.”574 One might wonder, more generally, if keeping a snake 
as a pet in SoHo or any other location is in and of itself an ethically sound act, but 
her specific point that other animals are killed to feed our preferred animals, our 
pets, is both true and something we do not want to think about. 
Chalmers presents her subject matter in ways that engage our neotenic 
tendencies. The oversized and close up representations allow the viewer to see 
features such as large eyes that people find so endearing in both children and 
many other young mammals that would typically not be noticed in insects and 
amphibians. “It’s easy, she notes, to have a connection with a cute puppy but 
much more difficult to be in touch with the parts of nature from which we have 
worked throughout time to separate ourselves."575 Her images show that these 
small creatures do indeed have faces. Chalmers uses her work as a way of 
becoming engaged with the natural world and says she is “fascinated by the 
strange disconnect between what people seem to want to believe happens in 
nature and what actually does.” Just as the creatures in her photographs, people 
are also, although oftentimes more indirectly, killers too:  
Humans are incredibly efficient killers, yet we are remarkably queasy at 
facing, or acknowledging, what we do. I’m an omnivore. Eating a chicken 
running around the yard is an ecologically sustainable thing to do. But 
supporting the industrial feedlot system of mass produced chickens, for 
example, is gross and distressing. I try to eat in a way that is easy on the 
planet. Unfortunately, though, there is really no innocence in eating. 
Something dies for us to live.576  
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From this perspective, all humans play God. We’ve just become very good at 
distancing ourselves. 
 There are also some scientists that share Chalmer’s misgivings. The 
anthrozoologist Hal Herzog had similar feelings when he worked as an assistant 
in a biochemical lab. One of his first tasks after he started working there was to 
collect molecules from the skin surface of earthworms. This was done by a 
process that involved dropping them in180-degree water. The worms died 
instantly and for Herzog it was just another laboratory chore. Some time later he 
was asked to do the same liquidification procedure to some desert creatures for a 
scientist who was studying skin chemistry. A box containing crickets, scorpions, a 
six-inch long lizard, a small snake, and what he describes as “a lovely little gray 
deer mouse” arrived at the lab. Herzog had no problem killing the crickets and 
experienced only a twinge of regret about the scorpions, which took longer to die. 
However when it came to the lizard, a striped juvenile, Herzog remembers,  
My stomach turned as I lifted it from the cage, and I began to sweat. My 
hands shook a little when I dropped it in the near-boiling water. The lizard 
did not die quickly. It thrashed for maybe ten seconds before becoming 
still. The little snake was an elegant racer with big black eyes. More 
shaking hands and sweating brow, and the thrashing reptile soon was 
reduced to molecules swirling in a solution. Finally, the mouse. I weighted 
the mouse, calculated the appropriate amount of distilled water, poured it 
into the beaker and turned on the heat. As the water approached the 180-
degree mark, I realized that I just could not “do” the mouse. 
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Herzog waited in the next room while the lab manager dropped the mouse into the 
scalding water and completed the procedure. Years later, the questions this 
experience provoked remain with Herzog. He still wonders if it was a matter of 
size, phylogenetic status, nervous system development, the grisly manner of their 
death, or the fact that “the mouse was really cute.” He also wonders if the result of 
this, or any experiment, is ever “really worth the deaths and sufferings of the 
animals.”577  
These kinds of life and death decisions are not only made by Chalmers or 
by researchers, but in a more distanced manner by pet owners and by everyone 
that consumes meat. The difference is the distance, not the killing. Chalmers asks, 
“Should we have pets at all? Look what we've done to dogs. You buy a beagle, 
which has been entirely manipulated for our pleasure to look like that. Then we 
have a whole industry that takes cows and grinds them up into little dog pellets. 
At what point do you start interjecting a morality?”578 And what for us might be a 
more abstract moral stance is for the animals an imperative to survive. Chalmers 
points out that we tend to like other mammals, enjoy the ones that are soft, with 
big eyes, and tend not to like the ones with glassy eyes and scales . . . .” 579 
Chalmers’ observation is supported by researchers such as Konrad Lorenz, who 
described the human tendency to respond positively to animals that resembled 
human children. These features include large eyes, bulging craniums, and 
retreating chins and do not respond as well to long-snouted animals with small 
eyes. Yet in some instances, as Chalmers observes, preventing a particular insect 
from going extinct might preserve an entire ecosystem.580  
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Stephen Jay Gould uses the example of Mickey Mouse, whose appearance 
over time changed from a “small-eyed, long-snouted animal” to a much younger 
looking animal with rounded features and large eyes. The public response to 
Mickey’s new image was very positive, to say the least. In his essay “A 
Biological Homage to Mickey Mouse,” Gould writes, “Many animals, for reasons 
having nothing to do with the inspiration of affection in humans, possess some 
features also shared by human babies but not by human adults . . . . We are drawn 
to them, we cultivate them as pets, we stop and admire them in the wild — while 
we reject their small-eyed, long-snouted relatives who might make more 
affectionate companions or objects of admiration.”581 As the reaction to Chalmers 
work demonstrates, once any animal — or insect — is personified, people begin 
to care about it, and especially if it possesses qualities that are similar to a human 
child. 
1. The Trace of the Infinite 
 Emanuel Lévinas believed “face-to-face” encounters were essential for 
ethical recognition. For Lévinas this face is not a physical entity but instead the 
ineffable element in an encounter that permits recognition of others in ways that 
evoke a sense of responsibility for their well-being. For Lévinas the face was 
associated with a transcendence which was only possible for humans. He believed 
that animals do not possess this transcendence and so do not have those 
metaphorical faces. According to Lévinas animals are bound by instincts and 
humans are not. (This is increasingly questioned by scientists, who now see 
increasing evidence that some species act in ways that are not solely instinctual, 
	   257	  
while human behavior is driven by instinct more often than previously imagined.) 
Therefore, since ethical agents must have free will, only humans can be 
recognized as ethical agents. As beings with free will, through these “face-to-face” 
encounters humans are called upon and can freely decide whether or not they 
should treat other humans ethically. According to Lévinas what is acquired 
through a face-to-face encounter isn’t knowledge about the other (which could be 
used to objectify or manipulate), but the awareness of an irreducible “otherness” 
in a being that is also human.  
The interplay of evolutionary and biological knowledge and moral 
philosophy evident in this discussion is an example of the contingency of our 
understanding of the world and of ethics more generally, and of the foundation 
upon which we base our interactions with other species. It also demonstrates the 
permeability of borders that are established for any given field of study. The 
philosopher Roger S. Gottlieb explains that according to Lévinas the 
responsibility for others does not arise from “an empirically or conceptually based 
sense of the “facts;” “the ultimate ontological structures of the universe;” “an 
expansion of self-interest through identification with the other,” (either practically 
or transcendentally); or a common commitment to social movements.582 Instead it 
arises from the direct experience of the moment. This implies that because of its 
use of the senses, the arts have the capacity to play a significant role in the 
creation of ethical awareness. This does not only apply to the viewer or audience, 
but to all participants in the art-making process, including the artist. 
In her exploration of our relationships with cockroaches, Chalmers creates 
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scenarios where cockroaches are placed in human, but not necessarily “humane” 
situations; in some they appear to be executed by being gassed, hung by the neck, 
or strapped to a chair and electrocuted. In spite of the widespread human 
repugnance toward cockroaches and our own efforts to eradicate them, Chalmers’ 
work has been harshly criticized by some because it appears the insects are being 
harmed or even tortured. Because of the ways in which the insects are represented, 
we respond to them as if they are human, we believe that they deserve to be 
treated ethically, even in the face of the reality that at the very same time we make 
every effort to eradicate them from our homes. In Chalmers’ portrayals, we 
become aware of the insect’s “vulnerability and need” and respond to “the other’s 
call to justice.” It appears that somehow her work evokes that “‘trace’ of the 
infinite” described by Lévinas583  
2. An Ancient Species 
According to fossil evidence, cockroaches were thriving as long as 350 
million years ago (at the same time as the dinosaurs), and were probably the first 
flying animals. Even today, most live in wild settings, eat mulch and leaf litter, 
and are significant contributors to the food chain because they provide food for 
bats, birds, and spiders.584 Cockroaches and humans are co-inhabitants of not only 
the same planet, but the insects literally live with us in our most intimate spaces, 
our homes. They can thrive wherever food, water, and shelter are available.585 The 
roaches spend the day in dark, warm moist areas in and near residential buildings, 
under kitchen sinks, in ventilation ducts, between walls, and in bathrooms. They 
come out at night to search for food in kitchens, food storage places, rubbish bins, 
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drains, and sewers. 
As discussed in the introduction Chalmers looks closely at insects and 
produced work which viewers find both fascinating and revolting, such as 
encounters between predators and prey. In one sequence of images hornworms 
devour a tomato and in turn are eaten by a praying mantis, which is then 
consumed by a tarantula. As Chalmers explains to the artist and critic Chin Lin, 
people “like to pretend that the food they eat is not killed” because they don’t 
want to see “the cycles of eat and be eaten that rule the nature world and are 
repressed by humans.586  She goes on to say, “Today, people tend to deny the 
obvious fact of death and violence in our world.”587 Food Chain makes that cycle 
evident.  
While frogs and praying mantises have faces that generate the impulse to 
assign them anthropomorphic traits, the roaches are, according to Chalmers, “a 
charged subject with a blank canvas. I can paint it. I can kill it. I can put a radio 
collar on it and trace it around my loft.”588 While intrigued by her tiny subjects, 
Chalmers seems somewhat ambivalent about her own relationship with 
cockroaches. She is painstaking in her efforts to not allow a single one to escape 
(and understandably so, given their success at reproduction!). In an interview with 
Blake Eskin from ArtNews the artist explained, “I want to do roach races. I want 
to make a racecourse and blow air on them and watch them go. When the chaos 
breaks out, it’s really interesting to see a roach panic. Because one panics, and 
then another panics, and then another—and then it’s pandemonium. If it’s 
panicked for ten minutes, it will die. Once, I had five die on me” (emphasis 
	   260	  
added).589 On the other hand, she balances absolute power over them with 
meticulous care for them.  
Lin notes, “The photographs are not exercises in entomological verité. On 
the contrary, they suggest the various illusions and dissimulations that plague 
human beings when they try to picture nature to themselves. Chalmers’ 
photographs, sculptures, and videos transform roaches into a surreal projection of 
the human psyche, a kind of mythos of the insect that is part curiosity and part 
revulsion.”590 She continues, “Chalmers’ work unveils the varying and 
contradictory aesthetic [and I would add ethical] responses of human beings to the 
natural world.”591 Chalmers agrees, “The photographs stage sentimentality and 
horror.”592 Yet in spite of the absence of what is commonly perceived as a face, 
Chalmers anthropomorphizes the cockroach, and by doing so exacts an uncanny 
and visceral response from viewers. We peer at them and see ourselves, 
something that we don’t want to see in an insect that so many find “repulsive.”  
3. Ethical Foundations 
In spite of Lévinas’ effort to move ethics away from rational justifications, 
emotional affiliations or self-interest, he remains constrained by a philosophical 
tradition that affirms an absolute divide between human and animal. Instead of the 
continuum, which after Darwin was becoming slowly but steadily accepted, 
Lévinas stakes his philosophy on human exceptionalism, and on the binary 
premise that while the human has choices, the animal, bound by instinct, has none. 
Yet, as described in the introduction, Lévinas himself offers a compelling 
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example of his encounter with Bobby, the dog who energetically greeted Lévinas 
and his fellow prisoners each morning and evening when they were being held as 
prisoners-of-war in a Nazi camp during World War II. As the philosopher 
Matthew Calarco has noted, these actions appear to contradict what should have 
been, according to Lévinas, Bobby’s instinct-driven fight for survival that 
precludes the capacity for ethical encounters. Calarco points out, “Bobby’s life is 
also at stake in the camp. He is a nomad struggling to survive, living on ‘in some 
wild patch’ of the prison.”593 
Calcaro doesn’t conclude that there is “a general transcendence in the 
animal itself”594 or that animals or humans create “ruptures” in the order of being. 
Rather than a “neoreligious” metaphysics Calarco understands ethics as “acts that 
are purely and wholly imminent to the material world.”595 Many animals, 
including humans, act in ways that are influenced by both biological and 
subjective factors. Therefore, he argues, the capacity for altruism is not limited to 
the human realm. In spite of his exclusion of animals, Calarco thinks a close 
reading of Lévinas’ ethical philosophy supports a “universal ethical consideration” 
without boundaries.596 Calarco believes animals exceed our human capacity to 
conceptualize them and that they are radical alterities which possess the power to 
make ethical claims on us. (Certainly many would agree that cockroaches fit the 
first if not the second of these points.) In addition, and drawing on the work of 
Frans de Waal, a cognitive ethologist, Calarco rejects a binary which sets up 
animal life in opposition to human life and argues instead for a continuum that 
acknowledges biological and psychological influences. He concludes,  
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To mark a rupture in the human-animal distinction, as biology and several 
other discourses and practices have done, is to announce the fact that 
philosophy cannot proceed with business as usual. Philosophy can no 
longer in good conscience ground itself on the assumption that human 
perspectives and human interests constitute the primary locus for thought. 
In short, today philosophy finds itself faced by animals, a sharp reversal of 
the classical philosophical gaze.597 
Perhaps Bobby is offering affection in the anticipation that it will be reciprocated, 
or for the bodily pleasure of being patted or having his ears scratched. Perhaps the 
recognition by the men is the affirmation of his identity as a dog. But even if it is 
not without self-interest, in the Kantian sense, it is a recognition and affirmation 
of relationship that is essential for ethics. And so, day after day, in spite of the 
energy that the starving dog might spend instead on looking for food, Bobby 
continues to greet the prisoners until at last he is driven away for good by the 
guards. In the face of the dog’s affirmation of the men’s humanity, can humans, a 
priori, deny ethical relations with an animal-other simply because the other is not 
human? Because Lévinas doesn’t follow the logic of his own argument, he fails to 
recognize that Bobby has a “face.” If, as Lévinas claims, it is the act of 
interruption — the rupture — which forms the foundation of ethics, then face-to-
face encounters cannot be limited to other humans.  
4. The Nameless Hordes 
Cockroaches are the ultimate other, the nameless hordes. They don’t have 
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“faces” — or at least ones that are easily visible. In Chalmers’ work however, we 
are confronted face-to-face with the “not us” who live with us. Although unlike 
Bobby, cockroaches run from rather than to us, the literal face-to-face encounters 
experienced by viewers in Chalmers photographs and videos blur the line between 
humans and insects. The videos and photographs seem to present actual events, 
ranging from horrific executions to discomforting domestic vignettes of the 
insects eating, drinking, and having sex. The roaches are assigned roles ranging 
from imposters to the condemned. Because they are placed in situations familiar 
to humans, their vulnerability is exposed.  
Thrust into particular and singular encounters, the question of whether we 
should assume ethical responsibility for these cockroaches isn’t so easily 
 
Figure 17. Catherine Chalmers, Hanging. Gelatin Silver Print. Collection of the 
artist. 
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Figure 18. Catherine Chalmers, Burning at the Stake. Gelatin Silver Print. 
Collection of the artist. 
dismissed. Because the insects seem to be suffering and their deaths seem to be 
orchestrated for our morbid consumption, the artist has been criticized. One might 
also question the ways that she disrupts their lives and manipulates them for her 
own purposes, even if they suffer no physical harm. However this line of thought 
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incongruously coexists with the long history of human attempts to eradicate these 
insects through any number of means. 
The dissolution of the human-animal binary opens the door for an 
increasingly complicated and complex set of relations. The animal is no longer a 
single category but a complex matrix of beings and relationships, as is the human. 
Derrida has suggested animot, a plural that can remind us, “There is no animal in 
the general singular, separated from man by a single indivisible limit.”598 Both the 
particularity and singularity of animot demands a reconsideration of relationships 
among and between living beings. 
The immense diversity of insect life is a case in point. Things get more 
complicated when the diversity of relationships is considered. For example, in 
Chalmers’ works insects are portrayed in turn as beautiful imposters, lovers, 
domestic creatures caught up in the day-to-day routines of life, condemned 
criminals, and hapless victims. “Imposters” is a series of photographs which 
depict cockroaches either as flowers or as “more likeable” insects (i.e., ladybugs 
and bumblebees) in “pretty settings.”599 The artist first chilled the roaches so they 
could be easily handled, then painted and decorated them with spines or feathers. 
(These embellishments fall off in a few days and do not harm the insects.)  
In Infestations the cockroaches are placed in dollhouse habitats, including 
a bathroom, kitchen, and living room. They dominate the domestic spaces by their 
size rather than their numbers. Their behaviors mimic (or perhaps are the same as) 
humans in the same situations: eating at a table, having sex on a bed. In other 
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images their roach-like behavior is magnified as the “oversized” insects cling to 
and dominate walls adorned with signature pieces from well-known contemporary 
painters and sculptors. These juxtapositions create tensions between impulses to 
anthropomorphize and demonize. Are they just like us or are they taking us over?  
The artist intends for these manipulations to generate reflection about how 
humans “set out to shape the planet as if it is a tabula rasa for our desires.” She 
reminds us, “The terror of whatever a roach does to us pales in comparison to 
what we can do to it.”600 This is materially expressed in the “Execution” series 
and also in the drawings made of roach parts glued to paper. A tiny three-
dimensional work entitled Trophy which consists of the mounted head of a 
cockroach on a piece of paper connects the tiny animals to larger “big game” 
animals which have suffered the same fate. As critic Lin Chin has observed, in 
these works “the line between insect mortality and human handicraft” meet.601 
These trophies transform living beings into objects as if they were just another 
form of art hanging on the wall.  
The varying forms of execution depicted in Chalmers’ “Execution” series 
echo the array of eradication methods used by exterminators. These include 
biological controls, insecticides (including sprays, dusts, and aerosols) baits and 
traps, and repellents. The lists of recommended toxins include: 
Alphacypermethrin, bendiocarb, betacyfluthrin, chlorpyrifos, cyfluthrin, 
cyphenothrin, deltamethrin, diazinon, dichlorvos, dioxacarb, fenitrothion, 
flufenoxuron, hydramethylnon, jodfenphos, malathion, permethrin, pirimiphos, 
propetamphos, and propoxur.  
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Perhaps because it generates the most empathy, the “Execution” series has 
drawn the most criticism. Cockroaches are presented as individuals (in the 
electrocution photographs) and as members of groups (in the gas chamber and 
lynching images). We can begin to imagine what it would be like to be in their 
places. When Burning at the Stake, a video and a set of photographs depicting a 
cockroach that appeared to be on fire, were published in The New York Times 
readers reacted negatively. The video, now posted on Chalmers’ website, is 
accompanied by text which states, “No roaches were harmed in the making of this 
video.” Chalmers only uses the American Cockroach, which is the largest species 
living in the United States, and purchases them from a biological supply company. 
She has raised cockroaches for years and cares for them meticulously. As they die, 
presumably from natural causes (their typical life span is about a year), she 
collects their bodies for further use. During the production process, videotaped 
flames were overlaid on the video of the living insects; and during the burning 
sequence a dead insect replaced the living one shown earlier in the sequence.602  
One photograph shows a line of roaches hanging by tiny string nooses. 
Two others depict electrocutions. In one an insect is tied to tiny chair, in another 
the bug is strapped horizontally to a miniature slab-style table. Chamber, a video, 
shows cockroaches apparently returning to life after being gassed. What is 
actually happening is that as the carbon dioxide used to incapacitate the insects 
wears off, they begin to twitch and move as consciousness returns. This return of 
consciousness is compelling. On one hand, it reminds us that these tiny creatures 
have consciousness (wondrous); on the other hand, it evokes an uncanny 
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invincibility (perhaps they will dominate the earth someday).  
Squish is shot at roach level. The insects race horizontally across the 
screen at astounding speeds or approach the viewer head on, their antennae and 
legs tap-tapping to the soundtrack as if they were dancers. Chalmers said that the 
“roach’s syncopated, rhythmic gait” led her to make this video.603 The squish of 
the title is the sound one hears after the video has gone to black and the “dancers” 
have disappeared. Cockroaches can run at speeds up to three miles per hour — the 
human equivalent of two hundred miles per hour, and that incredible swiftness is 
evident here. 
Although not visible in the Squish video, researchers at the University of 
California at Berkley discovered that to achieve this velocity, the insects rear up 
on their back legs like bipedal human beings.604 Another video made by the same 
scientists shows individual cockroaches racing up a ramp and disappearing under 
the end with an acrobatic flourish. They appear to vanish. It turns out the insects 
grab the edge with the claws on their back legs and swing themselves under like 
pendulums, landing upside down and underneath the ramp. The feat was 
discovered accidentally when scientists were studying how the roaches use their 
antennae to sense and cross gaps. When the gap became too wide, the roaches 
unexpectedly — and without any perceptible hesitation, flipped themselves under 
the ramp. When the scientist amputated the insects’ back claws they were no 
longer able to navigate the gesture and simply fell into the gap. 
The two videos, one made for aesthetic purposes and the other for 
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scientific, have notably different aims. While both manipulate the insects, in this 
video and also in the rest of her work with cockroaches Chalmers is interested in 
interrogating the human-animal relationship. The scientists, in contrast, focus on 
acquiring factual information. Chalmers presents the insects as subjects, while for 
the scientists they are objects, and sometime intentionally mutilated in the pursuit 
of knowledge.  
These scientific studies illustrate Lévinas’ warning that efforts to gain 
knowledge about rather than recognize the other deny any recognition of its 
integrity or needs. A comparison of Chalmers’ work with that of the scientists 
also highlights the ways in which context provides opportunities for bridging and 
bonding. “In traditional theater,” Michael Kirby, the drama theorist, explains,  
the performer always functions within (and creates) a matrix of time, place 
and character . . . . When an actor steps onstage, he brings with him an 
intentionally created and consciously possessed world, or matrix, and it is 
precisely the disparities between the manufactured reality and the 
spectators’ reality that make the play potentially significant to the 
audience.605  
A theatrical performance occurs “within a matrix of time and place required by 
the dramatic action and reinforced by the physical setting.”606 This is certainly 
true in Chalmers’ work. In “non-matrixed” performances, a task (such as a person 
walking to the store or the cockroach running up a ramp) is simply being 
performed. This may happen anywhere; it isn’t confined to any one special space. 
In the videos, the scientists present a non-matrixed situation while Chalmers’ 
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cockroaches are performers in a complex human-insect matrix. 
As discussed in the introduction, Peterson applies the concept of matrixing 
to animal performances. Since animals are not intentionally creating an illusion 
for audiences, when they “perform” they do not act. Instead he examines the 
infrastructure used to create the illusion that animals are acting. According to 
Peterson, because the audience responds to a symbolic matrix governed by 
appearances and a “received” matrix based on their own perceptions, they accept 
what is being presented in the performance. The symbolic matrix presented by 
Chalmers in the settings she constructs for the cockroaches is so convincing that it 
challenges the received matrix that is strongly informed by the viewers’ 
perceptions of cockroaches, even to the point, as discussed above, that viewers 
become concerned for the well-being of the insects. The concept of matrixing 
suggests two questions that will be considered in more depth in the last chapter. 
These are 
“How are animals made to perform?” and  
“How are animals made to mean?”607  
This suggests the differing aims of art and science with regard to animals. In both 
situations, the insects are manipulated by humans to one degree or another and so 
“perform.” In Chalmers’ works, the insects are also “made to mean;” her intention 
is to provoke thought and reflection. The matrix she establishes affirms the 
insects’ subjectivity, while in the Berkeley study they are objects with particular 
properties and the focus is solely on the mechanics of their performance. 
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Chalmers makes every effort not to harm the insects, while in experiment some of 
the cockroaches had the claws on their back legs cut off, destroying their capacity 
to perform this self-protective evasive maneuver.608  
Adopting an ethical approach to the production of scientific knowledge or 
artistic works requires a consideration of the relationship between the human and 
the animal, and the responsible treatment of both. As Peterson has noted, “behind 
the referential and thematic content of representations [and I would add scientific 
research] lie questions about their production; the analysis of animals as objects of 
performance necessitates investigating how actual animals perform . . . [and] how 
are animals made to perform?”609  
For most people the answer to this question relies on the value assigned to 
the animal by humans. Often this is based on its similarity to humans, and 
likeability factors such as having a face, large eyes, being perceived as an 
individual rather than a collective, or identified as friendly or useful rather than 
harmful or destructive. Lyall Watson, a scientist who is interested in what 
Chalmers has been exploring, writes, 
Almost everything we know or believe about cockroaches is exaggerated. 
“Cockroach!” The word itself has become an insult in every language as 
people heap easy abuse on anything alien. When faced with any such 
social quandary, humans instinctively distance themselves from its source. 
We rush to put as much space as possible between us and whatever it is 
that has made us feel so uncomfortable. And, more often than not, we 
stack the deck in our favor by dehumanizing our adversaries. Once that 
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ploy has been put into play, anything goes. It is us against them, and in 
such conflict, truth and reason are the first casualties.610  
Even if it seems more acceptable to gas a living cockroach or burn a dead one, 
one can imagine the public outcry if puppies — or their corpses — had been 
subjected to the same treatment. Certainly PETA and other organizations and 
individuals have spoken out against the treatment of animals, particularly 
mammals, in scientific studies. We create hierarchies that govern our sense of 
right and wrong. It also gets to the heart of why Chalmers’ depictions of 
cockroaches’ “executions” (rather than extermination) are so disconcerting.  
However when the anonymous plural has become singular, the 
dehumanized adversary becomes a particular individual, a term reserved for 
humans now applied to the insects. In spite of efforts to eradicate them through 
poisons and traps the face-to-face encounter with particular individuals — even 
cockroaches — makes a difference. 
5. Defamiliarization 
As considered in the earlier example of I Like America and America Likes 
Me by Joseph Beuys animals are often used symbolically to represent humans in 
art and politics. Perhaps inevitably, the “Execution” series not only highlights the 
insects’ situation, but the suffering that humans inflict on other humans. Some of 
the portrayals evoke Klu Klux Klan style lynchings or the Holocaust. Chalmers 
denies this is the case here and explains, 
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The “Execution” series is not about the suffering humans have endured at 
the hands of humans, but what other species have endured at the hands of 
humans. I do not want, in any way, to diminish the pain and horror that we 
have experienced through the centuries with these methods of killing. It is 
the opposite perspective: not looking in but looking out across the animal 
barrier that I am endeavoring to explore through this work.611 
On the other hand, although the focus is on the human-insects relationship, the 
anthropomorphic perspective is paramount:  
It has never been my intention, though, to offer them [cockroaches] an 
apology, to say we shouldn’t hate or shouldn’t kill them. I’m not 
advocating for their conservation or their destruction. What interests me is 
that the degree to which people hate cockroaches is so disproportionate to 
the actual potential for threat in the actions of the animal. This schism is 
indicative of the subjectivity – perhaps arbitrariness – with which we 
respond to nature in general. The cockroach is like a distorting mirror that 
amplifies the attitudes we harbor. 
Chalmers’ work humanizes the roaches while evoking an animalization of 
humans. Cockroaches and humans are connected not only in the choice of habitat, 
but also in some behavior and culture. Like humans, cockroaches are omnivores. 
The species that have adapted to living with people immigrate with them across 
the globe. For example, the American Cockroach used by Chalmers arrived on 
this continent during the early years of the slave trade, around 1625.  
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While there are 3500 species of cockroach, many of which live in the wild, 
only five are identified by the World Health Organization as posing health 
concerns for humans. Yet for most people, all cockroaches are seen as disease-
carrying vermin. While not intrinsically harmful, as they travel from drains, 
gardens, and sewers into buildings in search of food, many (but not all) scientists 
think they can potentially carry disease-causing bacteria. More recent studies 
suggest the allergic reactions in some individuals may turn out to be more 
common than any disease. Also roaches secrete a fluid with a long-lasting smell 
that is offensive to humans. 612  
Art such as these works creates conditions in which an intersection of 
contradictory matrices of thought is sustained. As drama scholar Bert O. States 
has noted, bisociation or the intersection of two apparently incompatible matrices 
results in a “flash,” a moment of surprise at an unexpected outcome. He compares 
this to the moment when “the floor cracks open and we are startled . . . by the 
upsurge of the real into the magic circle . . . . We suddenly see the familiar in the 
defamiliarization.”613 In a joke, this may occur when the punch line is delivered; 
in science; for scientists it is the “ah ha” moment; and in Chalmers’ work, is that 
disconcerting sense of unease when the distinctions between insect life and 
human life are eroded.  
According to States, we perceive a dog on stage “imaginatively” but we 
see the dingo in a zoo as “indicative because it serves as an illustration of what the 
“real animal” in the Australian wilderness would be like. However in the theatre, 
the dog is a “stubbornly real” thing. The animal is “alive in the sense of belonging 
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to immediate existence . . . but not yet to the world of art.” In art, animals are 
“defamiliarized and desymbolized object[s]” which are “‘uplifted to the view’ 
where we see it as being phenomenally heavy with itself.”614 This kind of 
situation is rich with potential for both artists and audience members to reimagine 
our relationships with animals. 
This experience of surprise, combined with a sense of the unknowable, the 
alien other, also appears in the face-to-face encounter of Lévinas’ ethical 
awakening. Human qualities are attributed to an animal (and an almost universally 
disliked if not despised one at that) while at the same moment the viewer is aware 
that the animal is not human. These are real cockroaches in a theatrical setting; 
they maintain their identity as insects even as they play the role of the human. 
This leads to a situation where people can complain about the harm seemingly 
done even as they would probably unhesitatingly, and perhaps even 
enthusiastically, endorse efforts to exterminate the roaches in their homes. At the 
same moment that these cockroaches qualify as living beings worthy of care they 
are vermin that must be eradicated. The unexpectedness of the punch line in a 
joke brings pleasure and the “ah ha” moment may lead to a breakthrough in 
understanding. In Chalmers’ work the “transitional moment of shock” which 
occurs when the cockroach is defamiliarized and desymbolized as it is “uplifted to 
the view” poses questions about our relationship to this particular category of 
animal.  
6. Deterritorialization 
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 According to Deleuze and Guattari the way to transform subject-object 
relation is to shift our understanding or reality from subjects and objects (things) 
to the relations between them and how these are governed by processes. Instead of 
molar units –discrete forms with clearly delineated boundaries and identities — 
they propose that becomings, and especially becomings-animal are the primary 
activities of life. Things are deterritorialized in that they are no longer forms but 
energies that coalesce and dissipate. 
Becomings replace relationships between bounded entities (subjects and 
objects) with movement itself. The activity of being in relation replaces discrete 
entities with affects, which are essentially movements of various forces and 
speeds that encounter each other. These fields of activity are described as 
molecular and associated with the “natural.” For Deleuze and Guattari affect is 
not a personal feeling but instead, as Brian Massumi notes, “the ability to affect 
and be affected,” He goes on to explain, “It is a prepersonal intensity 
corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body to another 
and implying an augmentation or diminution in that body's capacity to act.”615  
The free line of flight of molecular dynamics permits the “elementary” to 
communicate with the “cosmic.” In contrast, natural history conceptualizes 
relationships between animals based on differences between groups. These 
differential relationships fall into two categories: serial or structural. Serial 
relationships are judged by their similarity to an original “perfection.” Structural 
relations are organized according to the performance of common functions. One 
example of this is the function of organs such as gills and lungs. In contrast to 
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natural history, evolution (a kind of genealogy) looks on these relationships as a 
line of production in which what comes first creates or produces what follows.616 
Totemism, another model for understanding relationships between human 
and nonhuman animals, holds that humans have spiritual connections with 
animals or plants. According to Deleuze and Guatarri, it is based on “an 
equivalence of relations, a symbolic understanding based on analogy of 
proportionality. So for example, a man is to woman what bull is to cow but man is 
not a bull.”617 Because it is a structuration of differences, these relationships are 
constrained by predetermined structures. Christian theology also depends upon a 
similar structural model, sometimes referred to as the chain of being. 
In all of these analogical models, any new element is situated within a 
familiar territory. Therefore they privilege the familiar and limit opportunities for 
experiencing relationships, or even the experience of life itself. Evolution, natural 
history, myth, and theology, as Deleuze and Guatarri note, create a context in 
which “the relationships between animals are bound up with the relations between 
man and animal, man and woman, man and child, man and the elements, man and 
the physical and microphysical universe.”618 This results in a reductively 
functioning “binary machine.” One example of this is the persistent human-
animal divide. As one considers the relationships established during art-making 
processes and performances, it may be useful to consider whether or not the 
binary machine is in operation. This might be done by asking if the relationship 
being created and manifested serves to reinforce, obscure, or dissolve customary 
boundaries and hierarchies or if what is happening is leading to unexpected and 
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life-affirming dynamics of relating.  
For Deleuze and Guatarri the body is not an entity, does not depend on 
physical presence, traits, and characteristics, and does not possess boundaries that 
differentiate it from other bodies. According to their view, “A body is defined 
only by a longitude and a latitude; in other words the sum total of the material 
elements belonging to it under given relations of movement and rest, speed and 
slowness (longitude); the sum total of the intensive affects it is capable of at a 
given power or degree of potential (latitude).”619 They conclude that a body is 
comprised of affects, local movements, and differential speeds. It is important to 
remember that affects are not expressions of a self-contained subject; they are not 
personal feelings or traits.620  
Bodies are highly fluid and changeable: they are not fixed in time or space. 
And all boundaries are fluid and permeable. If this is the case, our understanding 
of what it is to be in relationship with any one or any thing unravels. A radical 
reconceptualization of relational possibilities — and what it is to be a being — is 
required. No longer are there individuated subjects and objects interacting with 
each other, but assemblages which come into being, change, or even dissipate in 
an ongoing dynamic of becomings. 
There are different kinds of becomings. Some include  becoming‐child, 
becoming‐woman becoming animal, becoming‐elementary, becoming‐cellular, 
becoming‐molecular, and becoming-imperceptible.621 Becoming-animal always 
involves multiplicity. Multiplicity is defined by borders rather than its elements. It 
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has no center but possesses multiple dimensions. Since it is defined by affects 
rather than units, it is not divisible. When a dimension is lost or gained its nature 
is changed. One might think of a swarm of mosquitoes. Bodies are multiplicities, 
comprised of assemblages that come together, change, or dissipate. Or as Deleuze 
and Guatarri would put it, processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization 
are continually occurring. 
Instead of individual identities there are packs which move in unison. This 
is reminiscent of the movement of cockroaches, or flocks of birds in flight. 
Humans tend to find the first unnerving and the second inspiring, perhaps because 
of their proximity to us. When birds intrude upon our personal or domestic space 
(our territory) as was unnervingly demonstrated in Alfred Hitchcock’s film The 
Birds, they become even more menacing than cockroaches. Also disconcerting for 
humans is the loss of an individual self, another kind of territory. A pack is not a 
collection of individual animals or units, but a constantly shifting assemblage of 
two or more affects. The energy that drives this process is not possessed by a 
particular entity, but rather in the relations within and between affects and other 
assemblages: Becomings might be said to occur in the space in between rather 
than within any given entity. These multiplicities enter into assemblages.622 
“Becomings-animal are neither dreams nor phantasies,” Deleuze and 
Guatarri explain, “They are perfectly real.”623 Instead it is the individuated self 
that is an illusion. “If we imagined the position of a fascinated Self, it was 
because the multiplicity toward which it leans, stretching to the breaking point, is 
the continuation of another multiplicity toward which it leans, stretching to the 
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breaking point, is the continuation of another multiplicity that works it and strains 
it from the inside. In fact, the self is only a threshold, a door, a becoming between 
two multiplicities . . .  A fiber stretches from a human to an animal, from a human 
or an animal to molecules, from molecules to particles, and so on to the 
imperceptible.”624   The fiber is the borderline between human and nonhuman 
animal. Becoming transforms this from a barrier to a connection. It is not that two 
discrete beings are bound together, but that there is a shared state.  
Becoming is horizontal and subterranean. Once can think of is as a 
rhizome which is neither a classification nor a “genealogical tree.”625   Becoming 
involves an alliance in which there are no subjects. It is its own reality, a creation 
without origins. It is neither the produce of evolution nor a “structure” that can be 
understood in terms of similarities and difference with other structures or forms. It 
isn’t a resemblance, an imitation, or an identification. 
According to Deleuze and Guattari there are three types of animals: family 
pets, state animals, and pack animals. The first, pets, run the risk of being 
appropriated for psychologically regressive or Oedipal purposes. As they harshly 
express this, “anyone who likes cats or dogs is a fool.”626 The second type of 
animal populates myths, and they are used as models or archetypes. The third 
form a molecular pack. The pack animals form a multiplicity that inhabits a space 
and includes the movements occurring within the same and across heterogeneous 
populations. Although they do not explicitly say so, humans certainly are within 
these three types of animals. 
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The concept of becomings-animal resists natural history’s use of 
characteristics to classify animals, and the corresponding tendency of societies to 
use animal characteristics to classify people. Just as becoming is a verb, one could 
understand “wolf” as “a wolfing.” The animal is no longer a bounded entity but 
rather a dynamic process. While the elimination of particularity serves to resist 
categorical limits, it also poses the danger of ignoring the very real needs of 
animals on a basic physical level. One the other hand, it opens up possibilities for 
rethinking the human and animal relationship at a time when it is critically 
important to do so. Becomings-animal could dissolve the boundaries that set each 
of us apart so that no one is “a definite being distinguished from other beings; nor 
from all of the becomings running through us.” 627 While Randolph Carter, a 
character in H. P. Lovecraft’s novel, perceives this as “the nameless summit of 
agony and dread,” it can also be seen as a profoundly ecological perspective and 
an antidote to existential isolation.628 Becoming animal forms “a block that runs 
its own line ‘between’ the terms in play and beneath assignable relations.”629  
An animal assemblage is not organized according to state or family 
structures. Instead, according to Deleuze and Guatarri, becoming-animals requires 
a human to make an alliance with an exceptional individual in the pack. The 
individual’s exceptionality is based on its anomalous role in the pack, its 
deviation from the standard. Anomalous is neither a trait of the individual nor a 
characteristic of a species. It is also not the perfect specimen: “It is a phenomenon 
of borderings.”630  
In One Thousand Plateaus the example of Captain Ahab and Moby Dick 
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is used repeatedly. Preferring the heroic over the domestic (and indulging in some 
unexpectedly trite asides which find their sources in stereotypes related to sex and 
age), Deleuze and Guatarri write, “Ahab’s Moby-Dick is not like the little cat or 
dog owned by an elderly woman who honors and cherishes it.”631 Instead Moby‐
Dick is the White Wall bordering the pack, a demon at the other end of the fishing 
line. In a dramatic instance of boundary crossing, Captain Ahab is dragged by the 
whale “that crosses the wall” and drags him “into the void . . .”632 This 
exemplifies deterritorialization while the elderly woman with the pet is indicative 
of Oedipal reterritorialization, a failure to break free from societal and familial 
constraints. These examples indicate how difficult it is to resist the impulse to 
categorize, even within a text expressly devoted to dissolving traditional 
boundaries. The woman-cat assemblage here may in fact be reenacting Oedipal 
roles, as Deleuze and Guattari assume, or may be engaging in a dynamic that is 
just as boundary crossing as the imaginary Ahab. 
Deleuze and Guattari use an orchid and a wasp as an example of thinking 
about relationships in terms of assemblages which coalesce and dissolve, rather 
than as molar units (subjects and objects). One doesn’t understand the wasp and 
orchid as having a relationship between beings but instead a becoming —the 
activity of multiplicities which result in an assemblage based on shared affects. 
An assemblage is not a subject or an object, but a haeccity, a thusness that is not 
an object. One might imagine cockroach-human as another kind of assemblage. 
As Chalmers’ work so vividly demonstrates, distinct boundaries — physically, 
emotionally, and imaginatively—between us and them are a kind of boundary 
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crossing, a molecular dynamic. The human relationship with cockroaches can be 
characterized as a dynamic of deterritorializations and reterritorializations. These 
can create situations and processes that are life affirming or negating. To continue 
on with efforts at extinction as we have done in the past may very well be an 
Oedipal impulse, a continuing reaffirmation of the status quo, while reconsidering 
relationships, as Chalmers’ works suggests we might do, could open up 
possibilities for a boundary crossing as heroic as that imagined by Deleuze and 
Guattari for Ahab and that great white whale. 
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Chapter Six 
Enlarging the Field: Animals in Action 
 The performances created by the artists considered in this chapter 
illuminate the ever-changing dynamic of relationships between humans and 
horses in Western societies. Over the past several decades, animal acts that 
emphasize human-animal relationships and celebrate the innate behaviors of 
horses have emerged. While still based on some commonly-held assumptions 
about distinctions between culture and nature arising out of nineteenth century 
romanticism, they challenge and redefine human-animal relations through 
expanding our conception of language. Yet even as one binary is deconstructed, 
another is reaffirmed. It appears to be an endless dynamic. In the performances 
and relationships described here, nature, as embodied by the horses, is superior to 
a culture, an artificial cage which isolates people from themselves and the rest of 
the world. Yet even if they are irresistible, recognizing the limitations of binaries, 
how they prevent us from engaging the tremendous diversity of life forms and life 
experiences, is invaluable. We need to remain vigilant that in spite of our urge to 
direct our attention to one thing or another, this or that, both art and philosophy, 
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among other disruptions of life, can surprise us into opening up to multi-
dimensional spheres of possibilities. The world is so much larger than we two 
points on a line.   
In these works, language is a form of communication that includes all of 
the senses. It is not simply a linguistic or semiotic system. Although sequences of 
trained behaviors may be part of the performance, the meaning is driven by an 
emphasis on communication and relationship between species. Of course it is not 
as if humans and other animals have never used the senses to communicate, but 
rather that for a number of reasons over the past few centuries we have been 
preoccupied with concepts about language that direct our attention away from 
embodied forms of communication. In the nineteenth century Western societies, 
reason, the superiority of the written and spoken word, and the ability of humans 
to control the natural world and even other societies were celebrated. 
Preoccupations about human exceptionalism sparked by Darwin’s work in 
evolutionary biology, imperialism, and the “linguistic turn” in philosophy 
influenced the Western definition of language and of what it is to be human. As a 
result language (and culture, for that matter) is understood as uniquely human 
attribute that make us (and especially during this period, the white Western 
European and American male) special. The focus then, and still very much so 
today, was on our uniqueness, rather than what we held in common with other 
species. In contrast, in these performances, the artists have used practices based 
on intuitive and sensory exchanges with the animals they are working with. 
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Especially with the dancers, the relationships are more about “being with,” to use 
Haraway’s phrase, rather than establishing and maintaining hierarchies.  
At the same time, the interactions for the most part are not as “natural” as 
they might seem. The interactions between humans and horses that follow, with 
the exception of Nita Little’s, have been shaped into performances that present 
artistic representations of human-animal relations or of what humans imagine 
about these animals or about nature. While the performances are based on the 
natural movements and inclinations of the horses, the horses are not simply acting 
“naturally.”  
During the eighteenth century, artists and philosophers associated with the 
Romantic Movement celebrated nature as something possessing intrinsic value, in 
part for the positive effect that “outer nature” had on “inner nature,” the human 
soul. The divide between nature and culture, including the Romantic view, was 
challenged by feminists in the twentieth century. For example in their essay on 
environmental ethics, Andrew Brennan and Yeuk-Sze Lo describe the thesis of 
Val Plumwood’s 1993 book, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature. Plumwood 
believed the oppression of women is “one of many parallel forms of oppression 
sharing and supported by a common ideological structure, in which one party (the 
colonizer, whether male, white or human) uses a number of conceptual and 
rhetorical devices to privilege its interests over that of the other party (the 
colonized: whether female, people of colour, or animals).”633 This analysis is 
particularly relevant to questions associated with the use of living animals in 
artistic productions in that it clearly describes the relationship between dualism 
	   287	  
and the ranking that often accompanies it, and the assumption of the right of 
dominance by humans over animals. Accompanying this is the association of 
nature with the body and the senses, especially the female body, and culture with 
male, mind, language, and reason. And while Romanticism, with its emphasis on 
nature and the senses, is often understood as a reaction to the Enlightenment, 
positivism, and the celebration of reason, both Romanticism and the 
Enlightenment affirm, and even depend on, the same ideological partitioning of 
the world. The following contemporary performances frame human and animal 
relationships in ways that challenge those binaries.  
1. Fenced In 
As discussed in the introduction, Said uses the metaphor of a field to in his 
description of a scholarly specialization or discipline. Just as with the fields made 
by farmers, these scholarly fields are somewhat arbitrary delineations in a much 
vaster landscape. What falls within this area seems to “acquire coherence and 
integrity.” 634 Over time this cultivated field acquires a sense of inevitability or 
stability. Then it appears that the subject matter has a cohesiveness based on its 
“agreed upon” characteristics. Yet this sense of permanence is illusory because as 
Said points out, “a field can change so entirely, even in the most traditional 
disciplines . . . as to make an all-purpose definition of subject matter almost 
impossible.635 Change occurs because of the sometimes arbitrary shifts in 
priorities and interests in various cultures and periods. 
Said, among other theorists discussed in this dissertation, believes that 
knowledge is not a process of discovery, but one of production. Just as fields are 
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planted with the aim of produce a specific crop, scholarly disciplines produce 
particular kinds of knowledge. The knowledge produced in Orientalism, for 
example, is directed toward relations between the colonized and the colonizers. It 
is defined, consciously or not, by assumptions that supported the establishment of 
power relations based on hierarchies which in turn justified Western imperialism. 
While there are important differences in applying this intra-species theory to 
interspecies relationships, there are some significant similarities. In her analysis of 
Said’s work political theorist Margaret Kohn writes,  
The term orientalism described a structured set of concepts, assumptions, 
and discursive practices that were used to produce, interpret, and evaluate 
knowledge about non-European peoples . . . . Said drew attention to the 
relationship between knowledge and power. By foregrounding the cultural 
and epistemological work of imperialism, Said was able to undermine the 
ideological assumption of value-free knowledge and show that ‘knowing 
the Orient’ was part of the project of dominating it (emphasis added)636  
While Said is referring to the Western production of knowledge about the Middle 
East, his insights also can be applied to how we produce knowledge about and 
understand human-animal relations.  
In similar ways, the fields of linguistics and semiotics embrace abstract 
systems that appear to be value free, even as they define systems that recognize 
only certain human forms of communication and deny nonhuman animals 
language. This is part of a larger orientation that leads to the framing of human-
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animal relations in ways that affirm human superiority. One consequence has 
been the tendency to overlook a rich array of sensory forms of communication, 
forms which have always existed between humans, and between and among 
humans and other species. The “concepts, assumptions, and discursive practices” 
associated with these fields of study have been used to regulate relations between 
human and non-human animals in ways which affirm and justify human authority 
and control.  
Just as with orientalism, there is an assumption that we (Western, human) 
are different from “them” (the animal other, both human and not). Maintaining 
this outsider position — we are not “animals”— denies or glosses over our own 
identity and place in the world. Another framing device is culture: As humans, 
especially as humans living in Western societies, our culture has been a signifier 
of superiority, as outside of or distinct from nature. Because we live inside the 
frame we have so meticulously created, these constructs are difficult to discern. 
Ironically, they seem “natural.” As Said concluded, “systems of thought like 
Orientalism, discourses of power, ideological fictions—mind-forg’d manacles—
are all too easily made, applied, and guarded.”637 While the artists considered here 
have not broken free from those manacles (How could they?), they are opening 
gates and exploring the adjoining fields, territories that have been fenced off for a 
long time. 
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2. Boundary Crossings 
Performances produced by companies such as Théâtre Équestre Zingaro 
have clear connections with circus traditions. The physical beauty and ability of 
the horses in the multimedia performances produced by the company, which also 
include costumes, dramatic lighting, compelling sets, and music, are mesmerizing. 
Théâtre Zingaro is a 500-seat theater-in-the-round on the outskirts of Paris. 
Trainers and their families, including Bartabas, the founder, artistic director and 
lead trainer, and 45 horses, live and work there. Each fall there are two months of 
equestrian shows that combine theater, dance, music and poetry. According to 
Bartabas (and many reviewers and critics agree) Théâtre Zingaro’s narrative, 
design, consistency, broad cultural references drawn from Japanese Butoh dance 
to Baroque liturgy, and seamless production create an aesthetic animal act that 
sets it apart from the circus.638 Bartabas’ skillful use of theatrical elements, which 
create compelling spectacles, helps to make his unconventional approach more 
accessible to broad audiences.639 
While nineteenth century circuses celebrated equestrian abilities and the 
skill of horse trainers, some contemporary animal acts, including Théâtre  
Zingaro’s among others, emphasize boundary-crossing narratives which challenge 
the so-called human/animal abyss and yet assume, even as they seek to transcend, 
a culture/nature divide. In contrast to the kinds of circus acts presented by trainers 
such as Astley, which comfortably assume a narrative of human superiority, in 
these contemporary works the horses seem to be behaving according to their own 
volition, apparently in complete accord with their two-legged counterparts. 
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Routines are developed around the animal’s inclinations and behaviors rather than 
more “theatrical,” artificial, or anthropomorphic movements. Also rather than 
relying on a system of rewards and punishments, many trainers and artists 
working with animals today, including Bartabas, seek to control — or perhaps 
influence might be the preferred term — the horses through giving or withholding 
a favorite treat.  
 Another difference is that trainers such as Bartabas select animals based 
on particular, rather than generic, attributes or tendencies. While in the past 
trainers may have chosen an animal based on the breed or appearance (color, size, 
etc.) that would best suit the act, these artists develop routines or choreograph 
movements which correspond to the personality and behaviors of a particular 
horse. In other words, the act evolves as an outcome of the artist’s or trainer’s  
 
Figure 19. Bartabas and Zingaro (performance). 
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experiences with and knowledge of an individual animal. For example it may take 
Bartabas several years to develop an act with a particular animal, and it is heavily 
influenced by that horse’s personality, tendencies and athletic ability.  
Théâtre Zingaro acts grow out of relationships between humans and horses, 
or between a particular rider and a particular horse. Bartabas describes his 
approach in a 2011 interview: 
I don’t make this show to “show” horses — it’s to dive into the depths of 
the relationship between man and horse. It’s about working together. 
Because you know horses for years and years, you know how to listen — 
the ideas come from the horse. When you truly work with animals you 
don’t control, you hear the body and the breathing (emphasis added).640  
This passage describes a kind of knowing and way of communicating that relies 
on the senses. The emphasis is on relationships that arise out of an embodied 
listening, and is quite different from the semiotic sequences described by 
Bouissac. It is not a set of arbitrary abstract codes, or rewards and punishments. 
While the movements or passages, however spectacular, may draw attention to 
the athletic abilities of the horse and/or rider, for Bartabas it is how they — 
human and horse — are together that matters. 
Bartabas worked with dancer and choreographer Carolyn Carlson together 
to create “We Were Horses,” a performance which combined sixteen dancers 
from Centre Chorégraphique National Roubaix Nord-Pas de Calais with twelve 
horses and riders from the Académie du Spectacle Equestre. During an interview 
published in 2011, Bartabas and Carlson shared their perspectives about the 
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collaboration. According to Bartabas, “Everything is dance,” including acrobatics 
and trick riding. In this performance his goal was to turn his riders into “horse-
riding dancers,” a corps de ballet. Because the horses are difficult to direct and 
require “knowledge about the way they operate” he choreographed the 
movements of the horses and riders while Carlson was responsible for the dancers. 
In spite of his sensitivity to the idiosyncrasies of individual horses, it is interesting 
to see that Bartabas here is referring to the animals as if they were machines that 
one must know how to operate.641 
 
Figure 20. Bartabas and Carolyn Carlson, We Were Horses (performance). 
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Carlson explains that she wanted to do this collaboration because she is 
“fascinated by horses. They embody the share of wildness that society has lost. 
Horses create a feeling of well-being since they are free . . . . They have been 
present in our culture since the beginning of humanity. It is part of our collective 
unconscious” (emphasis added).642 For Carlson the horses have somehow been 
able to hold onto the “wildness that society has lost” even though they have 
always been “present in our culture.” They are both inside culture and outside of 
it at the same time. Carlson also states that horses are part of us in our collective  
unconscious, which implies that humans are also inside and outside of culture.643 
In contrast Bartabas does not characterize the horses as being free or wild. Instead 
he describes a precise training program, yet one that is also sensitive to the needs 
and temperament of individual animals in any given moment. For example, since 
a horse’s attention span is short, he notes, “When you teach them new movements, 
you cannot ask them to repeat them endlessly as you would with actors or dancers. 
You cannot push them to a point where you get better results. You are working 
with an animal that hasn’t asked to be there and which doesn’t understand why 
it’s doing what it’s doing. You therefore have to be extremely vigilant. You have 
twenty minutes to warm up, twenty minutes of their concentration and then you 
have another quarter of an hour for relaxation. In the end, twenty minutes a day 
are all you can use for training.” Improvisation is also difficult, Bartabas explains, 
because horses are timid. Therefore the trainer can’t make last minute changes. 
The horses must be introduced to all aspects of the performance beforehand. 
Bartabas concludes, “You have to be guided by foresight and discipline, as you 
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would with children. You have to watch out for them. Horses are also very 
generous. They can die for you. Once they are well prepared, they are totally 
unlike humans who are aware of their physical limit. You have to curb them so 
that they don’t hurt themselves.”644  
Unlike Carlson’s more romantic description of horses as wild and free 
(and yet part of culture), Bartabas is pragmatic. He sees them as child-like, timid, 
and easily bored, but still trainable. They are animals that can be trained to present 
a cultural product: an artistic performance. Yet he also affirms Carlson’s beliefs 
about their naturalizing effect on humans. Even these carefully trained and long-
domesticated animals, according to Bartabas, “help us get back to our instincts.”  
In addition to acquiring knowledge of the necessary skills and techniques, 
the trainer and the rider must be attentive to the horse’s body language because 
“the animal never reacts the same way and cannot talk.” Further, the time spent 
with them has taught Bartabas “not to over analyze things and to listen to my 
feelings.”645 These lessons, however, are not because of a shared collective 
unconscious but rather by cultivating sensitivity to the animals’ responses 
moment by moment.  
Scientists studying their behavior have discovered that the horses are 
attending to the body language of other horses, and of humans, just as carefully as 
their human trainers. In a study published in 2008, researchers concluded that 
horses typically use visual signals to communicate and that their history of 
domestication has aided them in better “reading” human behavior. As is clear 
from the passage below, humans aren’t the only ones doing the observing: 
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Subtle changes of the position of their ears, the orientation and widening 
of the eyes, the dilation of the nostrils, and the tension of the mouth are 
utilized as parts of communicative signals . . . . Thus, both the history of 
being domesticated and the predisposition for utilizing visual cues of 
behavior can provide an advantage for horses in relying on human visual 
communicative gestures. They respond to the handler’s body language and 
voice . . . and can perceive and utilize subtle visual cues. The classic 
example, Clever Hans, showed that horses are able to rely on minute 
bodily signals emitted by humans.646 
Clever Hans was owned by Wihelm von Osten, a German math teacher. Von 
Osten spent four years teaching his horse to count and to tap out the letters to 
words (i.e., A = 1 and so on). Hans would tap his right foot in response to 
questions and math problems. He could also nod yes or no and use his head to 
indicate direction. It also appeared as if Hans could read placards with written 
words. Von Osten, who did not charge for his horse’s performance, genuinely 
believed that Hans was not simply trained to respond in particular ways, but could 
actually think. Ultimately a “Hans Commission” was formed in 1904 to 
investigate possible fraud. The composition of the commission included a circus 
manager, a count, teachers, a veterinarian, a major-general, and a physiologist. 
Since they were unable to discover any trickery or fraud, Hans’ reputation was 
even further enhanced. The horse became famous, not only in Europe, but also 
internationally. His abilities were newsworthy enough to be featured in article 
published in The New York Times. 647 
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After the commission disbanded, and upon further investigation, it was 
discovered that Hans was unable to come up with the correct response if his 
questioners didn’t know the answer. Eventually it was discovered that Hans was 
relying on subtle visual cues. He could perceive very slight and subconscious 
changes in the body language of Van Osten. As one of the investigators, Oskar 
Pfungst, observed, “The motive for this direction and straining of attention was 
the regular reward in the form of carrots and bread, which attended it. This 
unexpected kind of independent activity and the certainty and precision of the 
perception of minimal movements thus attained, are astounding in the highest 
degree.”648 Hans was able to read extremely subtle changes in the movements of 
the person anticipating the right answer — even if that person was unaware of 
making any such movements — and stop tapping at the correct moment. 
Anticipating by a century the work of the artists discussed here, and 
several years after the investigation, Pfungst reflected, 
Our horses are, as a rule, sentenced to an especially dull mode of life. 
Chained in stalls (and usually dark stalls at that) during three-fourths of their lives, 
and more than any other domestic animal, enslaved for thousands of years by 
reins and whip, they have become estranged from their natural impulses, and 
owing to continued confinement they may perhaps have suffered even in their 
sensory life. A gregarious animal, yet kept constantly in isolation, intended by 
nature to range over vast areas, 
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Figure 21. Karl Krall. Schillings is presenting Clever Hans to the audience. 1904. 
yet confined to his narrow courtyard, and deprived of opportunity for 
sexual activity — he has been forced by a process of education to develop 
along lines quite opposite to his native characteristics. Nevertheless, I 
believe that it is very doubtful if it would have been possible by other 
methods, even, to call forth in the horse the ability to think. Presumably, 
however, it might be possible, under conditions and with methods of 
instruction more in accord with the life-needs of the horse, to awaken in a 
fuller measure those mental activities which would be called into play to 
meet those needs.649 
The attentiveness to the “life needs” of his horses is a hallmark of Bartabas’ 
approach. In another interview published in The Guardian in the same year, 
Bartabas states: “In my technique, I like the horse to be able to do the movement 
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in his way. It's a very subtle thing, to do with his energy." Listening to the animal 
is important because it develops empathy. He also takes time. "I work with a 
horse for six, maybe 10, years,” he explains, “And they are all different. I don't 
cast my work like you would a cast an actor in a film. I make my productions 
around what the horses can do. I let the horses inspire it." He emphasizes the 
particular contributions of specific animals. In the same interview, Bartabas 
reflects, “Horses don't live such a long time. And when they die, it's not only an 
emotional thing – it also means you lose years of work. Every horse is special; it 
can do things no other horse can. When he goes, you lose part of yourself. It's like 
losing an arm or leg. You can never have it back."650  
3. Dances of Im/possibility 
In an interview with David Williams, Bartabas describes his work as “a 
joint ‘becoming,’ a collaboration between two forms of intelligence”: “dances of 
the im/possibility of contact.” This is a kind of communication that may be 
displayed, but perhaps not shared by the audience. Williams notes, “even if the 
picture those performances offer is of the merging of two quite different 
intelligences, the rest of us watch such an encounter at a remove, with Bartabas as 
our surrogate. Such performance offers a pleasurably distanced fantasy of a cross-
species encounter, rather than the philosophical or psychically unsettling 
challenge of an actual encounter.” He goes on to say it is “an eroticized fantasy of 
touching the other;” “a fantasy of a magical human transcending the species 
barrier” and then wonders, “aren't animals once again simply ours to do with as 
we please?” Williams concludes “in the theatre of animals, the fantasy of animal 
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contact is usually just that-the fantasy of touching animals and being touched by 
them.”651 While the projection of human fantasies onto animals may be a 
consistent theme in all of the performances discussed in this chapter, it is 
interesting to notice the dramatic change in their content and tone. Contrasted 
with the nineteenth century performances of Mazeppa, with its thrill of the 
forbidden and sexually eroticized nature of the horse-human contact, the 
“eroticized fantasy of touching the other” here is a longing for connection and the 
recognition of a desire for that cross-species connection described by Diane 
Ackerman. 
In contrast to the views expressed above, many equine ethnologists think 
horses are much more in culture than in nature, or in other words that their natural 
environment is a cultural one. In a study on how horses see the world, and more 
specifically, if they see humans as “significant objects,” the researchers noted that 
“through domestication, the human environment now represents the ecological 
life conditions for this species . . . [therefore] domesticated horses allow 
researchers to evaluate animals’ perception of humans in ‘‘natural’’ 
interactions.”652 Domesticated horses and humans have the same habitat, not 
different ones, and furthermore, one is not more “natural” than the other. Also, as 
noted in the last chapter, domesticated animals, by definition, have been 
selectively bred by humans for their own purposes. For example, not only is the 
behavior of horses influenced by culture, but physiologically formed by it. This 
may change as humans become more skilled with genetic manipulation. Also 
there is increasing recognition that culture does have physiological effects on 
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humans. To sum it up, the nature/culture binary is increasingly blurred; even as 
the horse continues to signify a natural realm outside of culture, and humans are 
distinguished/ contaminated by their association with culture.  
4. A Ground Of Inequivalence 
In her essay, “Dancing Attention on a Ground of Inequivalence,” Nita 
Little describes her interactions with a horse named Kate during a workshop 
offered by Joanna Mendl Shaw, creator of the Equus Project. Little is interested in 
exploring the relationship between the territories of her own body and that of the 
horse’s. The relationship between these territories is defined by the attention each 
gives to the other’s responses in a form of dance called Contact Improvisation. 
Contact Improvisation has been described as a “framework for an improvised duet” 
and “a dance of investigation of weight, touch, and communication.”653  
The encounter between Little and Kate occurred in a ring formed by 
people holding a bungee cord. (My attention is drawn to how we name people and 
animals. Should I be referring to them as Nita and Kate? Little and the horse?) 
Little entered the ring at the point where the previous dancer had exited, behind 
and to one side of the horse. Because at this point Kate was standing with her 
body and her head lowered, Little interpreted the horse’s position and posture as 
one of disinterest —or at the least as disengaged — and mirrored this by putting 
the animal in her own visual periphery. “I know, as I enter the ring, that how I 
play the edge of this horse’s attention will set the stage for all that is to follow,” 
Little writes, “I want her attention to soften with relaxation when she meets me. I 
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want her to make the call for her boundaries to expand and to bring me into her 
foreground. I do not want to demand it of her . . . rather; I prefer to let her 
consider me.” Little describes this peripheral vision as “edge of attention,” as “a 
potent place,” which is spatial rather than linear or cognitive, and so it may be for 
humans. 
Because horses have monocular vision, they use their eyes in an 
asymmetrical way.654 They can see what is to one side or the other more clearly 
than objects that are directly in front of them. They also can see distant objects 
more easily than things that are close to them. This is why they will raise their 
heads to see things that are within four feet, but lower their heads, as Kate was 
doing to look at things that are further away.655 Since Little is behind and off to 
one side, and also not too close, she is actually in a position where Kate, whose 
lateral vision extends to 205 degrees, can easily see her. Little is very likely not at 
all in the periphery of Kate’s vision. Also when confronted with an unknown 
object, horses tend to examine it using one eye. 656 They do not turn their heads 
from side to side to get a better view, as those with frontal vision might be 
inclined to imagine they do. In contrast to Kate’s position, which allows her to get 
a good look at the dancer, Little has decreased her ability to see Kate. On a purely 
visual level, the two were having very different experiences.  
The shape of their bodies gives horses a horizontal orientation toward 
space, which in turn influences the movements they are included to make. Little is 
aware that they are herd animals and subject to attack by predators. Further, and 
although this idea has been disputed by some equine ethologists, Little accepts the 
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premise of the Parelli natural horsemanship system that horses can smell meat-
eaters and so consider meat-eating humans to be predators. Little believes Kate is 
predisposed to be suspicious of her and so wants to behave in ways that will 
reassure the animal. On the other hand, since she had been observing Kate’s 
reactions to other dancers and perceived that the horse was not engaging with 
them, Little wants to behave in ways that will arouse Kate’s interest.  
Little is bringing to this encounter a number of ideas, based on research 
and observations, about why Kate is behaving in a particular way, but at the same 
time is very attentive to what the horse is doing at each moment. Little is also 
focused on shifts in her own internal state which she believes will put her in the 
“front and center” of the horse’s awareness. When the horse begins to approach 
her, Little attributes this move to her own attentiveness. “By touching her with my 
spatial attention (not my eyes or my physical body),” Little explains, “I had 
brought her with me. The tiny drag that happens when surfaces adhere in touch 
was enough pull to engage her in motion, probably before she even knew she was 
moving. I had accomplished a level of tactility that preceded decisions with my 
spatial attention producing a surface with which she was enminded into action.”657  
Perhaps it was Little’s attention that drew the horse closer, perhaps not. As 
discussed above, horses are highly skilled at reading humans, including 
responding to subtle eye cues (possibly by detecting fine movement of the eyes) 
as well as overall body and head orientation. In experiments where horses are left 
to freely move about in a ring, eighty percent of the time they move toward the 
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person with the more attentive posture, such facing and looking at the horse if that 
person is not holding work gear such as a halter or a bridle. 658  
More recent studies of equine behavior confirm Uexküll’s theory (at least 
with respect to horses): organisms construct their own subjective world. For 
example, horses choose objects that are significant for them. Since animals 
regularly encounter other species, they can identify humans as significant and 
interact with them in ways that are meaningful for them, and clearly also 
meaningful for humans.659 Horses such as Kate, who had a history of positive 
experiences with humans, were also more likely to respond in an affirmative way 
to people they did not know, demonstrating an ability to generalize their 
experiences.660 In the study these horses would even approach people who had 
their backs to them or were not looking directly at them, as was the case with 
Little. The horses would walk in front of the people who were turned away and 
also use tactile gestures such as nudging.661 The communicative exchange here 
may have been more dialogic that Little imagines. Rather than “drawing” Kate to 
her, the horse may have decided to investigate this novel human more closely, 
based on a number of factors, including her own observations which indicated 
that Little was neither acting in a threatening way nor holding any work gear.  
Some of the questions Little raises are especially relevant to interspecies 
communication: “How do species make meaning together when [human] speech 
is not an option? When brains are different, when thoughts emerge through bodies 
that have such profound dissimilarities?” Since the horse is not a human dancer, 
Little observes, “there are not those agreements here between us and we cannot 
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have a conversation to establish the grounds for this process. To do this kind of 
dance, I have let the horse feel my attention while also letting her know that I feel 
hers.” Little describes this experience as occurring on a “ground of inequivalence.” 
She explains, “What I hold in mind with the striking of a bell is certainly different 
from what ‘comes’ to you [as a human]. Not only is the sound that reverberates 
through my bodily awareness moving me differently on a cellular level, but the 
synaptic engagement of areas of the brain are unique to me.”662  
Little strives to remain sensitive to this inequivalence, which is perhaps 
even more acute across species, as she tries to have an “an attentional 
conversation” with Kate. The dance is not about “what happened and when” but 
“who did what” in a shared space that was neither Little’s nor Kate’s. While it 
was certainly shared, ownership rights might tilt in Little’s favor, given that she 
freely entered the ring while Kate was placed and kept there by human handlers, 
but perhaps this is also part of the inequivalence. Little recognizes that horses, as 
domesticated animals, and particularly Kate, because of her experiences with 
other dancers and her attentive owner, lived “a life keyed toward people and their 
actions.” Next, as Little recalls,  
Kate put her muzzle in the palm of my hand! A simple moment, physical 
touch. It surprised me. And, although she could have been looking for a 
carrot, I think not. I knew what it was by the feel of her soft lips (my eyes 
remained reaching into the vertical). Behind her lips I could lightly feel 
the presence of firmer structures, teeth and bone were pressing into my 
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hand slightly, moving her felt sense into my body, not playing with its 
surface (emphasis provided). 
In this moment, as Kate is pressing her muzzle and nibbling into Little’s hand, 
there is a period of almost full-engaged mutuality. I say “almost” because Little is 
still looking away. She is not turning her visual attention to the physicality of their 
exchange, but holding onto the idea of being a conduit between the horizontality 
of the horse and the verticality of the human. Little continues,  
The choice in how I understood her action was critical and significant — 
a thing to bring thought to. All further meaning would flow from this 
moment. Her intelligence was literally there in the palm of my hand . . . 
mine to assign. This would happen through the way my return touch would 
name her. Who was she that she would put her muzzle in my hand? What 
is her purpose? I could understand and meet that purpose as open to 
possibility, the action of curiosity or I could reduce it to a relatively 
narrow range of wants and needs. The feeling of her soft lips touching the 
inside curvature of my palm, her breath upon it, and the way she held 
touch as she moved into it, the feeling of reach into my body told me she 
was entering me, speaking to me, engaged in knowing rather than finding 
(emphasis added).663  
Little’s perception that Kate is not looking for food while investigating Little’s 
hand has the support of other observers of equine behavior. The nibbling that 
Little describes so well is part of social interactions between horses, between 
horses and humans, and during a horse’s exploration of a “novel non fear-
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inducing object.”664 Nibbling has been defined by these researchers as an 
“exploratory/affiliative” behavior that is not associated with food. It also does not 
lead to biting or other aggressive behaviors.665 
In spite of the powerful experience of touching, several points of 
separation emerge. First, Little retains the power to “name” the experience. Also, 
while Kate is apparently fully absorbed in the moment, Little is also interpreting it. 
Little considers whether the experience is one in which the horse is “speaking” 
and “engaged in knowing” her or simply acting out of a “narrow range of wants 
and needs,” such as searching for something to eat. A third possibility, not 
mentioned here, is a combination of both — that Kate might be “engaged in 
knowing” even as she is satisfying her “wants and needs.” Finally, Little has 
entered the ring with a set of intentions that Kate does not share. One is to engage 
in Contact Improvisation and the other is to explore the concept of enmindedness. 
Enmindedness is an experience where mind and body are not separate but act as 
one.666 It truly is a moment of contact between beings living in the same space 
and, simultaneously, two different worlds. 
Kate appears to be experiencing the “enmindedness” that Little is 
exploring in this dance. Little seems to be flickering back and forth between 
enmindedness and a more abstract conceptual thinking. Little is both inside and 
outside of the moment, acutely aware of the embodied senses but also raising 
questions, and as she states earlier, maintaining a connection with the vertical. 
This might be understood as a kind of bilingualism in that Little is translating 
back and forth between a purely embodied language and an abstract language. 
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This bilingualism separates the human from fully participating in the horse’s 
experience. We might assume, but cannot know if Kate is fully immersed either, 
although it is probably safe to assume that she is having the same experiences as 
Little.  
While Kate is not participating in the internal dialogue that Little is 
experiencing, she is paying attention. This is yet another layer of communication. 
Little notes that this attention itself is “meaningful between us; actions fluidly 
enacted between physicality and attentionality.” For the horse to be part of a duet, 
and not simply a prop, Little writes, “she [Kate] needed to feel herself in the 
dance as it was made.” Therefore Little creates a space where Kate can 
concentrate on Little without being distracted by remaining still. Little observes 
that the action of concentration has “no words in language which adequately 
represent this sensory level of awareness.” Little believes that one can concentrate 
others, even if they do not wish to have this happen. It can be a form of 
unwelcome control or a gift. In this dance, Little understands herself as “being 
concentrated by Kate, and moving within the sphere of her ‘living attention’” 
Little goes on to say, “Although working with a horse is different, it is also not 
different in that my attention to the quality of the space of our mutual meeting 
was on some level a shared language. My participation in the making of the 
concentration, as well as in receiving it, was information that Kate could 
understand. It is a visceral level knowing.”  
What Little and Kate are doing is attentive and fully embodied listening. 
This isn’t to say that at times during this encounter their thoughts might wander. 
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For example, when Little is imagining that she is the vertical axis, which gives 
Kate access to the stars, yet her attention and her senses are at best divided. Little 
describes this as a shared “actuality of bodies” and a “shared but non-parallel 
meaning.” While it does seem as if the embodied experience is shared, 
particularly during those moments of nuzzling, and appears to be enjoyable and 
even meaningful to both of them, the experiences are parallel rather than shared. 
Little understands the exchange as a dance, while certainly Kate does not “think” 
about what is happening in this way. Both are primarily engaged with each other, 
however, rather than on presenting a performance to an audience.  
Little’s physical contact with Kate is based on awareness and 
intentionality in each moment. She compares what she is doing with the French 
ethnologist Jean-Claude Barrey’s concept of isopraxis, which describes how 
homologous muscles move at the same time in riders who are attuned to their 
horses.667 In the same way, Little believes that in her dance with Kate the 
influence of one upon the other is mutual, as was also the case with Bartabas’ 
experiences. However, the difference is that for Little’s performance, the 
communicative exchange has intrinsic value, while for Bartabas, successful 
communication results not only in a connection between horse and rider, but also 
is used as an instrumental tool for creating a compelling performance for 
audiences. 
5. Un/Stable Landscape 
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Choreographer Joanna Mendl Shaw directs the Equus Project. Her work 
includes large-scale site works for dancers and horses that are shown on stage and 
in rural and urban landscapes. At times she works collaboratively with equestrians 
in various locations. Mendl Shaw describes these dances as being created through 
“nonverbal conversations” between humans and horses. Often the interactions are 
separated by “interlude of unpressured time” when the human dancers are not 
asking for the horses’ attention. 668 As mentioned in the discussion of Nita Little’s 
experience with Kate, Mendl Shaw’s work is informed by the Parelli Natural 
Horsemanship (PNH) equine training system. PNH training is codified into seven 
exercises and takes into account the horse’s temperament (i.e., introverted, 
extroverted, etc.) which in this system is called horsenatalities.669 Many of Mendl 
Shaw’s works with horses occurs in round pens where the horses are free to move 
about without restraint, yet at the same time they can’t seek refuge in a corner 
where they might avoid contact with their human trainers if they wish to do so. 
In the following passage Mendl Shaw describes an experience that 
demonstrates the shift from making an animal perform to creating a space where 
the relational aspects between the horse and the human can be explored.  
I have had wonderful dances with her [Tory] in the past, moving with her 
in an open arena where she is free to canter away from me and then come 
back when she is ready. She likes moving big, striding alongside me. This 
round pen is fifty feet in diameter, made with six-foot panels of high metal 
fencing. As round pens go, it is very open and airy, but sometimes the 
round pen feels confining to Tory. Knowing that she is prone to 
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claustrophobia, I start with quiet, free-flowing movement, undemanding 
and somewhat contained in space. 
 I offer her my hand to sniff then stroke her, especially at her poll 
(behind the ears) and haunches. These are two of her favorite spots. Then I 
move to the opposite side of the round pen and focus on pulling some 
weeds that are growing up through the sandy footing. This activity takes 
my attention away from Tory and allows her an interlude of unpressured 
time—time when I am not waiting or asking for her attention. Even 
stroking is a form of asking for attention! Within a few seconds Tory 
comes to me, offering another itchy spot for rubbing. We repeat that 
sequence of events. The dance has already begun in this quiet sequence of 
stroking and scratching, leaving and returning. 
Moving to the next stage of requesting in our nonverbal 
conversation, I direct my attention to her neck, behind the ears. Without 
touching her, I add some rhythmic pulsing with my hands directed toward 
her neck. She yields, stepping left leg across right in a perfect equine 
pirouette. I change my focus to her haunches and repeat the rhythmic 
motion, pressing toward her hindquarters, again through gesture, which 
yields another pirouette, this time with the haunches moving. We rest. She 
licks and chews. (Licking and chewing is an equine behavior that 
communicates acknowledgment and a state of willingness to engage.) 
As is evident from this passage, the focus is on using the animal’s own 
inclinations and instincts even as the movements arising out of these encounters 
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are organized into sequences that will come together in a repeatable, 
choreographed performance.  
Like Bartabas, Mendl Shaw emphasizes a relational and embodied 
approach. Instead of discipline, the emphasis is on building a relationship based 
on mutual trust and respect for the animal. And, like Carlson, Mendl Shaw works 
within a binary that affirms the value of the “natural” over the “rational.” Mendl 
Shaw wants to “fram[e] equine behavior in ways that reveal its natural beauty 
rather than parroting rehearsed sequences.”670 While the emphasis is on 
apparently spontaneous movements, the human trainer/choreographer/performer 
is still framing and controlling the situation. The horses are typically in some kind 
of enclosure, often a round pen, and are “at liberty,” meaning that they are not 
being controlled by means of a harness or any kind of physical restraint.  
Both the training process and the performance present narratives about 
human-horse relationships, although what these mean for the horses involved 
obviously can only be imagined. The story of Hamlet suggests how different these 
perspectives can be. Once Hamlet learned a routine, he would skip to the end. 
Using a technique learned from circus trainers, Mendl Shaw began rehearsing 
“skill sets” out of order; the proper sequence was only done during an actual 
performance. So while Mendl Shaw was creating a representation of human-
animal relations which foregrounded the horse’s “natural” behavior, Hamlet 
apparently preferred to be done with the whole thing as soon as possible. 
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During periods when the Equus Project dancers weren’t actually working with 
the horses they experimented with these horsenatalies. Mendl Shaw describes this 
as steering “clear of imitating equine behavior but investigat[ing] states of being, 
out of which movement motifs would develop.” One dancer would establish a 
horsenatality and then the second dancer would create a movement dialogue. The 
second dancer was essentially responding as he or she would have if partnering 
with a horse. Mendl Shaw describes these exercises: 
[They were] defined by the fundamental curiosity of a moving body — its 
playfulness or fearfulness, its survival instincts, and its comfort levels. 
Though we started by rehearsing a way of being with a horse, what 
evolved was a distinctive way of dancing with another human. By 
exploring rules of engagement, the horses [including the imagined horses] 
were teaching us a lot about ourselves.671  
The close physical contact with the horses highlighted the ways in which states of 
mind such as playfulness or fear are embodied and also expressed by movement. 
Another outcome was that the human dancers became more attentive to not only 
their own bodies but also their partner’s. They were developing a physical or 
movement vocabulary. 
  This can be compared with Bakhtin’s insights on heteroglossia or the 
“social diversity of speech types” first presented in the introduction. 672 
Heteroglossia is both the effect of and the expression of particular contexts or 
environments. As such, the senses play an extremely important role in all forms of 
communication, including artistic expression, and for animals as well as for 
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humans. To repeat Bakhtin, “Each word [and I would add all other forms of 
expression] tastes of the context and contexts in which it has lived its socially 
charged life.”673 Although Bakhtin acknowledges the connections between 
language and the physical realm, and recognizes that “all utterances are heteroglot 
in that they are functions of a matrix of forces practically impossible to recoup,” 
he comes to the very edge of doing so (one might say within a whisker), he does 
specifically include animals in his discussion.  
 Bakhtin’s theory of language demonstrates how messy it can be. Every 
communicative act has a constellation of intended and perceived meanings, all in 
play with each other. Missed communications, miscommunications abound, even 
if the intention is to be perfectly clear. The methodical system such as that 
proposed by semiotics becomes a complex universe with countless possibilities. 
An utterance (a spoken word, statement, or vocal sound) is one of many links in 
innumerable chains of speech acts. Utterances are not simply generated by an 
individual, but are “responsive reactions to other utterances.”674 Each utterance 
has boundaries, responsivity or dialogicality; a point where the speaker has 
finished, and a generic form. The generic form depends on the sphere where the 
communication is occurring, and yet at the same time it is maintained by the 
speech genre. If the genre doesn’t match the sphere, the one communicating is 
seen as incompetent by others in that sphere. A sphere could be a professional, 
social, or familial environment, among others.675 As Mendel Shaw and her 
dancers were learning, competence in communicating might also occur in public 
spheres or social worlds that include other species. 
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Mendl Shaw’s studio-based work led to the development of intricate 
scores which, when brought back to the horses, was “humbling.”676 Mendl Shaw 
discovered that motions couldn’t simply be clever or graceful. If the dancers were 
to engage the horses, each gesture had to be clear. Her choreographic vocabulary 
was simplified as the dancers all learned how to “merge attending and intending.” 
Every gesture was an embodied utterance that was embedded and could only be 
understood in context. An utterance — a spoken word, statement, or vocal sound 
— is one of many links in innumerable chains of speech acts. Utterances are not 
simply generated by an individual, but are “responsive reactions to other 
utterances.”677 According to Bakhtin, each utterance has four traits: boundaries, 
responsivity or dialogicality; a ending (where the speaker has finished), and a 
generic form.  
The generic form depends on the sphere where the communication is 
occurring, and yet at the same time, as communications scholar John Shutter 
observes, “the sphere is created and maintained by its speech genre.”678 A sphere 
could be a professional, social, or familial environment, among others.679 As the 
Equus Project dancers tried to use the vocabulary they have developed in the 
studio with the horses, the horses essentially judged them as incompetent and so 
adjustments had to be made.  
The “utterances” developed and then refined by Mendl Shaw can be 
organized into six movements: 
• tracking and sponging (vs. imitation),  
• herding scores, 
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• shaping in space,  
• alpha negotiations,  
• logging material (doing and remembering), and 
• shaping the logged material into phrase material.  
The careful attending to the horses’ movements, and the animals’ responses to the 
dancers’ movements, expanded the troupe’s “kinetic dialogue.” Emotional 
behavior, whether on the part of the horses or the humans, was put aside. Rather 
than being confrontational, dancers explored “movement situations.” Mendl Shaw 
reflects that “The high-energy, aggressive-for-no-reason duets that are the 
mainstay of some dance repertory began to seem fairly simplistic compared to the 
jagged and complex, often quite raw, and nuanced Round Pen interactions” where 
the human performer focuses on reacting to the horse’s responses and 
movements.680 
One example of a site-specific work that uses this movement vocabulary is 
Un/Stable Landscape. The dance, which involved ten dancers and five horses, 
was performed in the paddocks and hillside pasture of a small farm in Pownal, 
Maine. Mendl Shaw and her colleague, Minneapolis dancer Carl Flink, wanted to 
create a dance that would “move people, create visual beauty, and honor the 
horses. Our goal was to entertain the spectators while taking the time to truly 
engage the horses.”681 The dance was a series of frames that Mendl Shaw hoped 
would present “equine behavior in ways that revealed its natural beauty rather 
than parroting rehearsed sequences.”682 The challenge was to create and rehearse 
the piece in ways which would continue to engage the horses and prevent them 
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from anticipating cues. At the conclusion, the dancers and horses were going to 
leave the paddock and run up the hillside together.  
To prevent the horses from bolting out of the open gate and up the hillside, the 
ending was only practiced once. Careful planning, combined with an awareness of 
equine behavior, led to the desired outcome. At the conclusion of each of the two 
performances, as Mendl Shaw recalls, “the horses waited patiently for the gate to 
be opened, then trotted alongside the dancers, moving in cadence with them, ears 
forward, relaxed, and happy to simply trot with their human herd up the hillside.” 
This sentence is quite rich in its complicated expression of the human artist/horse 
relationship. In this piece Mendl Shaw was able to realize her vision of 
successfully integrating human and horses in a movement situation. The horses 
did move alongside the dancers in ways that clearly were full of ease. The horses 
and humans are moving together in a hybrid herd. Yet at the same time, the 
attribution of what are perhaps human emotions to horses is irresistible. This is 
not to deny that animals have emotions. If the horses were waiting patiently, then 
they would need to anticipate what the next move was, the very situation that 
Mendl Shaw had painstakingly worked to prevent from happening. While the 
moment in the dance is one of seamlessly paired experiences of human dancers 
and horses, this description reveals the different “linguistic consciousnesses” of 
the two species. 
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Figure 22-24. Joanna Mendl Shaw, Un/stable Landscape (performance). 
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6. Unfinalizable Relationships 
In the works discussed above, narratives shift from an emphasis on human 
control or domination to one in which relationships characterized by respect and 
understanding are increasingly important. Rather than acts that depend upon 
either anthropomorphized behaviors or the ability of the trainer/rider to control 
the animal, the emphasis is on performances which highlight sensory and 
embodied forms of communication that appear equitable and “natural.”  
Nature, as embodied by the horses, is celebrated in these works. The 
artists and trainers often speak of this as preferable to a human culture. Rather 
than affirming the superiority of reason, progress, and culture, a vision of the 
natural world where humans can communicate with animals in ways that affirm 
each other’s natural and innate qualities is the goal. The binary division between 
culture and nature, reason and instinct, and mind and body, and human and animal 
are not challenged. Instead the performance seeks to bridge or transcend them. 
Therefore, although what is traditionally less valued has been elevated, the nature-
culture dichotomy are affirmed.  
In Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, Bakhtin uses the concept of 
polyphony, or many voices, to describe the ways in which the novel permits 
individual voices to each express their own view. These voices do not add up to 
one complete whole nor do they necessarily contradict each other. Instead, 
polyphony is related to the “unfinalizable self.” Bakhtin believed that people can 
always change, and also that someone can never be fully known. Expanding 
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Bakhtin’s communicative sphere beyond speech, to include other sensory forms 
of communication and other species increases the range, texture, and richness of 
this musically inspired concept, further extending the “multiplicity of social 
voices and a wide variety of their links and interrelationships” and also the 
various multilayered links between utterances and languages.683 Also, as is the 
case with humans, while one can establish relationships with animal others, they 
can also never be fully known. 
In all of the works discussed in this chapter, just as the heteroglossic novel 
is an artistic representation of language, not language itself, these performances 
are artistic representations of relationships between horses and humans. The 
difference is that while these are representations, the performers and trainers and 
the animals must develop relationships based on some kind of shared 
understanding of each other and some degree of trust and/or confidence in the 
predictability of their partner’s responses. The artwork comes together into what 
appears to be a cohesive whole, even though various humans and horses may be 
expressing an array of understandings and sensibilities. The later works of the 
Equus Project also seek to present two social languages — a hybridization — that 
brings together two “different linguistic consciousness[es].”684 Just as with the 
hybrid novel, a dance such as Un/stable Landscape is what Bakhtin has described 
as “an artistically organized system for bringing different languages into contact 
with one another, a system having as its goal the illumination of one language by 
means of another, the crying-out of a living image of another language.”685 
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 These works also employ what Bakhtin calls stylization, the “artistic 
image of another’s language.”  The artists (Bartabas, Mendl Shaw) are 
representing the horses in ways that seek to “mutually illuminate” each other – 
and also the many languages which lie between the poles of stylized language and 
parody.686 This stylization, according to Bakhtin, is the image of the language as 
imagined by the stylizer. Finally, while Bakhtin is referring to oral and written 
language, there is an almost palpable sense of an impulse to expand beyond this 
limitation: “The dialogic contrast of languages (but not of meanings within the 
limits of a single language) delineates the boundaries of languages, creates a 
feeling for these boundaries, compels one to sense physically the plastic forms of 
different languages.”687 Language is not only a “dialogue of social forces” but 
language itself is determined by these social forces. The recognition of who 
speaks and who does not changes. 
 As Bakhtin notes with respect to the novel, and as is exemplified in the 
works of the artists considered in this chapter,  
Dialogue is determined by the very socio-ideological evolution of 
languages and society. A dialogue of languages is a dialogue of social 
forces perceived not only in their static co-existence, but also as a dialogue 
of different times, epochs, and days, a dialogue that is forever dying, 
living, being born: co-existence and becoming are here fused into an 
indissoluble concrete unity that is contradictory, multi-speeched and 
heterogeneous . . . from this dialogue of languages, these images take their 
openendedness, their inability to say anything once and for all, or to think 
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anything through to its end, they take from it their lifelike concreteness, 
their ‘naturalistic quality’688 
Just as Mendl Shaw discovered during her troupe’s exploration of a movement 
vocabulary, “what is realized . . . is the process of coming to know one’s own 
language as it is perceived in someone else’s language, coming to know one’s 
own belief system in someone else’s system.”689  
 Performances such as those of the Equus Project, while still employing 
symbolic representations, recognize the particularity and preferences of the 
animals in them. The processes used to create the artwork are literal, in that they 
engage and build relationships between the human and animal performers in ways, 
which affirm the value of sensory and embodied communication. Scientific 
knowledge about the animals informs but is not a substitute for paying close 
attention and to recognize that horses not only respond but can also initiate or 
deny exchanges. 
 Language, if present at all in these performances, is one more possible 
means of expression. In contrast, the earlier performances such as those discussed 
in the circus acts, used bodies and senses to symbolically express what could be 
readily translated into a verbal narrative. An Un/stable Landscape does not only 
refer to a dance by the Equus Project, but also as Said suggests, fields of 
knowledge, arbitrarily defined and continually shifting, which define relationships. 
While the “mind-forg’d manacles—are all too easily made, applied, and guarded,” 
and the bonds we have constructed are not easily shed, art does have the capacity 
to open the paddock gate.690  
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 Performances such as those of the Equus Project, while still employing 
symbolic representations, recognize the particularity and preferences of the 
animals in them. There is a genuine attempt to engage in cross species 
communication. The processes use to create the artwork engage and build 
relationships between the human and animal performers in ways, which affirm 
various forms of sensory and embodied communication. In these dances 
Bakhtin’s concept of heteroglossia is expanded to include an embodied animal 
rhetoric that includes all the senses. Unlike the matrixed performances of the 
circus acts discussed earlier, where animal bodies and actions were translated into 
a human narrative, the works in this chapter are not necessarily untranslatable in a 
solely human language. Instead, they are a hybrid. The artists make an effort to 
understand the subaltern animal on his or her own terms, rather than expecting the 
animal to articulate something we can recognize within our own symbolic 
systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
Closing Reflections 
I designed this project with the aim of bringing together three important 
areas in my life: animals, the arts, and philosophy. I wanted this research to 
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address questions that have preoccupied me for a long time, some for as long as I 
can remember. The questions are both ongoing and foundational ones for the 
artists, ethics, and relationships between humans and so-called “animals:” 
• Is it ever really possible to think a new thing, or to think about things in a 
new way? 
• Can someone ever really understand what someone else (any animal, not 
just the human kind) is thinking and experiencing? 
• How does the way we make art and articulate influence how we think and 
how we understand each other? In particular, how can we become more 
sensitive to and use our senses to engage with others and the world around 
us? 
These are broad questions and it took some time to figure out how to create a 
research project that could contain them.  
After reading Derrida’s essay, “The Animal That therefore I Am,” I 
decided to focus my research on human and animal relations, using the 
perspectives afforded by continental philosophy, and deconstruction in particular. 
Deconstruction can work as a prism that reveals a spectrum of ideas and insights. 
In this practice what once seemed familiar can be understood as containing or 
pointing to the unknown, ignored, or overlooked. Because the arts uses many 
different forms of sensory media, considering the these works though the lenses 
offered by deconstruction provide pathways for, at best, increasing understanding 
between species and, at the minimum, making us more aware of the tenuous 
nature of our assumptions with regard to other species. As Morton as pointed out, 
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“Aesthetics . . . performs a crucial role, establishing ways of seeing and 
perceiving this place.”691 While Morton was writing about “nature” more 
generally, the same applies to “animals.” Art is a vital means for discerning what 
lies beyond those typical forms of human communication, the written and spoken 
word. I decided to explore artworks that included living animals, and more 
particularly, the relationships between contemporary artists and the animals. 
These relationships include both what occurs during the period when the artwork 
is being created — the artistic practices — and what is expressed as a result of 
those processes. All of this, along with the engagement of audiences, can be 
understood as part of the situated textualities described by Hunter. A matrix of 
practices, materials, beings, and contexts inform each other in every artwork 
consider here, and contribute to our understanding of human-animal relations. I 
have only picked up a few of these strands to examine in this project. 
Some of the artists I have written about challenge us to reconsider how we 
think about and treat animals. At other times, and sometimes unintentionally, they 
reiterate the status quo. The artworks discussed present perhaps an idiosyncratic 
history of U.S. and northern European relationships with animals over the past 
few centuries. Most of my attention is directed toward art created during the last 
fifty years. However each work considered occurs at a signature moment in 
human-animal relations. Most of the works were made by artists and institutions 
located in the United States or in Northern Europe, and so are influenced by those 
cultural heritages and societal conventions.  
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Learning more about the display of animals in the dioramas, zoos, and 
circuses over the past few hundred years provided helpful historical context. As 
one considers the history of our relations with animals in these institutional 
settings, the pattern of imposing upon them the preoccupations and desires of our 
own species becomes clear. Often, and sometimes almost literally, the animals are 
made to enact equivalents of human words and actions. Just as Spivak has noted 
in “Can the Subaltern Speak?” the use of animals in this way does not recognize 
that they have a language outside of the imposed human discursive practices. 
One common theme that emerges from my consideration of the natural 
history dioramas, the circus rings, and zoo cages, and even Beuys’ performance, 
is that all the works considered have the same perspective. In each a particular 
version of reality or truth, whether it be Akeley’s organicism or Beuys’ 
shamanism, is presented in a monologic manner. Also each frames the animal in 
ways that reveal more about humans than the animals. We look at the animals but 
do not interact with them. They are objects of admiration or curiosity. None are 
presented as particular individuals. All are symbolic — animals that have been 
transformed into disembodied anthropomorphized abstractions. The individual’s 
or the species’ particular needs and desires are overlooked.  
For example, it appears that Beuys was sincere in his efforts to expose 
ideological assumptions and undermine positivism through the use of artistic, 
antirational, and shamanistic methods. Ironically however his critique of and 
effort to heal the wounds of imperialism and genocide through a symbolic 
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performance blinded him to the ways in which he was re-enacting those very 
practices.  
Beuys did not have the perspective of the critiques offered by postcolonial 
or environmental theorists such as Morton, who calls for an ecology without 
relying on the cultural construction we call nature. Duprat and Chalmers are also 
engaged with challenging binaries such as art and nature, art and science, or 
human and animal, but use critiques directed to our senses rather than our intellect. 
This is not to say that their work does not demand an intellectual as well as a 
visceral response.  
In contrast Bartabas and Carlson in many ways reinforce long-standing 
binaries, just as Beuys did. They embrace idealistic representations of horses as 
romantic embodiments of nature and nobility. In particular Carlson, as well as 
Akeley and Beuys, use imaginary external reference points, which deflect them 
from responding to the living animal before them. They all looked elsewhere for 
what is essentially is an Eden-like ideal. All affirm an essentially romantic 
approach in which animals are the embodiment of nature while humans are 
contained, and sometimes even corrupted, by culture. The belief that nature is 
“natural” rather than a cultural construct is challenged by Morton. He observes, 
“the very word environmentalism is an example of wishful thinking” because 
there is no other “it” to take care of.692  Both nature and animal are not things that 
simply surround or differ from us. He hopes that we may “yet return to the idea of 
the “thing” to its older sense of meeting place,” in order to create ‘a society that 
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fully acknowledged . . . we were always already involved in our world.”693  The 
“thing” here is not an object or an other, but a shared circumstance.  
Morton’s work perhaps builds on the earlier thinking of Harding and 
Haraway, who have both observed that we are never on the “outside” looking in, 
but already and always implicated in the world offer grounding alternatives to this 
abstract and utopian stance. There is no place we can go to “get out of the way.” 
Maintaining an active awareness of this insight can help artists — and the rest of 
us — to be more self-reflexive as we remember to ask, “What kind of relationship 
do we have?” and “How is this relationship expressed both materially and in 
practice in the artworks we are implicated in, in one way or another?” Bartabas’ 
relationship with animals still contains idealizing tendencies but he also seems to 
be aware of the highly situated context of his relations with the horses, both as a 
species and as individuals, with the performing arts environment. Although he 
acknowledges the animal’s intrinsic value, he uses his knowledge instrumentally 
to train the animals with the aim of creating what Peterson describes as matrixed 
performances. 
Derrida’s warning about the violence of concepts also comes to mind as I 
consider the work of some of these artists. He calls for a language that will curtail 
the violence incurred by the human-animal binary, which denies the tremendous 
diversity of life. Both art and philosophy depend on languages for communication 
and articulation. The language of philosophy is abstract, while the language of art 
also includes the senses. To challenge this binary, he examines the ways in which 
the words we use have the power to erase our awareness of the diversity and value 
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of singular living beings. He discards “animal” for the less constricted l’animot, to 
emphasize the particular animal, an animal who is irreplaceable. Chalmers, with 
the same aim in mind, challenges the binary by creating visual situations in her 
photographs and videos in which humans cannot easily dismiss the animal other.  
What is common in the work of Duprat, Chalmers, Little, and Mendl 
Shaw is the commitment to understand and respond to the needs of the animal 
other. This attending to the other is a form of discourse, and developing a deep 
understanding of the animals, at the least on a physiological level, is crucial to 
their work. These discourses differ in that Duprat and Chalmers rely on the 
natural sciences while Little and Mendl Shaw use dialogical practices. Chalmers 
and Duprat carefully provide for the needs of their animals and are committed to 
creating optimum living conditions for them. Both artists also describe their 
struggle with defining these relationships with the “other.” Duprat searches for the 
right ways of describing just what kind of relationship he has with caddis fly 
larvae, while Chalmers questions her right to determine which particular animal 
lives and which one dies. Each life is unique; each one matters. Chalmers 
positions the animals in ways that demand our response; her work is a 
manifestation of the face-to-face encounter described by Lévinas. 
In their embodied dialogues with horses Little and Mendl Shaw are trying 
hard not to put “words” in the mouths of these animals. For both artists, the 
differences in the ways horses and humans literally see the world demonstrate 
some of the challenges in cross species communication. Inevitably there are 
missed signals, misinterpretations, and impositions of meaning on the part of the 
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humans, and perhaps also on the part of the horses. It is very difficult — perhaps 
it is impossible — to hear not what you are listening for, but instead to receive 
what another being, another species, is expressing.  
Both Chalmers and Duprat produce physical objects that are intended for 
others to view and react to. In contrast, the dances of Little and Mendl Shaw are 
more involved with process rather than product. In some sense, an audience is not 
even necessary. Instead the embodied connection of dancer and horse is the 
artistic expression. It suggests a participatory art with no onlookers and is instead 
private dialogue between participating beings. Letting go of the artistic “product” 
may be one way of truly engaging with the horses, who also do not have the 
creation of a product in mind, but are living in the present moment, or at least that 
is how it seems. In their efforts to dance with horses, both Little and Mendl Shaw 
seek to embody various kinds of assemblages and becomings such as those 
described by Deleuze and Guattari. The choreography of their dances is informed 
by imagined continuities, a kind of artistic process which is quite different from 
the production created Bartabas and Carlson, who very much have the specular 
view in mind in spite of its traditions of distancing.   
These reflections are not a summing up but a survey of the field, with 
some potential pitfalls flagged to avoid tripping in the same spots again. Art and 
philosophy can be understood as holistic practices, rather than as two different 
ways of engaging with life. If art were understood as a situated textuality, as a 
practice for working out the problem of silence, the “impossible to represent” then 
it is also an embodied philosophical inquiry into our relationships with other 
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living beings.694 It can provide a means of engaging with animals in ways that 
accept the inadequacy of human languages and resist what Hunter calls a 
“coercive obscuring of grounds”.695 After all, those grounds are obscure enough, 
in spite of our best intentions. As Derrida points out, we do not or cannot ever 
truly understand what is on the minds of animals. Even so, can our understanding 
of heteroglossia be expanded to include an animal rhetoric? How can the ethics of 
Lévinas be enlarged to include the face-to-face encounter with the animal? 
While none of the questions identified above have definitive answers, this 
area of inquiry remains as interesting as ever for me, as one strand of thought or 
experience continually opens up additional and intriguing possibilities. Engaging 
the senses, recognizing the material conditions, and being in dialogue with other 
beings can be a continuous and life sustaining practice, rather than a process 
marked by endpoints or products. While there is no definitive answer to these 
questions, Derrida’s definition of textuality comes to mind: it is a sowing that 
does not produce plants but is still infinitely repeated.696 And yet each season 
brings its differences. Repetition is infinitely variable. 
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